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Preface
The initiative to write this book came originally from the Cinefogo 
Network of Excellence, and especially its Finnish representative, Pro-
fessor Emeritus Raimo Blom from University of Tampere. The aim of 
Cinefogo, The Network on Civil Society and New Forms of Governance in 
Europe – the Making of European Citizenship, is to coordinate research 
on European citizenship, especially concerning civic participation, 
governance, and social protection, and also to initiate and facilitate 
debates among scholars, politicians, and general public.
The authors of the chapters of this book all have different rela-
tionships with the Cinefogo network. Some, like Blom himself and 
Harri Melin of University of Tampere, as well as Martti Siisäinen from 
University of Jyväskylä, are regular participants of and contributors to 
Cinefogo workshops on a wide range of topics. Annamari Konttinen 
from University of Turku is more focused on East Asian civil societies 
in her research but was involved in one Cinefogo-funded research 
project. Antti Kouvo from University of Turku and Mikko Lagerspetz 
from Åbo Akademi were invited to join the book project because of 
their sustained contributions in the fi eld of citizenship studies.
All authors, however, equally share the most important goals 
of Cinefogo and wish to promote ever greater degrees of interaction 
between different fi elds of scholarly research, and between academia, 
decision-making elites, and citizens. We thank Tampere University Press 
for giving us the venue, and especially Head of Publication Centre Outi 
Sisättö and Graphic Designer Maaret Kihlakaski for smooth collabora-
tion as well as an anonymous reviewer for enlightened observations.
The compilation of this book has been made fi nancially possible by 
Cinefogo network of excellence. We wish to thank especially coordinator 
Thomas Bøje for his encouragement and support. The Department of 
Sociology and Social Psychology of University of Tampere has hosted 
the administration of the Finnish Cinefogo sub-project, and together 
with the Finnish Social Science Data Archive facilitated the smooth 
progress of our work.
In Turku in April 2009
Annamari Konttinen
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The Idea of Citizenship in a Globalized World
Annamari Konttinen
Active Citizenship and Democracy
Concern over the decline of citizens’ social and political participation 
frequently arises in public discussion. The trend manifests itself in 
many forms, from the dissolution of community ties to decreasing 
voting turnout. Social scientists have studied these phenomena for a 
long period of time, and aspired to distinguish reasons behind them. 
The varied nature of different forms of participation, and the different 
conceptual and empirical tools pertinent for the study of them have 
produced many lines of study related to the subject, and perspectives 
applied range from study of civic skills and individual resources of citi-
zens to socially valued civic virtues such as tolerance, interest in politics 
or concern for the underprivileged in society. Concepts employed by 
these studies, such as civic competence, civic culture (Almond and 
Verba 1963), civic experience (Schudson 2006) and civic participation 
(Putnam 2000) are also closely related. Notably, research on political 
alienation has for long surveyed citizens’ sense of belonging and their 
notions on their ability to make themselves heard in the society, a no-
tion in this tradition called sense of political effi cacy.
Also trust that citizens feel towards social institutions has been 
central in the study of citizenship and political participation. It is, 
in particular, the combination of political effi cacy and trust that has 
traditionally been assumed to explain and shape citizens’ political par-
ticipation. (Reef & Knoke 1999; Citrin & Muste 1999; Gabriel 1995, 
10
357-61; Nousiainen 1998, 323-25.) For example, low institutional 
trust combined with high political effi cacy is typical for the ‘dissident’ 
citizen, whereas the combination of low sense of political effi cacy and 
high trust combine to form the foundation to political subordination 
(Paige 1971, 810-813; cf. Finifter 1970).
Lately, the concept of trust has become especially topical due to the 
lively debate concerning social capital. In this debate, the importance of 
trust has been emphasized as a force sustaining the society and generat-
ing cohesion. Observations concerning the “crisis of trust” have thus 
understandably been important for spurring this debate. For example, 
Putnam (2000) discusses the corrosion of trust and its consequences 
to the society, such as decreased communication between people and 
the subsequent weakening of the nations’ social performance.
Interest in phenomena such as trust, civic competence and political 
effi cacy is highly understandable for the functionality of the democratic 
system alone. The issues are always topical, even if they occur in dif-
ferent contexts in different times. Different types of trust, the trust 
between people and the trust in the political system of the society are 
related to citizens’ sense of their political power, their political effi cacy. 
In addition, citizens’ own ideas of the nature of good citizenship guide 
their choices. Thus, the emergence of active political participation is a 
fundamentally multi-dimensional phenomenon.
Even if trust, as such, is a term with positive connotations, it should 
be asked, whether the citizens’ trust in political institutions is always 
an entirely positive phenomenon. For the functionality of democracy 
it is desirable that citizens are free also to express healthy distrust 
towards political actors and institutions (cf. Nousiainen 1998, 324). 
According to some theories, increase of the level of democracy in fact 
increases the lack of interest and distrust towards political authorities, 
while the main focus of attention shifts to other social relationships. 
(Warren 1999, 1.)
The study of political alienation, or lack of sense of political effi cacy 
in general, has relatively long traditions and established measures, and 
the phenomenon is thematically relevant for the assumed interactional 
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relationships within elements of social capital. Despite overlapping 
measures, the research tradition is not particularly visible in the wide 
variety of studies on social capital, even though several studies touch 
on the relationship between social capital and political power. (E.g. 
Svallfors 1999; Joslyn & Cigler 2001; Pattie et al. 2003; de Hart & 
Dekker 2003; Dekker 2003.)
Active citizenship is often considered a desired consequence of the 
accumulation of social capital. For theories concerning the mechanisms 
of social capital, an interesting observation concerns the relationship 
between generalized and institutionalized trust, when it is used to ex-
plain the variation in political effi cacy. In addition to horizontal trust 
generalized in the entire society, institutions appear to have a focal role 
in supporting active citizenship, as well. On the basis of the analyses, it 
can be said that people experience themselves as having strong politi-
cal power when they feel that the political, legislative and controlling 
institutions are able to create an environment in which social activity 
is rewarding. Thus, the vertical dimensions of trust also appear to have 
an important role in generating attitudes that promote participation 
and experiences such as political effi cacy.
Measuring trust has often been confi ned within the boundaries of 
each nation state included in the study, and comparisons are conducted 
between states as units of analysis. Multinational actors have rarely been 
studied, and in the ever globalizing world, we are facing new challenges 
regarding conceptually capturing and measuring people’s emerging 
ideas of multi-level belongings, loyalties and associating. 
This book reports some core results relevant to the foundation 
of politically active citizenship by using the Finnish ISSP 2004 survey 
(sample size 2500, response rate 54,4) in its Nordic, EU and interna-
tional contexts. The full ISSP 2004 data set1 is used for international 
comparisons of citizenship beliefs. Our second focus is in the differences 
between the EU countries. The outer reference group consists either 
of some non-EU countries (the United States, Russia and Japan) or of 
all ISSP countries. Differences in citizenship beliefs and action in the 
different capitalism and welfare state regimes presented in the literature 
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are given special attention. Based on this analysis, tentative “citizenship 
regimes” are proposed and the unity of European conceptualization of 
citizenship is discussed. 
We study different aspects of citizenship simultaneously from the 
perspective of the EU and its assumed unifi ed foundations in terms 
of citizenship ideals, and Finland as a special, partly anomalous case 
within the EU framework and even more so within the framework 
of Nordic welfare regime: Finland seems different from its neighbors 
and, indeed, from any other country in our analysis. E.g. Finns put 
far less emphasis on the political citizenship in their conceptions of 
“the good citizen”. The importance of political citizenship is lower in 
Finland than in other countries (see Blom in this volume). Also, Finnish 
citizen participation is very state-centered even if it is quite lively (see 
Siisiäinen in this volume).
For all these reasons, we will now spend a few moments studying 
the unique characteristics of Finnish Democracy.
Why Finland? The Special Character of Finnish Democracy
The roots of Finnish formal representative democracy on the national 
level go beyond her gaining of independence in 1917. General suffrage 
for men and women over the age of 24 was established already in 19062, 
and the unicameral Diet was founded the same year. Its predecessors, 
estate-based legislative bodies, had functioned throughout the 19th 
century during the semi-independent era of Finnish autonomy as a 
Grand Duchy under Russian rule. Despite this institutional stability, 
however, the history of 20th century Finland is marked by several dra-
matic social and political crises and transformations.
Finland declared herself independent from Russia in December 
1917, only to enter a severe period of Civil War between the working 
class “reds” and the middle class/land owner “whites”. The national 
trauma of the war gave way to political consensus only two decades 
later, when the country united in defense against attacks by the Soviet 
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Union, leading to two wars in 1939-40 and 1941-44. The economic 
depression of the inter-war period (the 1920s and ‘30s) and the hard-
ships of the war time contrasted with the after-war reconstruction 
period, an era of optimism and rapid socio-political reformations.
The structural changes in Finnish society after the Second World 
War have been more profound and occurred within a shorter period 
of time than in most if not all highly developed industrial countries. 
Finland’s predominantly agrarian society transformed into an industrial 
and service economy during a period called the “Great Migration” in 
the 1960s and ‘70s, characterized by depopulation of the countryside 
and growth of suburban residential areas. Throughout the political 
turbulence and great changes in life style in recent decades, the early and 
continual development of democratic institutions and the welfare state 
have nevertheless provided relative stability for the Finnish society. 
The erosion of rural communities and traditional social ties has 
in most industrialized countries challenged the earlier foundations for 
feelings of solidarity and belongingness in society. In recent social sci-
ence literature these changes have been addressed, among others, by the 
increasing body of literature focusing on the rediscovered concept of 
trust in society (e.g. Misztal 1996; Sztompka 1999) and that of social 
capital (e.g. Putnam 2000). These notions form the conceptual back-
ground to the treatise of Finnish citizenship and political participation 
in the following chapters.
The Social Faultlines of Finnish Citizenship Generation
The political generations discernible in the Finnish population refl ect 
the contours of Finnish political, economic and social history briefl y 
described above. In fact, it is possible to treat all political crises as demar-
cation lines between political generations: common experiences create 
common cultural and mental patterns (Sztompka 1999, 152). The 
generation effect is produced “when a particular age cohort responds 
to a set of stimuli (…) and then carries the impact of that response 
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through the life cycle” (Almond and Verba 1989, 400). Belonging in 
a political generation shapes the process of political socialization, the 
resulting values and a common generational habitus – the dispositions 
and classifi cation systems for a way of life (Bourdieu 1984). Differ-
ent generations have also experienced remarkably different levels and 
structures of opportunities for political participation in Finnish society 
(Berndtson 1992, 106-115). 
Central experiences for the War Generation3 born between 1900 
and 1919 have been the Civil War, the Depression years, and the 
Second World War. Overcoming economic hardship in the context of 
an inadequate social security system dominated the experiences of the 
formative years – in the best case. Many members of this generation 
ended up wasting their youth – or losing their lives – in wars. Limited 
possibilities for schooling for a large proportion of the population re-
sulted in meager prospects for upward mobility. For many, the after-war 
reconstruction period meant building new homes and raising families, 
and a new sense of optimism stemming from after-war social reforms, 
improved welfare, and expectations of better prospects for the next 
generation set in (Jääsaari 1986).  
Typical for the After-war Generation, the generation of “recon-
struction and growth” (Roos 1987) born in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
has been “life split in two”. The members of this generation have ex-
perienced the hardships of wartime as children or young people, but 
have also been able to fully contribute to and benefi t from the after-
war economic boom, reconstruction and modernization beginning in 
their early adulthood. While the earlier stages of industrialization had 
already provided opportunity for organizing for workers and relatively 
progressive labor legislation for the earlier generations by the end of 
the 19th century, the postwar generations have been able to enjoy full 
social security – sickness pay, child benefi ts, schools, unemployment 
benefi ts, pensions – for most of their lives. 
The Generation of the Great Transformation was mainly born 
during or soon after the war. The formative years of this generation 
were spent during the 1960s and 1970s, characterized by migration 
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from rural to urban areas, a swing in the political climate away from the 
conservatism, nationalism and conformity of the post-war period. This 
generation – the “baby boomers” – also consists of the largest cohorts 
in Finnish history, and it remains a powerful force in Finnish political 
life (Alasuutari 1996; Berglund 1990; Jääsaari & Martikainen 1991; 
Nousiainen 1971). It has also been called the generation of cultural shift 
or the “radical generation” due to the social movements and cultural 
transformations in the late 1960s. Eyerman & Turner (1998) describe 
the “1945 generation” as the Lucky Generation in most Western coun-
tries, having enjoyed peace and very high levels of employment backed 
up by economic growth and material affl uence.
For the next two political generations, growing welfare, modern 
western lifestyle and consumption patterns as well as signifi cant degrees 
of freedom regarding choice of career and way of life in general have 
been typical. These developments were, however, severely disrupted for 
those entering the labor market during the economic depression in the 
early 1990s, characterized by a sudden fall of the GNP and a histori-
cally unique fall in employment. The labor market became diffi cult to 
enter and job choices suddenly became extremely limited regardless of 
individual merit or effort. The whole decade of 1990 can be described 
as a crisis for employment (Kautto 2001, 17-20).
The suburban generation, or “rock generation”, born in the 1950s 
and ‘60s is the fi rst one with the experience of being born into a full-
fl edged welfare state. It has, however, also been the fi rst generation 
having to question the foundation and consequences of continuous 
economic development due to environmental problems and new kinds 
of global concerns. The air of constant growth and progress has been 
replaced by feelings of insecurity, later materialized in recession, un-
employment and growing income differences (Jääsaari & Martikainen 
1991, 21). This generation, in response to the new challenges, also 
produced the new — in their beginning non-governmental — political 
and cultural forces such as the green movement.
The concept of “Generation X”, referring to cynical, frustrated 
and unmotivated youth more oriented towards consumption, mass 
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entertainment and video games than social or political activities, has 
become a popular and stereotypical image in recent discussions about 
the changes in political participation among contemporary youth (see 
e.g. Coupland 1998). There seems to be more to the generation born 
in the 1970s and ‘80s, however: the emergence of a plethora of new 
kinds of social movements in the 1990s mobilizing mostly young people 
suggests a metamorphosis of interest in social and political issues, not 
a decline or disappearance of such interest among the young. 
One distinct characteristic of the two youngest generations seems to 
be, however, the lack of shared experiences comparable to the magnitude 
of wars. The result seems to be that political orientations, and non-
orientations, are much more individualized among these generations 
than among earlier generations. Earlier empirical research (Jääsaari & 
Martikainen 1991) suggests, however, that the political views of young 
people (in their study predominantly representatives of the “suburban 
generation”) are not signifi cantly different from those of the general 
population on average, even though their political interest is low, and 
they view the sphere of politics as contaminated with old-fashioned 
authoritarianism and pretension and thus distasteful. 
In sum, the political generations in Finland can be presented as 
a set of fi ve relatively distinct cohorts. These are listed in Figure 1, 
together with their approximate years of birth:
FIGURE 1. The political generations in Finland4.
Generation Year of Birth
The War Generation 1900–1919
The Generation of After-War Reconstruction and growth 1920–1934
The Generation of Great Transformation 1935–1951
The Suburban Generation 1952–1970
“the X-generation” 1971–
A genuinely intergenerational perspective is diffi cult to employ in 
social science research (Roos 1987, 153), as the effect of age and stage 
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of life are often indistinguishable from intergenerational differences. 
Furthermore, without panel data it is impossible to analyze changes in 
political orientations over time. Most recent empirical studies (Wass 
2008) have, however, addressed this question with appropriate data 
and suggest that there are clear generational differences in voting activ-
ity. The general decline in voting turnout is partly – but not entirely 
– explained by generational replacement. Also life-cycle effects can 
be detected: the young assume more citizen responsibility alongside 
with other grown-up roles. Some of the following chapters concerning 
Finland in this book (Kouvo; Konttinen & Kouvo) will investigate 
the effects of membership in age groups coded to correspond to the 
above-noted generations on political orientation. 
Class 
For earlier generations, social class was a determining force in their 
lives. With the advent of the modern welfare state, and especially the 
increased educational opportunities in the post-war era, the life styles 
and ranges of choice earlier enjoyed exclusively by the upper classes have 
become attainable by the majority of members of Finnish society. 
The income distribution of present-day Finland is remarkably 
equal by international comparison,5 and the individual capital created 
by education and access to information is high. A strongly unequalizing 
factor, the cleavage between the employed and the unemployed, remains, 
however, a gloomy legacy of the economic recession of the 1990s.
The Finnish political system was for a long time based on a 
relatively stable stratifi cation of society, including vertical as well as 
horizontal stratifi cation. Typical, though by no means exceptional, 
for Finns has been that party support has been closely related to social 
class, professional status or the rural-urban divide. The other side of 
the coin is that parties have traditionally represented class interests, 
though these interests have become less clear-cut with the emergence 
and later dominance of the new middle class in society (Pesonen & 
Riihinen 2002).  
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The Centre Party has always relied on strong agrarian support, 
whereas the Social Democratic Party has traditionally derived most of 
its support from the working class. These two, traditionally based on 
mass membership, are losing their mass base as the new generation 
of citizens fi nd the idea of “belonging” to a party alien. The National 
Coalition is the oldest and largest conservative middle-class party. His-
torically, the Centre Party and the Social Democrats have formed the 
core of most national coalition governments, but recently a “bourgeois” 
Centre Party – National Coalition combination and a wide-spectrum 
“rainbow” coalition government built around the Social Democratic 
Party – National Coalition axis, but excluding the Centre Party, have 
had considerable life spans, too.
On the municipal level, the collaboration between the Social 
Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party has historical roots. 
After the Second World War (1939-45) emphasis was put on maintain-
ing political balance between the working class and conservatives in 
local politics. This was motivated and facilitated by the fact that these 
groups – earlier antagonistic due to the legacy of the bitter Civil War of 
1918 – had joined forces to fi ght the Soviet Union in the Second World 
War. Especially in Finnish cities, where support for rural based Centre 
Party has been weaker than in the countryside, the union between 
the Social Democratic party and the National Coalition Party has a 
specifi c and commonly used name: “Brothers in Arms Axis” (Laine & 
Peltonen 2000). The “Brothers in Arms” coalition is one example of 
how generation structures political experience and political orientation, 
sometimes strongly enough to override class interests. 
Gender 
In most societies, the public and the political have traditionally been 
defi ned as “male” spheres of society, whereas the private and especially 
the home have been perceived as the appropriate domains for women. 
With the advance of gender equality, opportunities for both genders 
to realize themselves in all spheres of life have increased considerably, 
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but women still tend to be underrepresented in political life and in 
positions of power.
In Finland, the traditional gender segregation of society never 
became extreme: the harsh realities of agrarian subsistence made it es-
sential that men and women worked side by side, and the division of 
labor remained relatively fl exible. This innate relative gender equality 
was both illustrated and reinforced by the fact that general suffrage 
was granted in 1906, making Finland one of the fi rst countries in the 
world to do so. At that time most of the male population also became 
eligible to vote for the fi rst time as well, so the majority of the popula-
tion – male and female – began a new era of political citizenship on 
an equal footing. 
The next breakthroughs for Finnish women in the political arena 
were – ironically – the Second World War and the improvements in 
welfare of the late 1960s and early ‘70s. During the war, women of 
the home front bore the main responsibility for many “male” duties, 
and old gender boundaries were questioned. Political parties turned to 
women, many of whom had remained politically uncommitted even 
after gaining suffrage, for additional support. Women became more 
active voters, though they held only 12% of the seats in Parliament 
immediately after the war (Kuusipalo 1989). The Great Transforma-
tion of the 1960s and ‘70s brought more opportunities for education, 
employment and child care to women as well as new advances in 
consciously feminist thinking as well as a signifi cant liberal shift in 
attitudes related to women’s role in society.
Although women have since the mid-1980s voted more frequently 
than men in both local and national elections, Finnish political repre-
sentatives are still predominantly men. Currently, 42% of the Members 
of Parliament are women, the fi gure being the all-time high, and in 
the Municipal Council elections of 2008 40% of the candidates and 
41% of the elected Council members were women6.
In terms of individual resources relevant for political participation, 
the picture is fragmented: in older generations, men tend to be bet-
ter educated than women, but the differences are disappearing, since 
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among the youngest generations women are slightly better educated 
than men. As of 2007, the proportion of women of the After-war and 
Great Transformation Generations participating in the work force 
was equal to that of men, approximately 80%, and for the younger 
generations the lower employment levels for women are partly due to 
women being more likely to take parental leaves, but also increasingly 
to the longer time women spend on education. Despite trends toward 
equality in the workplace, the average income of women remains 15-20 
% smaller than that of men.
Civic Mind and Good Citizens -- Perspectives
In this volume, Annamari Konttinen and Antti Kouvo examine the 
political orientations of Finns. Finnish citizens’ political orientations 
are in this study viewed in the context of political culture, “an entity 
of knowledge, beliefs and assessments inherited from generation to 
generation”. The fi ndings are placed in comparative context by analyz-
ing the relevant portions of the entire ISSP 2004 data.
An important fi nding is that even when several possible deter-
minants were taken into account, the sense of political alienation 
is strongest among those who have least both fi nancial and human 
capital. Simultaneously, the better resourced citizens are much more 
likely to be allegiant citizens with high levels of political trust and 
effi cacy. These results suggest that those who lack both fi nancial and 
educational resources do not expect much of either political system or 
themselves as political citizens. 
In his chapter, Harri Melin examines the civic mind and the nature 
of Finnish democracy from the perspective of legitimacy. The results, 
quite intuitively, indicate that when government authorities treat eve-
rybody equally, and when politicians take into account the views of 
citizens, and when citizens have fair opportunities to participate, the 
legitimacy increases.
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In the ISSP survey, dimensions of civic mind were measured by 
several items. First, how the respondents saw the importance of people’s 
rights in a democracy. The second set of questions dealt with the role 
of political parties and referendums. Thirdly, the respondents were 
asked to evaluate how well the democracy works in their country today, 
ten years ago and ten years from now. The last item dealt with views 
regarding the political system of the respondents’ country.
In international comparisons, Finland belongs to highly functional 
parliamentary democracies, the Nordic welfare state model, social 
corporatist countries and the least corrupt countries in the world. 
The image that the respondents have of their country in the Finnish 
ISSP survey on citizenship is, however, more critical. The respondents 
believe that the Finnish political system does not encourage people to 
take initiative in political matters, that too many politicians act only 
in order to gain personal benefi t, and that there are no real choices 
between the political parties.
Martti Siisiäinen’s chapter Differentia Specifi ca of Voluntary Or-
ganizing in Finland conducts a general analysis of voluntary organizing 
in Finland in a comparative perspective. Registered voluntary associa-
tions have played an exceptionally important role in Finnish society, 
for historical and social reasons. Indeed, there still are exceptionally 
many associations in Finland relative to the size of population; Finns 
have many association memberships, and collective action is, probably 
in a unique way, channelled into voluntary associations and because 
there are less real alternatives to associations.
Associations should be studied in their social and historical en-
vironment and as parts of the totality of political system and culture. 
Associations and networks should also be weighted relative to other 
fi elds in actors’ lives. 
Antti Kouvo notes in his chapter Missing Link between Trust and 
Participation? A Country Comparison that possible benefi ts of associa-
tions have puzzled scholars of the sources and mechanisms of social 
capital. The reciprocal relationship between trust and civic engagement, 
the so-called Tocquevillean model has been an often-presented supposi-
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tion in the social capital literature. Besides indicating the vitality of civil 
society in general, associations are believed to bring about a multitude 
of possible benefi cial outcomes such as bringing together people from 
different backgrounds, enhancing trust in others and in public institu-
tions and thus supporting political involvement and awareness. 
The analyses show that the relationship between association mem-
bership and generalized trust varies to a great degree between different 
countries. Results also confi rm the previously known fact that at the 
individual level this relationship may be relatively weak. However, in-
stitutional confi dence seems to predict generalized trust well in almost 
all countries in the sample. The mechanism through which associations 
promote generalized trust in society is situated between macro and 
micro levels of society. Even when controlling for institutional trust, 
living in a nation with dense associational network seems to increase 
the likeliness of trust for fellow citizens.
In his chapter, Raimo Blom studies Divergent Citizenship by 
investigating different conceptions of citizenship. The ISSP survey 
included a set of questions concerning the respondents’ perceptions 
of good citizenship.
The main result is that there is a relatively clear cluster of Nordic 
countries that share perceptions of good citizenship. The analysis of 
political citizenship, which is also the most important dimension of 
the ‘good citizen’, results in a tight group of Nordic countries in con-
nection with Social citizenship. The other two analyses that combine 
the study of Political citizenship with that of Law-abiding citizenship, 
and Political citizenship with Participation, result in an even larger 
gathering of countries around the Nordic focus. 
All in all, the results reveal many differences between countries 
with different welfare regimes. However, much depends on the criteria 
of citizenship. From the European point of view, and especially in the 
Nordic countries, a critical question is the low perceived importance of 
Social citizenship and helping people worse off. The EU countries are 
weaker in Social citizenship that the non-EU countries, and in the Nor-
dic countries, the situation is worse than in the other EU countries.
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Mikko Lagerspetz investigates some of the ways in which spe-
cifi cities of Post-Communism can be thought of being revealed by 
an international comparison of the ISSP 2004 survey results, and 
also presents some interesting paradoxes. Despite democratisation, 
citizens of post-communist countries continue to distrust their state 
and the new democratic institutions. They see civil disobedience as 
an important democratic right; this parallels the importance that the 
“dissidents” and revolutionary movements of the 1980s attributed to 
direct civic participation. At the same time, relatively few people do in 
fact involve in such activities, at least less than in West Europe; and the 
idea of a pluralist society in which different interests can be expressed 
still gains less acceptance than it does in the West. Explanations to these 
phenomena are manifold and related both to history, to the present 
social situation, and to global trends. 
A multitude of studies on different forms of participation, net-
works, social movements and associations as well as various aspects 
of social capital, attitudes and values have appeared during the boom 
that started in the 1990s. The chapters in this book contribute to this 
research tradition by providing an extensive portrait of citizenship 
covering phenomena such as citizens’ notion of the signifi cance of 
citizenship and the characteristics of a “good citizen”, trust of politi-
cal institutions and the functioning of the entire democratic system, 
as well as a variety of forms of social and political participation and 
association activity.
Globalization has brought about changes in the notion of citi-
zenship: the nation state, while still is an important locus of political 
identity, has lost some of its signifi cance as the guarantor of citizen 
rights. These ideas resonate with the work of a number of contemporary 
writers such as Heater on ‘world citizenship’, Falk and Urry on ‘global 
citizenship’, Soysal on ‘post-national citizenship’, and Kaldor and Keane 
on ‘global civil society’ in that they see identifi cations, networking and 
mobility that crosses national borders as a force that is permanently 
going to change the way we conceptualize citizenship.
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Overcoming the dualism of nation-based or global citizenship and 
seeing alternative notions of belonging, and of exercising rights and 
obligations is a remarkable challenge both for theoretical and empiri-
cal social research.
   25
References
Alasuutari, Pertti (1996) Toinen tasavalta (The Second Republic). Tampere: 
Vastapaino.
Almond, Gabriel & Verba, Sidney (1963) The Civic Culture: Political At-
titudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Almond, Gabriel A & Verba, Sidney (1989) The Civic Culture. London: 
Sage.
Berglund, Sten (1990) Finland in a Comparative Perspective. In Berglund & 
Sundberg (eds.) Finnish Democracy. Jyväskylä: Gummerus.
Berndtson, Erkki (1992) Politiikka tieteenä (The Politics as Science). Helsinki: 
VAPK Kustannus.
Bourdieu, Pierre (1984) Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of 
taste. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Citrin, Jack & Muste, Christopher (1999) Trust in Government. In Robinson, 
John P, Shaver, Phillip R & Wrightsman Lawrence S (eds.) Measures 
of Political Attitudes. San Diego: Academic Press.
Coupland, Douglas (1998) Generation X: tales for an accelerated culture. 
London: Abacus. 
de Hart, Joep & Dekker, Paul (2003) A Tale of Two Cities: Local Patterns of 
Social Capital. P. 153-169 in: Hooghe, M. & Stolle, D. (eds.): Gen-
erating Social Capital. Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative 
Perspective. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Dekker, Paul (2003) “Generalised Social Trust: Meanings and Political Cor-
relates. Paper presented at the 19th IPSA World Congress (RC 29.1) 
Durban, South Africa, 29.6 – 4.7.2003.
Eyerman, Ron & Turner, Bryan S. (1998) Outline of a Theory of Generations. 
European Journal of Social Theory 1 (1): 91-106.
Finifter, Ada W. (1970) Dimensions of Political Alienation. The American 
Political Science Review 64:2, 389-410.
Gabriel, Oscar W. (1995) Political Effi cacy and Trust. In: van Deth, J. & 
Scarbrough, E. (eds.): The Impact of Values. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Joslyn, Mark R. & Cigler, Allan (2001) Group Involvement and Democratic 
Orientations: Social Capital in the Postelection Context. Social Sci-
ence Quarterly 82:2, 357-368.
Jääsaari, Johanna & Martikainen, Tuomo (1991) Nuorten poliittiset valinnat 
(The Political Choices of the Youth). Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Jääsaari, Johanna (1986) Sukupolvet, elämäntapa ja politiikka (Generations, 
Lifestyle and Politics). Politiikka 4/1986, 258-281.
26
Kautto, Mikko (2001) Diversity among Welfare States. Comparative Study 
on Welfare State Adjustment in Nordic Countries. Stakes Research 
Report 118. Saarijärvi: Gummerus.
Laine, Markus & Peltonen, Lasse (2003) Ympäristökysymys ja aseveliakseli. 
Ympäristön politisoituminen  Tampereella vuosina 1959-1995. (The 
Environmental Question and the  Brothers-in-Arms Axis: The Politi-
calization of the Environment in Tampere 1959 to 1995). 
Misztal, Barbara (1996) Trust in Modern Societies. The Search for the Bases 
of Social Order. Polity Press: Cambridge.
Nousiainen, Jaakko (1971) The Finnish Political System. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Nousiainen, Jaakko (1998) Suomen poliittinen järjestelmä. Porvoo: WSOY.
Paige, Jeffery M. (1971) Political Orientation and Riot Participation. American 
Political Science Review 36, 810-820.
Pattie, Charles; Seyd, Patrick & Whiteley, Paul (2003) Citizenship and Civic 
Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain. Political Studies 
51:3, 443-468.
Pesonen, Pertti & Riihinen, Olavi (2002) Dynamic Finland. The political 
system and the welfare state. Studia Fennia, Historica. Helsinki: 
Finnish Literature Society.
Putnam, Robert (2000) Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Reef, Mary Jo & Knoke, David (1999) Political Alienation and Effi cacy in 
Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsmann (eds.) Measures of Political At-
titudes. San Diego: Academic Press.
Roos, J. P. (1987) Suomalainen elämä: tutkimus tavallisten suomalaisten 
elämäkerroista. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura
Schudson, Michael (2006) The Varieties of Civic Experience. Citizenship 
Studies, Vol 10, No 5, 591-606.
Svallfors, Stefan (1999) Political Trust and Attitudes Towards Redistribu-
tion: A Comparison of Sweden and Norway. European Societies 
1:2, 241-68.
Sztompka, Piotr (1999) Trust. A Sociological Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Warren, Mark. E (1999) Introduction. In Warren, M. E. (ed.): Democracy & 
Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-21.
Wass, Hanna (2008) Generations and turnout: The generational effect in 
electoral participation in Finland. University of Helsinki, Faculty 
of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Helsinki: Uni-
versity of Helsinki.
   27
Endnotes
1. ISSP is an annual cross-national survey program with 45 member countries. The 
theme for 2004 survey was Citizenship. For more detailed information about the 
data, see Appendix 2.
2. This was early even compared to the other Scandinavian countries. For example, 
Denmark granted universal suffrage in 1918, and Sweden in 1921.
3. The labeling of the generations in this section relies on Roos’ (1987) presenta-
tion.
4. Adapted from Roos 1987.
5. Measured by Gini-coeffi cient, a common indicator of income inequality refl ect-
ing the distribution of income throughout the population, Finland achieved a 
very low .23 in 1995, and 0.25 in 2000. Sweden, known for great equity, had 
a Gini-coeffi cient of 0.22, and the other Scandinavian countries slightly higher. 
Most European countries range from .25 to .35, while for the US it is .36.
6. Election statistics available on the Statistics Finland www-page: www.tilastokeskus.
fi .
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Political Orientations and Active Citizenship   
in Finland1
Annamari Konttinen & Antti Kouvo
Political Orientation
This chapter examines the political orientations of Finns as defi ned 
by the combination of the degree of institutional trust and feeling of 
political effi cacy experienced by our respondents. Finnish citizens’ 
political orientations are in this study viewed in the context of politi-
cal culture, “an entity of knowledge, beliefs and assessments inherited 
from generation to generation” (Almond & Verba 1989). We also 
pay, however, close attention to the discontinuities in the ways politi-
cal orientation is handed down from one generation to the other by 
studying differences between generations. In addition, we investigate 
potential gender differences and socioeconomic stratifi cation effects in 
political orientation. More specifi cally, we study how different social 
characteristics – generation, education, income, employment and 
gender – are related to political orientation types. 
In post-industrial societies, the traditional foundations for col-
laboration and social solidarity, common ideologies and shared values 
no longer offer suffi cient guidelines for increasingly complex decision-
making situations that individuals are facing (Giddens 1991; Misztal 
1996). In circumstances of uncertainty and risk, the notion of trust as a 
medium of interaction between the individual and complex systems has 
1. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution by Riley Dunlap in drafting 
an earlier version of this chapter.
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re-entered sociological discussion. Trust, together with communication 
and shared meanings, is also a key component of social capital, an es-
sential prerequisite for the functioning of democracy, good governance, 
and economic performance (Putnam 1993; 2000; Stolle 2003).
High levels of social capital have been associated with types of po-
litical orientation that promote active civil society, political participation 
and a sense of belonging in society. At the same time, changing patterns 
of political participation, especially the decline in voting turnout have 
been observed with concern. It is becoming increasingly clear that a 
sense of political alienation is growing, and that this alienation is a 
fundamentally multi-dimensional phenomenon.
This shift in citizens’ political orientations has been empirically 
studied by Inglehart (1999a), among others, who suggests that de-
spite the decline in the traditional ways of political participation such 
as voting, elite challenging forms of participation are becoming more 
common. Underlying this trend is a multifaceted transformation of 
the political sphere: in industrial societies the support for political 
authorities is generally declining, while the support for democratic 
regimes per se is rising.
The original conceptualization of this trend is formulated by Eas-
ton and Dennis as the so called two-part paradigm that distinguishes 
between two types of political support: diffuse support, or general trust 
and confi dence in a political system and specifi c support based on the 
evaluation of particular politicians and policies (Fansworth 2001; Ingle-
hart 1999a; Easton and Dennis 1969). Conversely, the incongruences 
might work the other way around: trust may be vested in persons, but 
distrust felt for the institutions that they represent (Sztompka 1999, 
173). 
While the concept of political trust involves perceptions of the 
political system’s and authorities’ responsiveness to the public’s interests 
and demands, or the system’s output, the concept of effi cacy attempts 
to complete the picture by directing attention to the input: individu-
al’s sense of competence in infl uencing the political system (Reef & 
Knoke 1999, 414). Together, these two represent crucial dimensions 
of political orientation of individual citizens.
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Political Trust
Trust is a crucial component of social capital, facilitating the smooth 
functioning of society in the form of horizontal trust, i.e. the trust 
people feel towards one another, and vertical trust, the trust people 
extend to public institutions (Sztompka 1999, 15). Inglehart (1990; 
1999b) emphasizes the cross-culturally observable correlation between 
the presence of generalized trust and the quality of life and subjective 
well being at the individual level as well as economic development and 
the stability of democracy at the general level.
The general level of trust felt and expressed in a given society, the 
trust culture, varies according to factors like normative coherence, the 
stability of the social order, and the transparency of social organization. 
The feeling of trust is, however, unevenly distributed among different 
segments of society. (Sztompka 1999, 122-123 and 171.)
Level of vertical trust (in this case, more particularly political trust) 
was in the ISSP 2004 questionnaire measured by asking respondents 
to indicate whether they felt they could “most of the time trust people 
in the government to do what is right”, and by asking whether they 
thought that “most politicians are in politics only for what they can get 
out of it personally” (Table 1). These represent two aspects of political 
trust, i.e. trust in government and the political regime (Citrin & Muste 
1999, 465-466), and they also closely relate to notions of diffuse support 
in the political system (here conceptualized as “people in the govern-
ment”) and specifi c support in politicians as individuals. In addition 
to these two questions we included an approximate to vertical trust 
through items concerning the respondents’ view of the level of honesty 
of last national elections1 and personal opinion of public service involve-
ment in corruption2. Though there was no question directly asking the 
level of trust in authorities, these both indicate respondents’ view of 
the trustworthiness of the political system and public authorities. As a 
scale measuring vertical trust, the four items achieved together a fairly 
high level of reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0,622).
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 Table 1. Levels of political trust (percentages)
%
(N)
Strongly 
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree
No 
answer
Trust in people 
in government
Politicians in 
politics only for 
personal profi t
3,7
18,3
39,8
31,3
28,5
24,5
18,4
17,4
3,8
1,5
5,8
7,0
Very 
honest
Somewhat 
honest
Neither 
honest or 
dishonest
Somewhat 
dishonest
Very 
dishonest
No 
answer
Last national 
elections: 
level of honesty
67,3 23,7 3,5 ,3 ,5 4,8
Hardly 
anyone is 
involved
A small 
number of 
people are 
involved
A moderate 
number of 
people are 
involved
A lot of 
people are 
involved
Almost 
everyone is 
involved
No 
answer
Public service 
involvement in 
corruption
15,5 41,2 19,8 5,2 1,1 17,2
The following fi gures compare some aspects of national trust cultures 
while presenting frequency distributions of responses to questions 
related to political trust. In general, the Nordic countries seem to have 
a strong trust culture, indicated by agreement with the fi rst statement 
“most of the time we can trust people in the government to do what 
is right” and disagreement with the second: “most politicians are in 
politics only for what they can get out of it personally”. Top countries 
include Denmark, Finland, Ireland (fi rst statement) and Denmark, 
Norway, Netherlands (second statement). In general, the Nordic aver-
age indicated stronger trust culture than total ISSP 2004, total EU or 
total non-EU. Differences between the Total ISSP, EU, and Non-EU 
countries are markedly small.
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Figure 1. Trust in people in government. ISSP comparison
Other studies conducted roughly at the same period with ISSP 2004 
(Konttinen et al. 2003; Yhdyskuntatutkimus 2001, 35) also report low 
levels of trust in political institutions in Finland, even when compared 
with other social institutions. For example, according to the Good Gov-
ernment survey, the most trusted social institutions are the police, the 
Defense Forces and the educational system: 74.3%, 66.8% and 65.3% 
of citizens, respectively, express “very much” or “quite a bit” of trust 
in these institutions. The least trusted are the political parties (8.3% 
trust them “very much” or “quite a bit”), the parliament (23.6%) and 
major companies (28.4%). It is especially noteworthy that trust toward 
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Figure 40a. "Most of the time we can trust people in govern-
 ment to do what is right" (%).
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Figure 2. Politicians in politics only for personal profi t. ISSP comparison
the parliament, the “most obvious symbol of democracy” (Sztompka 
1999, 181), is low compared to that for the other institutions, and 
lukewarm at best: only 1.8 percent express “very much” trust in the 
elected parliament. (Konttinen et al. 2003.)
There are several possible explanations, both long-term and short-
term by nature, for the phenomenon. A long-term explanation points 
to the special characteristics of Finland in terms of her political culture. 
Nousiainen (1998, 23-26) has interpreted current Finnish political 
culture as being rather individualistic and critical towards authorities. 
This could be seen as a backlash after a long period of a relatively (in 
Nordic perspective) hierarchical and authoritarian political culture. 
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Figure 40b. "Most politicians are in politics only for what they
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On the other hand, a shorter-term explanation might be found in 
the aftermath of a severe economic recession of the 1990’s. In addition 
to the impacts of far-reaching cutbacks in the welfare sector during the 
recession, the unemployment rate was still on a relatively high level 
when the data was collected (8.8 % in 2004 3). The inability of politi-
cians to solve these critical social problems has likely created distrust 
in political authorities (Blomberg & al. 2002; Newton 2001, 209-210; 
Mattila & Sänkiaho 2005; Bäck & Kestilä 2008). 
The possibility of uneven distribution of the experiences on po-
litical trust in different demographic groups poses a major challenge 
for active citizenship. In addition to strengthening the trust culture, 
questions concerning the position of different demographic groups are 
crucial for the cohesion of society. 
From the results of the analysis of variance for Finland (presented 
in Table 2), it can be seen that explaining variation in political trust in 
Finland is diffi cult. In the fi rst models, age has a very signifi cant effect 
as the youngest age group stands out as having the highest levels of 
trust while the second and third age groups (earlier conceptualized as 
the Generation of Great Transformation and Generation of After-War 
Reconstruction and Growth; the Introduction to this volume) express 
clearly lower levels of trust. The oldest age group (earlier conceptual-
ized as the War-Generation and set as a reference group) expresses the 
lowest levels of trust. However, when we take into account the impact 
of other determinants, only the membership in the youngest age group 
remains as an almost signifi cant predictor of political trust. 
Gender has little effect on political trust, as there are no sig-
nifi cant gender differences in any of the models. Of all predictors of 
political trust, education stands out as the most clearly signifi cant. 
It also maintains its signifi cance, even when economic and political 
variables are entered. The effect of education is perfectly monotonous: 
the higher educated the respondent, the more likely to express high 
levels of political trust. Employment status is signifi cantly related to 
political trust, with the retired having very signifi cantly lower levels 
of trust than do the other classes. Interestingly, the level of political 
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Table 2. Analysis of variance predicting political trust by F-values (in bold) and 
parameter estimates (β)4.
Main 
effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age
-33
34-52
53-69
70-
Gender
Male
Female
Education
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Employment
Out of mkt.
Retired
Student
Unemployed
Employed
Income (OECD)
1. Lowest quintile
2.
3.
4.
5. Highest
Party preference
No answer
Would not vote
Other party
Green League
Left Alliance
SDP
Center
National Coalition
12.299***
1.97***
1.21**
1.08**
(a)
0.002
0.01
(a)
26.970***
-1.78***
-.94***
(a)
9.168***
.04
-.81***
.83**
-.68
(a)
3.518**
-.88***
-.64**
-.56*
-.30
(a)
8.320***
-.98***
-2.21***
-.70*
-.02
-1.17**
-.37
-.03
(a)
12.299***
1.97***
1.21**
1.08**
(a)
12.298***
1.97***
1.20**
1.08**
(a)
.035
.03
(a)
9.187***
1.56***
.80*
.76*
(a)
.269
.08
(a)
22.709***
-1.64***
-.95***
(a)
2.828*
.95*
.41
.579
(a)
.377
.09
(a)
21.750***
-1.62***
-.92***
(a)
2.667*
.02
-.44
.64*
-.55
(a)
2.219
.90
.42
.30
(a)
1.395
.19
(a)
10.735***
-1.30***
-.64**
(a)
1.428
.47
-.07
.75*
.01
(a)
2.289
-.88**
-.49
-.37
-.30
(a)
3.777*
1.22*
.70
.40
(a)
1.650
.20
(a)
10.214***
-1.27***
-.63**
(a)
1.352
.35
-.10
.75*
.02
(a)
2.309
-.87**
-.53*
-.40
-.40
(a)
7.283***
-.71**
-1.78***
-.19
-.30
-.57
.11
.62*
(a)
Adjusted R 
Squared .032 .031 .071 .077 .065 .112
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001; (a) = set to zero as a reference class.
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trust among students is clearly the highest. It is also the only predictor 
whose signifi cance does not disappear when the economic and politi-
cal variables are entered in Models 5 and 6. Income5 is weakly related 
to political trust. The analysis of all socioeconomic variables suggests 
that in general, the better-resourced members of Finnish society tend 
to experience higher levels of political trust.
Party affi liation is a highly signifi cant predictor of political trust, 
although the effect is mostly produced by the difference between 
non-affi liated (“would not vote” and “no answer”) and affi liated re-
spondents. Those identifying with the main government party at the 
time, Centre, show slightly higher levels of political trust than oth-
ers. To a non-signifi cant extent, the same concerns the SDP, another 
member of the coalition government at the time of the survey. Since 
the Greens and Left Alliance have traditionally been highly critical of 
several institutions in Finnish society, their lower levels of institutional 
trust is understandable.
In general, explaining variation in levels of political trust among 
Finnish citizens is diffi cult. Although a majority of the variables em-
ployed in Table 2 are important predictors of institutional trust when 
considered individually, when all of the variables are studied together 
in Model 6, only age, education and the political variables remain 
signifi cant. Furthermore, all of the variables combined explain only 11 
percent of the variance in trust.
The hypothesis presented by Sztompka that the well-resourced 
members of society enjoy higher levels of trust because of being more 
“protected” by their individual capital in the form of relative autonomy, 
wealth, social networks and professional expertise (Sztompka 1999, 
171) is only partially addressed by the present analysis, as social net-
works and professional expertise are not included. It is noteworthy, 
though, that the elements of individual capital that are included have 
some relation to levels of political trust (cf. “Luke theorem”) but that 
these relationships, except for education, lose most of their statistical 
signifi cance when they are studied together with other factors.
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Political Effi cacy
The views presented above suggest that individual capital, at least to 
an extent, protects citizens from risks of unwarranted trust; but it is 
clear that in a complex system of interdependencies, more than indi-
vidual resources is needed to make a civilized life possible. The notion 
of effi cacy refers to the feeling that the individual can infl uence the 
political system when necessary. This sense of effi cacy forms an essential 
foundation of political orientation practiced in everyday citizenship. In 
situations where the political system fails to respond to the individual’s 
interests, feeling of effi cacy becomes particularly important as it implies 
that there is a possibility of change to the unsatisfactory situation. 
In measuring political effi cacy, one of the most widely used scales 
is the ANES Political Effi cacy Scale by Campbell, Gurin and Miller 
(1954). The ISSP 2004 survey used an abbreviated version of this scale. 
In the original scale, political effi cacy was defi ned as “the feeling that 
political and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can 
play a part in bringing about this change” (Reef & Knoke 1999, 424). 
The original 5-item scale included two items measuring the perceived 
impact of voting, but these were not used in the ISSP 2004 survey. 
Here we followed the example of Agnello (1973), who employed the 
three non-voting items from the original ANES Political Effi cacy Scale 
to form what he called an “index of powerlessness”. Though we still 
make use of the original designation of political effi cacy, dropping the 
voting-related items shifts the focus of the scale away from the means 
of bringing about social change and thus produces a scale that em-
phasizes the evaluation of the individual’s political potency in general. 
Moreover, political scientists often distinguish between external and 
internal political effi cacy. Internal effi cacy refers to the requisite skills 
and resources to infl uence the political system and external effi cacy to 
the perception that government institutions are responsive to citizen’s 
attempts to exert political infl uence. (Borg 1995; Clarke & Acock 
1989). Along with this classifi cation, it is important to note that indica-
tors used in our study are mostly measuring internal political effi cacy. 
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However, internal effi cacy is in two items understood in relation to 
responsiveness of governmental institutions and thus include also an 
external element.6 
Table 3. Levels of political effi cacy (percentages).
%
(N)
Strongly 
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree
No 
answer
People like me don’t have 
any say in what the 
government does
I don’t think the government 
cares much what people like 
me think
I think most people in Finland 
are better informed about 
politics and government 
than I am
23,8
18,2
8,3
28,2
27,1
20,6
18,7
21,4
26,1
21,3
25,3
29,8
3,6
3,7
7,4
4,4
4,2
7,8
Table 3 presents the items used in the effi cacy scale and the distribu-
tions of responses to them from the Finnish sample. Of the three ef-
fi cacy items used, the fi rst two focus on the respondent’s evaluation of 
institutional responsiveness to citizens like the respondent her-/himself. 
As expected, the statement “People like me don’t have any say in what 
the government does” is strongly agreed with by Finns (52% either 
strongly agree or agree). Strongly disagreeing with the statement would 
border on lacking a realistic conception of political reality: individual 
citizens can seldom directly infl uence the day-to-day decision-making 
of government. The assessment of responsiveness of the government 
is quite negative, too: 45% of respondents either strongly agree or 
agree with the statement “I don’t think the government cares much 
what people like me think”, again a response indicating a low level of 
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effi cacy. As the neutral categories receive a large number of responses 
in all questions, clearly more respondents agree than disagree with 
these statements. The third item addresses more directly the respond-
ent’s evaluation of his or her political competence (knowledge about 
politics, ability to understand important issues in politics) compared 
to their fellow citizens. The responses show more confi dence: nearly 
30% disagree and more than seven percent strongly disagree with the 
statement “I think most people in Finland are better informed about 
politics and government than I am”.
Overall, these results suggest that Finns tend to have a low sense of 
effi cacy, especially in terms of the evaluation of system responsiveness. 
Assessment of the respondent’s own personal political competence is on 
the positive side for more than a third of respondents, so this low sense 
of effi cacy is not necessary related to a poor political self-esteem. This 
discrepancy is especially interesting in a welfare society with a stable 
democratic legacy, well-developed educational system and free media: 
does this combination produce well-resourced but critical citizens? 
This also raises a question of whether it is possible to predict feelings 
of effi cacy by variables traditionally associated with individual “politi-
cal resources”: education, employment and income? How about the 
impact of gender, still an unequalizing factor in society? And fi nally, 
is the feeling of effi cacy related to the (other) political views (i.e. party 
preference) of the respondent? A summated rating scale was constructed 
from the three items measuring political effi cacy to examine the dis-
tribution of effi cacy among different segments of society. The scale 
achieves a satisfactory level of reliability (α = 0.672).
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TABLE 4. Analysis of variance predicting political effi cacy by F-values (in 
bold) and parameter estimates (β)7.
Main 
effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age
-33
34-52
53-69
70-
Gender
Male
Female
Education
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Employment
Out of mkt.
Retired
Student
Unemployed
Employed
Income (OECD)
1. Lowest quintile
2.
3.
4.
5. Highest
Party preference
No answer
Would not vote
Other party
Green League
Left Alliance
SDP
Center
National Coalition
5.853***
1.44***
1.61***
1.30***
(a)
.07
.04
(a)
62.559***
-2.70***
-1.52***
(a)
9.732***
-.33
-1.22***
-.31
-.62
(a)
13.172***
-1.59***
-1.25***
-1.35***
-.49
(a)
11.449***
-1.52***
-2.41***
-.63
.11
-.85*
-1.05***
-.78
(a)
5.853***
1.44***
1.61***
1.30***
(a)
5.862***
1.44***
1.61***
1.30***
(a)
.115
.05
(a)
2.435
.97*
1.02**
.96*
(a)
.665
.12
(a)
57.254***
-2.62***
-1.51***
(a)
1.728
.12
.29
.57
(a)
.561
.11
(a)
51.077***
-2.52***
-1.46***
(a)
3.363**
-.15
-.82*
.31
-.31
(a)
.861
.31
.45
.58
(a)
1.465
.20
(a)
29.122***
-2.14***
-1.23***
(a)
1.395
.16
-.38
.60
-.03
(a)
4.436**
-1.02***
-.74**
-.92***
-.33
(a)
.856
.54
.66
.67
(a)
2.989
.28
(a)
23.078***
-1.95***
-1.08***
(a)
1.437
.05
-.45
.53
-.05
(a)
3.707**
-1.00***
-.70**
-.82**
-.36
(a)
6.267***
-.79**
-1.74***
.05
.26
.16
-.18
.27
(a)
Adjusted R 
Squared
.012 .011 .098 .106 .110 .143
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001; (a) = set to zero as a reference class.
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As is evident from the results of the three fi rst models reported in 
Table 4, membership in an age group (earlier conceptualized as ”gen-
eration”) is a strong predictor of political effi cacy. Younger citizens on 
average have higher levels of effi cacy than do their older counterparts. 
The effect is the strongest in the second age group (34-52 years; the 
“Suburban generation”). Previous fi ndings from Finland (e.g. Borg 
1995) also confi rm the existence of a link between age and effi cacy. 
Young people feel themselves more effi cacious than do older people. It 
is obvious that the phenomenon is at least partially related to the effect 
of education furthering political effi cacy, as the younger respondents 
are on average better educated than their older counterparts. Indeed, 
when level of education is taken into account (models 3-6) the effect 
of age loses a lot of its signifi cance. 
An alternative explanation for age group differences can be found 
in the generation-specifi c processes of political socialization. For ex-
ample, Finnish studies on voting turnout have shown that generation 
has an impact on voting behavior (Wass 2007). According to this view, 
older people who are used to participating collectively through politi-
cal channels feel more readily deprived when those channels appear 
blocked than do their younger and more individualistically oriented 
counterparts. It might also be that negative perceptions of one’s effi cacy 
simply increase with age and experience, when people gradually become 
more aware of limitations of the responsiveness of the political system. 
Lastly, the results might also partially refl ect the interconnectedness of 
feelings of effi cacy and active participation in society through working 
life. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the signifi cance of 
age as a predictor of effi cacy loses signifi cance when employment is 
added to the model.
In contrast, gender has a complex pattern of effect on effi cacy. The 
effect of gender actually gradually becomes stronger when other vari-
ables are entered in the model. Though not statistically signifi cant, the 
effect of gender is consistent in the sense that men consistently express 
stronger feelings of effi cacy. Education has very signifi cant effect on ef-
fi cacy, as the better educated express higher levels of effi cacy. The effect 
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is monotonous and remains highly signifi cant when other variables are 
taken into account. Income has a very signifi cant effect also: those with 
higher income tend to express stronger feelings of effi cacy. The effect 
is not perfectly monotonous, however: the low middle income group 
(second quintile) express higher feelings of effi cacy than the middle 
income group (third quintile).
Employment status is signifi cantly related to effi cacy at the outset, 
as the retired, the unemployed, students and those voluntarily out of 
the labor market all have lower levels of effi cacy than those currently 
employed. The effect is the strongest for the retired. However, this vari-
able has no signifi cant effect on effi cacy after the other demographic 
and socioeconomic variables, especially income, are taken into account. 
Overall, the results for education and income clearly indicate that po-
litical effi cacy increases with individual capital, or political resources, 
as one would expect to be the case.
Party preference is very signifi cantly related to political effi cacy. 
The signifi cant effect of party preference in Model 6 stems mainly 
from the difference between non-affi liated (“would not vote” and “no 
answer”) and affi liated respondents. Of the non-signifi cant effects, it 
is notable that those affi liated with the Greens with their strong grass 
root tradition feel higher levels of effi cacy, whereas even the voters of 
the main government party Centre feel lower sense of effi cacy than 
other affi liated respondents. The very signifi cantly (for Social Demo-
cratic Party) and almost signifi cantly (for Left Alliance) lower sense 
of effi cacy of voters of the main opposition parties is understandable. 
However, the only difference that remains signifi cant after the other 
factors are included in the model is the difference between affi liated 
and non-affi liated voters.
The overall results in Table 4 indicate that the socioeconomic 
and political variables are fairly good predictors of political effi cacy, 
as indicated by the adjusted R square of .14. The socioeconomic vari-
ables of education and income remain at least signifi cant predictors of 
effi cacy when other variables are entered in the model — and in each 
case political effi cacy increases with socioeconomic status as would be 
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expected. Also, income, education and employment status have a very 
signifi cant effect when studied separately. In addition, party preference 
is very signifi cantly related to effi cacy when the other variables are 
taken into account. 
International comparison of effi cacy
When levels of effi cacy are compared cross-nationally, Japan shows, 
rather surprisingly, top results in terms of evaluation of government 
responsiveness, followed by the Nordic Countries. The statement 
presented in Figure 3 read: “People like me don’t have any say in what 
the government does”. Strong disagreement with this statement is not 
logically necessary for a positive evaluation of system responsiveness: 
individual citizens can seldom expect to directly infl uence the deci-
sion-making of government. Non-EU countries rate higher than EU 
countries in this respect, partly because of the strong infl uence of Japan. 
Nordic countries as a group are positioned between them. Figure 4 
presents responses to another statement related to government respon-
siveness: “I don’t think the government cares much what people like 
me think”. Here, again, disagreement shows high level of effi cacy, and 
the results are very similar with Figure 3 with the exception of Japan 
standing out less, and the Nordic countries faring even better in country 
group comparison next to EU countries and non-EU countries.
44
Figure 3. Evaluation of Government responsiveness #1. ISSP compari-
son FIG 36b
When evaluating their own personal competence in terms of under-
standing important political issues8, respondents in Denmark and the 
US rate the highest. Slightly surprisingly, Ireland and Spain do very 
well, too. Country groups are very equal in this respect.
Despite high levels of institutional trust, the Finns show lower 
levels of interpersonal trust and political effi cacy than any other Nordic 
country. This challenges the assumption of a united Nordic political 
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Figure 4. Evaluation of Government responsiveness #2. ISSP compari-
son Fig. 36c
culture. Explanation cannot be found in differences in level of educa-
tion, welfare system or stability of democracy as there are very small 
differences in these respects among the Nordic countries. This leads one 
to conclude that there is an element of political culture not immediately 
tied to the functioning of central institutions in any given society.
Total ISSP
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Germany
Netherlands
Great Britain
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
Russia
United States
Japan
Nordic Countries
EU Countries
Non-EU Countries
0 25 50 75 100
24
19
16
16
15
31
15
21
25
19
31
40
15
43
17
26
22
35
29
33
24
32
41
31
39
46
36
46
37
29
31
29
36
34
16
22
27
13
22
12
19
18
8
20
11
11
19
14
21
17
16
20
26
19
29
26
13
31
20
19
22
10
10
32
5
25
17
22
5
4
5
18
5
2
3
3
3
3
2
2
5
5
8
4
6
ISSP 2004  Citizenship  FSD2184 / CINEFOGO 2006-2007
 AG-
REE
NEUT-
RAL
DIS-
AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
Figure 36b. "I don't think the government cares much what
people like me think" (%).
46
Figure 5. Evaluation of personal political competence. ISSP comparison
Political orientation types
Political effi cacy and trust can also be seen as two conceptually or-
thogonal dimensions of political orientation as J.M. Paige (1971) 
suggested in his study of riot participation. Paige distinguished four 
types of political orientation based on levels of trust and effi cacy, and 
the typology he developed is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. A typology of political orientations by J.M. Paige
Trust Effi cacy
Low High
Low Alienated Dissident
High Subordinate Allegiant
Paige (1971) labeled the high trust – high effi cacy orientation “alle-
giant”, to describe active supporters of the existing political structure 
who trust that the government will be run in their best interests and 
that they can infl uence it when necessary. The low trust – low effi cacy 
situation leads to an “alienated” orientation, likely to discourage politi-
cal participation even when signifi cant discontent might be felt. The 
high trust – low effi cacy combination also suggests passive adjustment, 
though this time via loyal and unquestioning “subordinance”. Finally, 
having a high sense of political potency while at the same time feeling 
distrustful towards government produces, according to Paige, a “dissi-
dent” orientation. Subsequent studies (e.g. Sigelman & Feldman 1983) 
have shown that correlations between orientation types and levels of 
political participation that Paige suggested do, indeed, exist but that 
in international comparison they are relatively weak.
The measures employed in this study differ considerably from those 
of Paige, so some important modifi cations in the descriptions presented 
above are necessary. We use an effi cacy scale that is less specifi c than 
the measure Paige used9, one that is not completely independent from 
system responsiveness, a concept closely related to trust. For the purpose 
of mapping the political orientations of the general public, however, 
the items used here appear to have content validity. The applicability 
of the typology is, however, an empirical question.
Table 5 presents the frequency distributions of different political 
orientation types. The variables for the analysis are organized so that 
the higher the mean value is, the higher the level of political trust or 
political effi cacy. Following Paige, the clusters constructed are identifi ed 
as allegiant, alienated, subordinate and dissident political orientations. 
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From the table is possible to see that the sizes of the four categories 
differ signifi cantly from one another. Notably, the alienated and al-
legiant groups are similar in size, and twice the size of subordinated 
and dissident groups. 
Table 5. Alienated, subordinated, dissident and allegiant political orienta-
tions (number of cases and percentage of total)
Political effi cacy
Low High
Political trust
Low
alienated
 318
33,3%
dissident 
155
16,2%
473
49,5%
High
subordinate
151
15,8%
allegiant
332
34,7%
483
50,5%
Total 46949,1%
487
50,9%
956
100,0%
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Table 6. Predictors of political orientations. Logistic regression
Alienated
Expβ
Dissident
Expβ
Subordinated
Expβ
Allegiant
Expβ
Age
-33 .543 .491 1.553 3.231
34-52 .537 .636 1.181 3.357
53-69 .779 1.119 .719 2.168
70- (a) (a) (a) (a)
Gender
Male .946 .935 .854 1.235
Female (a) (a) (a) (a)
Education
Primary 4.951*** 1.016 1.526 .164***
Secondary 2.305** .994 1.570 .451***
Tertiary (a) (a) (a) (a)
Employment
Out of mkt. .595 1.468 1.835 .819
Retired .960 .822 1.680 .828
Student .179 1.750 2.277* 1.573
Unemployed .943 .761 .573 1.454
Employed (a) (a) (a) (a)
Income (OECD)
1. Lowest quintile 2.629** .958 .457* .661
2. 1.507 1.172 .866 .693
3. 2.053** 1.146 .720 .565*
4. 1.441 1.169 .739 .804
                
5. Highest (a) (a) (a) (a)
Party affi liation
No answer 1.566** .768 1.152 .674
Would not vote 2.905*** 1.201 .968 .204**
Other party .871 1.369 1.151 .809
Green League 1.158 1.106 .513 1.168
Left Alliance 1.153 1.925 .716 .616
SDP .938 .733 1.349 1.051
Center .602 .975 .949 1.617
National Coalition (a) (a) (a) (a)
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 .153 .033 .061 .168
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001;( ns) =*p > 0.05; (a) = set ti one as a reference category.
In table 6 are presented the results of multinomial logistic models 
(MLR) for each type of political orientation. The effects of the inde-
pendent variable(s) in the models are presented with the odd ratios 
50
(Exp b). The pseudo-coeffi cients of the explanation proportions of the 
models are also reported (Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2). From the results we 
may see that the two most common groups of political orientation are 
also those that are most easily explained by background variables. 
Table 7 shows that whereas belonging to dissident and subordi-
nated groups is apparently something that is determined by factors not 
included in this analysis, the probability to belong to either allegiant or 
alienated group of political orientations is more dependent on the level 
of education and political activity. Passive voters with low education 
and income are much more likely to feel themselves politically alienated 
than active voters with high education and income. Correspondingly, 
those with tertiary education are nearly four times more likely to feel 
themselves politically allegiant compared to their fellow citizens with 
only primary education. Besides education, also any party affi liation 
seems to remarkably promote feelings of allegiance.  
Overall, socio-economic factors such as education and income 
together with voting seem to have a great importance when explaining 
the membership in certain orientation category. A key fi nding is that 
the risk of political alienation (feelings of low political effi cacy and low 
levels of institutional trust) seems to grow with low education, and cor-
respondingly, the membership in the allegiant group with high feelings 
of both effi cacy and trust is more common among those with higher 
education. Low income also increases the probability to be politically 
alienated, although compared to the highest income quintile, the lowest 
and third income quintiles are nearly identical in this respect. In the 
dissident and subordinate clusters the differences between different 
socio-economic groups are not as remarkable.
 Overall, also age group seems to have a great importance when 
explaining the membership in certain orientation category, while educa-
tion likely functions as an important mediating factor. A key fi nding is 
that the risk of political alienation (feelings of low political effi cacy and 
low levels of institutional trust) seems to grow with age, and correspond-
ingly, the membership in the allegiant group with high feelings of both 
effi cacy and trust is the more common the younger the respondent is, 
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although the two youngest groups are nearly identical in this respect. 
In the dissident cluster the differences between age groups are not 
monotonous as the dissident political orientation is particularly low 
among the oldest and youngest generations. Subordinate orientation, 
however, (see Table 7) is most common among these groups. 
Table 7. Political orientations by sociodemographic characteristics and 
support for political party
Alienated Dissident Subordinated Allegiant Total
Age
-33 25,6% 13,9% 19,8% 40,7% 100%
34-52 32,3% 15,7% 15,2% 36,8% 100%
53-69 39,7% 19,5% 11,4% 29,4% 100%
70- 54,3% 14,3% 22,9% 8,6% 100%
Gender
Male 35,4% 14,6% 14,8% 35,2% 100%
Female 30,9% 18,1% 16,9% 34,1% 100%
Education
Primary 51,8% 17,1% 15,9% 15,2% 100%
Secondary 34,0% 15,6% 17,4% 33,0% 100%
Tertiary 15,3% 15,8% 11,5% 57,4% 100%
Employment
Out of mkt. 27,4% 21,9% 21,9% 28,8% 100%
Retired 46,9% 17,3% 15,4% 20,4% 100%
Student 13,5% 14,6% 27,1% 44,8% 100%
Unemployed 40,8% 18,4% 8,2% 32,7% 100%
Employed 32,9% 15,2% 14,0% 37,9% 100%
Income (OECD)
1. Lowest quintile 38,7% 15,3% 13,9% 32,1% 100%
2. 31,4% 15,7% 19,6% 33,3% 100%
3. 39,9% 15,3% 16,0% 28,8% 100%
4. 27,7% 15,3% 14,7% 42,4% 100%
5. Highest 21,7% 14,7% 16,8% 46,7% 100%
Party affi liation
No answer 40,2% 13,4% 18,2% 28,2% 100%
Would not vote 56,0% 14,0% 16,0% 14,0% 100%
Other party 34,2% 21,9% 15,1% 28,8% 100%
Green League 22,5% 18,0% 11,7% 47,7% 100%
Left Alliance 37,0% 23,9% 10,9% 28,3% 100%
SDP 32,7% 14,2% 19,8% 33,3% 100%
Center 31,1% 14,9% 14,2% 39,9% 100%
National Coalition 24,7% 17,7% 15,2% 42,4% 100%
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Summary
This chapter set out to examine the political orientations of Finns 
by analyzing the Finnish portion of the ISSP 2004 survey data. This 
was carried out by studying the levels of political trust and feelings of 
political effi cacy among the respondents, focusing especially on differ-
ences between different segments of the population in this regard. The 
fi ndings were placed in comparative context by analyzing the relevant 
portions of the entire ISSP 2004 data.
The results of the analysis of variance show that explaining varia-
tion in political trust is diffi cult. Age has a signifi cant effect, although 
after the other variables are taken into account only the youngest cohort 
stands out as having higher levels of trust. It is noteworthy, though, 
that the elements of individual capital that are examined have very 
little relationship to levels of institutional trust, except for education. 
Trust (or distrust) seems to be a relatively equal social entity in Finn-
ish society.
The results also suggest that Finns tend to have a low sense of politi-
cal effi cacy, regardless of what particular aspect of effi cacy is measured: 
the evaluation of system responsiveness or assessment of the respondent’s 
own personal political competence. Socioeconomic variables such as 
education and income are signifi cant predictors of effi cacy, and in each 
case, political effi cacy increases with socioeconomic status as expected. 
In addition, party identifi cation is signifi cantly related to effi cacy as 
well but this is produced by the difference between those having a party 
preference and those not having one or not intending to vote. 
Finally, four types of political orientation were distinguished in the 
data, following a typology by Jeffery Paige. The largest categories repre-
sent the alienated and allegiant orientations. The implication of this is 
that low trust– high effi cacy combinations or high trust – low effi cacy 
combinations are relatively rare among Finnish citizens. An important 
fi nding is that even when several possible determinants were taken into 
account, the sense of political alienation is strongest among those who 
have least both fi nancial and human capital. Simultaneously, the better 
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resourced citizens are much more likely to be allegiant citizens with-
high levels of political trust and effi cacy. Even though public concern 
for the political passivity of, for example younger generations, may be 
well founded in certain specifi c situations, our results suggest that those 
who lack both fi nancial and educational resources do not expect much 
of either political system or themselves as political citizens. 
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Endnotes
1. ”Thinking of the last national election in Finland, how honest was it regarding 
the counting and reporting of votes?”
2.  ”How widespread is corruption in the public service in Finland?”
3. According to Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi /tup/maanum/taulukot.html) 
the standardised unemployment rates differed crucially within the EU in the year 
2004. Compared to the mean unemployment within the EU (EU-15: 8,1%; 
EU-25: 9,0%), Finland’s unemployment rate was average. In the Nordic context, 
however, Finland fared rather poorly. The unemployment rate for   Denmark was 
5.6 %, and for Sweden 5.5 %. In comparison, the fi gures for the US and Japan, 
respectively, were within the “Nordic” range: 5.5% and 4.7%
4. The tables (2 and 4) are based on the same multivariate analysis. Table 4 reports 
the parameter estimates (β) when the dependent variable is political effi cacy and 
table 2 when the dependent variable is trust. The models are constructed in a 
similar fashion.
5. Income is self-reported net-income of a household divided by the equivalence 
scale taking into account the number of adults and children in the household. 
We used the so-called OECD scale with factors 1 for the fi rst adult, 0.7 for each 
additional adult and 0.5 for each child. As an example, the net-income of family 
with two adults and two children is divided by 2.7. The formula used is a / (b+c) 
in which a = self-reported net-income, b = equivalence factor for adults, and c = 
equivalence factor for children.
6. See for example Clarke & Acock 1988, 555.
7. The tables (2 and 4) are based on the same multivariate analysis. Table 4 reports 
the parameter estimates (β) when the dependent variable is political effi cacy and 
table 2 when the dependent variable is trust. The models are constructed in a 
similar fashion.
8. Note that this measure of personal political competence is different from the one 
presented in Table 3 and used for the summated rating scale in Table 4.
9. In fact he, frustrated with the lack of conceptual independence of the existing ”ef-
fi cacy” scales from ”trust”, stripped the measure of effi cacy to the bare minimum, 
and ended up measuring the level of political knowledge of his respondents to 
approximate ”effi cacy” (Paige 1971, 814-815).
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Civic Mind and the Legitimacy                        
of Finnish Democracy
Harri Melin
In this chapter, I shall analyse the civic mind and the nature of Finnish 
democracy from the perspective of legitimacy. Social scientists have 
been discussing the legitimacy of political power since the days of Max 
Weber (1978). According to Claus Offe (1984, 130), the maintenance 
of legitimacy is still one of the main tasks of modern democracies.
The concept of civic mind is very diffuse. It covers a wide range 
of issues from culture to participation. When social scientists talk 
about civic mind, theoretical thinking dates back to the 1960s and to 
a classical study by Almond and Verba (1963). The concept of civic 
mind refers to issues related to communities’ relations and civic action. 
It covers concepts such as public meetings, elections, the underprivi-
leged, communities on the web and churches, among others. In the 
United States, the concept of civic mind refers, not only to voluntary 
associations and political action, but business, as well. A wide variety 
of economic activity is focused around civic mind, mainly related to 
legal issues and the media.
The concept of civic mind has not been widely explored in the 
literature. One can say that it is an aspect of the analysis of citizenship. 
Civic mind is related to citizenship duties and citizenship rights. For 
this purpose we may defi ne civic mind as combination of civic skills 
(active participation) and civic virtues (tolerance, interest in politics etc.) 
(e.g. Warren 2000) 
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Civic mind is closely connected with civic competence, civic 
culture (Almond and Verba 1963), civic experience (Schudson 2006) 
and civic participation (Putnam 2000). In their classical study, Almond 
and Verba compared the civic competence in fi ve countries. They were 
interested in people’s subjective evaluations of the extent of their pos-
sibilities to infl uence political decisions. One of the major fi ndings in 
the project was that civic competence increases along with the increase 
of political activity. In the 70´s, the elements of political action were 
revisited by a new comparative project. According to Almond and 
Verba, civic culture is pluralistic, and “based on communication and 
persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that [permits] 
change but [moderates] it”. (Almond & Verba 1963, 8. See also Barnes 
and Kaase 1979; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979).
Civic Mind
In the ISSP survey, civic mind was measured by several questions. 
First, how the respondents saw the importance of people’s rights in a 
democracy. This theme was analysed with several questions, such as: 
should all citizens have an adequate standard of living, should govern-
ment authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities, should 
government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their 
position in society, and should politicians take into account the views 
of citizens before making decisions? The second set of questions dealt 
with the role of political parties and referendums: political parties should 
encourage people to become active in politics, political parties do not 
give voters real policy choices, referendums are a good way to decide 
important political questions. Thirdly, the respondents were asked to 
evaluate how well the democracy works in their country today, ten years 
ago and ten years from now. The last item dealt with views regarding 
the political system of the respondents’ country.
Equal opportunities and material well-being are important com-
ponents in democracy. It is extremely diffi cult to build democracy 
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without certain economic preconditions. In the European context, it is 
widely accepted that an adequate standard of living is also an important 
democratic right. This kind of an assumption is also dominant in the 
ISSP 2004 survey on citizenship.
A clear majority of all the respondents fi nd that, in democracy, all 
citizens should have an adequate standard of living. More than two out 
of three rate it as very important. The fi gure is highest in Norway (74 
per cent). There are only a few deviations. The fi gures are lower in Japan 
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Figure 35a. IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY:
ALL CITIZENS HAVE AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LI-
VING(%).
Figure 1. All citizens have an adequate standard of living*.
*There are different opinions about people’s rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
That all citizens have an adequate standard of living.
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(51 per cent), Germany (55 per cent) and the Netherlands (56 per cent). 
Finland represents the ISSP average in all aspects but one. None of the 
respondents found adequate standard of living entirely unimportant. 
Minority rights are becoming an increasingly important social 
and political issue, but what do we mean when we talk about minori-
ties? In the political context, minorities are most often understood as 
ethnic or religious minorities. However, today, we are faced with a 
world of minorities claiming their rights. In minority issues, Finland 
is an interesting example because it has no minority problems, and, 
yet, the political debate on minorities is lively.  Historically, the Swed-
ish speaking minority has been the only real minority in Finland. At 
the end of the year 2007 there were about 289 600 Swedish-speaking 
Finns, that is 5.46 % of the total population. International comparisons 
have shown that there is only one minority in the world that has no 
complaints about their situation and that is the Swedish-speaking Finns. 
More recent minority debates often deal with immigrants, Russians 
being the most important group, and with sexual minorities (gays and 
lesbians). Today there are some 40 000 people of Russian origin living 
in Finland. Russian minority has been growing steadily, there are two 
main causes: marriages and work related mobility.
It may be not fully correct to say that Finland has no minority 
problems, but the scope has been, at least this far, quite limited. The 
amount of immigrants has increased dramatically in Finland. At the 
beginning of the 90´s there were only 26 000 foreigners in the country 
and last year the fi gure was 143 000. In less than 20 years the fi gure has 
increased more than seven times. In spite of rapid growth, only 2.6 % of 
the total population are of foreign origin. This far immigrant population 
has not been any issue. We have two ethnic minorities Roma people and 
Saame people. There are about 10 000 Roma people and about 8 000 
Sami people in the country. Both of these minorities are integrated into 
the Finnish society.
From the perspective of civil society minorities in Finland do not 
make any big issue. Rights of Swedish-speaking Finns and Sami peo-
ple are protected by laws. Both groups have their own organizations, 
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Swedish speakers have their own political party. What come to other 
minorities their social organisation are quite weak. It is more ore less 
in the process of making. In the future we may have more active civil 
society in this respect.
In international comparison Finnish people place less emphasis 
on minority rights than the ISSP countries in average. Only a half of 
Figure 2. Government authorities respect and protect the rights of mi-
norities*.
Total ISSP
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Germany
Netherlands
Great Britain
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
Russia
United States
Japan
Nordic Countries
EU Countries
Non-EU Countries
0 25 50 75 100
58
50
62
65
54
53
41
45
61
71
68
51
62
15
58
55
61
19
23
19
19
20
28
28
18
22
17
18
21
16
15
20
22
17
12
15
10
10
13
12
16
17
10
8
10
14
12
20
12
13
11
6
7
5
4
8
5
8
12
4
2
3
8
5
27
6
6
6
2
3
2
1
3
1
4
5
2
1
0
3
2
8
2
2
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
8
1
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
0
2
1
9
1
1
2
VERY IM-
PORTANT
 NOT AT ALL
IMPORTANT
 NEUT-
RAL
ISSP 2004  Citizenship  FSD2184 / CINEFOGO 2006-2007
Figure 35b. IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY:
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES RESPECT AND PROTECT
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (%).
*There are different opinions about people’s rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities.
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the respondents consider them very important. This is understandable 
because of reasons mentioned above. 
Close to 60 per cent of all the ISSP respondents fi nd it very 
important that the government authorities respect and protect the 
minorities’ rights and close to 90 per cent fi nd it important. Only one 
per cent fi nds the question unimportant.
The variation is considerably greater here than in the previous 
question. The Spanish, only one per cent, and Portuguese, about 68 
per cent, respondents place more emphasis on minority rights than 
the other countries. Danish people are in the third place. The fi gure 
is lowest in Japan, where only 15 per cent fi nd it important that the 
government should respect and protect the rights of minorities. 
The Netherlands is an interesting case. We have learnt that the 
Netherlands is “the” tolerant society, in which minority rights are highly 
valued, as well as protected. The fi gures were the lowest in Europe. The 
result may partially be explained by the ethnic disputes in the country 
at the time when the survey was conducted.
The very idea of citizenship is a product of modern capitalism. 
The French revolution and the declaration of independence of the 
USA stressed that all people should have equal political rights and 
they should be treated equally regardless of their position in society. 
Since then, all capitalist democracies have agreed with this idea. There 
is a global understanding that government authorities should treat all 
citizens equally.
This idea is shared by the vast majority of respondents in all 
countries that participated in the ISSP 2004 survey on citizenship. 
Only three people out of 100 fi nd the issue unimportant, while three 
quarters consider it very important. There is some variation between 
the countries. The fi gures are highest in Sweden (85 per cent very 
important) and in the USA (82 per cent) and lowest in Japan (60 per 
cent very important) and in Great Britain (63 per cent). In general, 
the idea of equal treatment is widely accepted in the Nordic countries. 
Among the Nordic countries, the fi gures were lowest in Finland.
It is said that political parties are transmitting the interests of 
different social forces. Political parties represent their members and 
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supporters in the governmental decision-making processes. In these 
processes, politicians are the most important actors, and they are pro-
vided with the mandate to act by the citizens. This kind of classical 
thinking also implies that politicians should very carefully take into 
account their supporters’ views before making any political decisions. 
Politicians should follow the “voice” of the people. However, during 
Figure 3. Government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of 
their position in society (Q35c)*.
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Figure 35c. IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY:
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES TREAT EVERYBODY EQ-
UALLY REGARDLESS OF THEIR POSITION IN SOCIETY (%).
*There are different opinions about people’s rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:
That government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in 
society.
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the past few decades, this line of thinking has been heavily criticised. 
Nowadays, it is said that there is a growing distance between the elec-
torate and the decision makers.
More than two thirds of all respondents fi nd it highly important 
that the politicians take into account the views of the citizens before 
making decisions. Again, only three per cent consider it unimpor-
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Figure 35d. IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY:
POLITICIANS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF CITI-
ZENS BEFORE MAKING DECISIONS (%).
Figure 4. Politicians take into account the views of citizens before mak-
ing decisions*.
*There are different opinions about people’s rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
That politicians take into account the views of citizens before making decisions.
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tant. The variation between the countries is small. The fi gure “very 
important” is highest in Japan and in the USA, 75 per cent in both 
countries and lowest in Finland (58 per cent). Combining the positive 
categories, the difference between the countries disappears entirely. We 
may conclude that all around the world people share the idea that, in 
a democratic society, politicians should take into account the views of 
the citizens before making decisions.
In modern democracies, citizens participate in public decision-
making by voting. We vote in local and general elections. After the 
elections, city councils and parliaments are responsible for the actual 
decision-making. During the past 15 years, the public sector has adopted 
practices from private enterprises. New public management thinking 
places a lot of emphasis e.g. on effi ciency and accountability. The public 
decision-making is becoming increasingly professional. It is often said 
that the problems are so complicated that ordinary people are unable to 
master them. What is people’s take on this, then, would they like to have 
more opportunities to participate in the public decision-making?
A half of the respondents consider it important that people have 
more opportunities for taking part in decision-making and only four 
per cent fi nd it unimportant. There are interesting differences between 
the countries. People in the non-EU countries are more in favour of new 
opportunities than people in the EU countries. In the Nordic countries, 
the support is at the lowest level. In our sample of countries, the fi gures 
are highest in Spain and Portugal (60 per cent very important) and 
lowest in Finland (38 per cent) and Denmark (40 per cent). 
How can this result be interpreted? One line of argument is that, 
in the Nordic countries, we have long traditions of political democracy 
and active voluntary associations. People fi nd that the existing systems 
provide enough means for participation as it is. On the other hand, in 
countries where the democratic tradition is younger, people are more 
eager to gain more opportunities for participation.
During the past 10 years, new forms of political action have rapidly 
increased on a global scale, including those of civil disobedience. The 
phenomena can be seen in connection with extensive demonstrations 
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against the IMF, WTO and similar organizations. In the Unites States, 
opposition against the war in Iraq is also a good example. This kind of 
civil disobedience is by no means a new phenomenon. Similar phenom-
ena can be found in the 1960s. However, an entirely new characteristic 
of civil disobedience is the global scale.
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Figure 35e. IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY:
THAT PEOPLE BE GIVEN MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO
PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING (%).
* There are different opinions about people’s rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
That people are given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making.
Figure 5. People should be given more opportunities to participate in 
public decision-making*.
   67
Slightly over one quarter (29 per cent) of the respondents consider it very 
important for people’s rights in a democracy that the citizens may engage 
in acts of civil disobedience in opposing government action. Altogether, 
61 per cent fi nd this important and 24 per cent unimportant.
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Figure 35f. IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRACY:
THAT CITIZENS MAY ENGAGE IN ACTS OF CIVIL DIS-
OBEDIENCE WHEN THEY OPPOSE GOVERNMENT ACT-
IONS (%).
*There are different opinions about people’s rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
That citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose govern-
ment actions.
Figure 6. Citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they 
oppose government actions*.
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Here, the differences between countries are considerable. In Russia, (38 
per cent very important) people are more than twice as often in favour 
of civil disobedience as in Norway (16 per cent). In Great Britain, al-
most a half (44 per cent) of the respondents fi nd it unimportant, while 
in Portugal only 15 per cent share this opinion. All Nordic countries 
belong to the group in which people do not place much emphasis on 
civil disobedience.
The debate concerning the role of political parties since the late 1970s 
has been lively. In his classical study about the security state, the Ger-
man sociologist Joachim Hirsch (1980) presented the idea that political 
parties are not collective organizers anymore as much as apparatuses 
of mass integration. By this Hirsch means that political parties are no 
more mediating the interests of social classes but trying to integrate 
voters to the current political system. As a consequence of this political 
parties do not encourage people to become active in politics anymore. 
Hirsch’s prognosis has been quite correct at least in the Nordic context, 
where we have had real mass parties compared with most of the Europe. 
In the Nordic countries there have been real differences between the 
political agendas e.g. the social democratic parties and the conservative 
parties. Meanwhile, we have witnessed the decline in the membership 
fi gures and decline in voting rates.
Today, only very few people strongly agree with the statement 
that political parties encourage people to become active in politics. In 
fact, slightly more often people fi nd the opposite to be true. About one 
quarter have a neutral opinion in this respect. Again, the differences 
between countries in comparison are signifi cant. Surprisingly, people 
in the United States fi nd that political parties encourage people to 
become active in politics more often than the rest of the world. From 
the Nordic perspective this is slightly strange, since the political par-
ties in the USA are only active during elections. The fi gures are lowest 
in the Netherlands and Great Britain. In the Nordic countries, the 
Danes are the most optimistic in this respect, whereas the Swedes are 
the most pessimistic. All in all, people in the non-EU countries have 
a more positive attitude towards political parties than people in the 
European Union. 
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One ideal model of democracy suggests that all important political 
questions should be solved by referendums. However, referendums are 
not widely used in contemporary world. Switzerland is perhaps the best 
example of a country in which referendums are used on a regular basis. In 
the rest of the world, referendums are very rarely used. A good example is 
the vote on whether a country should join the European Union. Those 
who speak in favour of referendums are often accused of populism. 
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Figure 48a. "Political parties encourage people to become
 active in politics" (%).
*Thinking about politics in [your country], to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? a) Political parties encourage people to become 
active in politics
Figure 7. Political parties encourage people to become active in politics*.
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One quarter of all respondents strongly agree with the statement that 
referendums are a good way to decide on important political questions. 
Another 45  per cent agree with the statement. Only slightly over one 
tenth disagrees. The Danes are the most often in favour of the idea, 
while people in Finland have the greatest doubts. In comparison, the 
differences between the different country groups are not signifi cant. 
*Thinking about politics in [your country], to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? c) Referendums are a good way to decide impor-
tant political questions.
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Figure 48c. "Referendums are a good way to decide important
 political questions" (%).
Figure 8. Referendums are a good way to decide important political ques-
tions*.
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The comparisons have shown that the elements of civic mind, 
such as competence, active participation and tolerance, that were 
already proposed in the 1960s (Almond and Verba 1963) can also be 
found in the contemporary world. People, for example, think that in 
a democratic society all citizens should have an adequate standard of 
living, and that, in a democracy, government authorities should respect 
and protect minority rights and treat everybody equally regardless of 
their position in the society.
There are, however, clear differences between the countries. If 
we wanted to name the countries where we can fi nd “developed civic 
minds”, the Nordic countries would be at the top. Denmark is the best 
example here while Finland has a number of contradictory elements. 
The fi gures are also high in Spain and Portugal and the United States. 
Japan and Russia both have different political traditions and clearly 
deviate from the standard pattern. In Europe, the fi gures are in many 
respects critical in the Netherlands and Great Britain.  
Our analyses have shown that the European Union is, by no means, 
a homogenous political entity. There are tangible differences between 
the EU countries. It seems that people in the old EU countries, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands, are more sceptical towards the political 
system than other EU countries.
Legitimacy of Finnish Democracy
With the term legitimacy social scientists usually refer to Max Weber’s 
analysis on the sources of legitimate authority or power (Weber 1978). 
Weber talks about charismatic, traditional and rational/legal authority. 
The legitimacy of charismatic authority is based on the charisma of 
the leader. In the case of traditional authority, legitimacy is based on 
tradition. People accept the government because of the length of the 
period it has been in power. Rational authority is typical of modern 
societies. Legitimacy is based on the perception that the government’s 
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power derives from a set of procedures, principles and laws. Representa-
tive democracy is a proper example of legal authority.
Many social scientists have proposed that in the contemporary 
world we can see a process of the erosion of citizenship and crisis of 
legitimacy (Balibar 1988, Habermas 1998). The crisis is caused by 
the post-national world of corporate globalism, increased migration, 
Internet revolution and multicultural states (Scobey 2001, 13). In this 
respect Finland is an interesting case for analysis. Finland has long 
traditions of democracy, active civil society and the country has been 
shaped strongly by economic globalisation during the past 15 years.
Figure 9. Most of the time we can trust the government to do what is right.
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Figure 40a. "Most of the time we can trust people in govern-
 ment to do what is right" (%).
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The most common source of legitimacy today is the perception that 
a government is operating under democratic principles and is subject to 
the will of the people. Governments often claim a popular mandate to 
exercise power; however, how this mandate is obtained can vary greatly 
from regime to regime. Liberal democratic states claim democratic le-
gitimacy on the grounds that they have regular free and fair contested 
elections. The Finnish democracy meets all the formal requirements 
mentioned above. How do the Finnish respondents in the ISSP survey 
perceive the state of the art at the time of the 2004 survey? 
Trust in government is an important aspect of legitimacy. Accord-
ing to a number of surveys, for example ISSP and ESS, the Finns have 
high trust in political institutions. This holds true for the parliament, 
judiciary and the police, as well as the politicians. According to the 
2000 ESS survey, 82 per cent of Finns trust the Finnish parliament and 
69 per cent trust politicians. In international comparisons, the fi gures 
are rather high. However, the trust in institutions does not equal trust 
in that the government does what is right.
Most of the respondents are sceptical about the actions of the 
people in the government. Merely three per cent of all respondents 
strongly agree with the statement that most of the time we can trust 
the government to do what is right. One quarter agrees with the state-
ment. About the same number have a neutral opinion. More than 40 
per cent express a differentiating opinion.
There is no clear division between the countries. People in the 
Nordic countries have a more positive orientation than the ISSP av-
erage. People in Denmark and Finland have the highest trust in the 
government to do what is right. On the other hand, the German (62 
per cent disagree) and Japanese (63 per cent disagree) respondents are 
highly critical and the Russians are somewhere in the middle.
All politics is about interests. Political parties are supposed to 
mediate the interests of the members and supporters. On the other 
hand, citizens think that politicians should act without promoting any 
personal interests. However, we all know that politicians are human 
beings, too, and they do not differ from anyone else, they have their 
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own reference groups and interests. Politicians in all countries are a part 
of national elites, and according to a common understanding, they, at 
least partially, make their decisions based on their personal interests. 
More than a half of all respondents agree with the statements 
that most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of 
it personally. One quarter of the respondents strongly agrees with this 
Figure 10. Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of 
it personally.
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Figure 40b. "Most politicians are in politics only for what they
 can get out of it personally" (%).
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statement. Only a total of 20 per cent disagree, the same number holds 
a neutral opinion.
People in the non-EU countries are more willing than people in the 
EU to believe that the politicians are selfi sh. In the Nordic countries, 
more often than in other countries, people consider politicians to have 
other interests besides gaining personal benefi ts. Finland is an excep-
tion. Here, more than a half believes that most politicians are in politics 
solely for personal gain. In Norway, the corresponding fi gure is merely 
26 per cent. In the EU context, the Portuguese are the most critical 
towards politicians, more than 80 per cent of the respondents believe 
that politicians are in politics mainly because of personal reasons.
When people cast their votes in general elections, they make 
political choices. They choose between different parties and it is as-
sumed that the parties promote different goals. Socialist parties support 
the welfare state and are critical towards unrestrained market forces. 
Christian parties trust the Christian values and place a lot of emphasis 
on family politics. Greens are concerned with environmental issues. 
Conservative parties, on the other hand, rely on individualism and 
private entrepreneurship. 
The differences between political parties seem clear. However, a 
half of all respondents fi nd that political parties do not provide the 
voters with real policy choices. Only 22 per cent disagree with this 
statement and one quarter is of neutral opinion.
People in Portugal and in Ireland are the most critical towards 
political parties in this respect. In both countries, at least 60 per cent 
believe that parties do not give voters real policy choices. In the Nordic 
countries, the Finns are the most critical ones. People in Denmark have 
the highest trust in politics. More than one third fi nds that different 
policy choices are available for the general population, while in Japan 
only 12 per cent share this opinion.
Research has shown that in the Soviet Union, close to 100 per cent 
of the electorate always voted in the general elections and candidates 
nominated by the communist party were always elected to the parlia-
ment and various councils. Social scientists were highly critical towards 
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these results. The results were, without a doubt manipulated. Today, we 
closely follow the elections around the world. Independent monitor 
reports on how honest the counting and reporting of votes is.
Three quarters of the respondents believe that the counting and 
reporting of votes in the last national elections in their country was 
honest and 14 per cent believe the opposite to be true. In the Nordic 
countries, most of the respondents consider the elections to have been 
honest. In Finland and Denmark, none of the respondents believed in 
Figure 11. Political parties do not give voters real policy choices.
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Figure 48b. "Political parties do not give voters real policy
 choices " (%).
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dishonest practices and in Sweden and Norway only a few believed in 
dishonesty. The United States, on the other hand, is the other extreme. 
More than a half of Americans are of the opinion that the counting 
and reporting of votes in the last national election was dishonest, and a 
quarter believes it was highly dishonest. On the other hand, in Russia, 
with the Soviet traditions still alive, 39 per cent consider the election 
to have been honest and one third considers them dishonest.
Figure 12. Thinking of last national election in Finland, how honest was it 
regarding the counting and reporting of votes.
Total ISSP
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Germany
Netherlands
Great Britain
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
Russia
United States
Japan
Nordic Countries
EU Countries
Non-EU Countries
0 25 50 75 100
36
71
51
74
59
40
59
39
49
45
13
3
14
16
64
42
30
37
25
38
23
33
41
35
32
33
30
68
36
25
59
29
38
35
14
4
8
3
6
13
4
19
12
12
13
30
14
22
5
13
16
9
0
2
0
1
4
1
8
4
9
5
26
24
3
1
5
12
5
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
2
4
1
6
23
1
0
2
7
ISSP 2004  Citizenship  FSD2184 / CINEFOGO 2006-2007
Figure 49. THINKING OF THE LAST NATIONAL ELECTION IN
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The nature of political campaigns varies from country to country. The 
variation between the campaigns is also great between the political par-
ties and between the candidates in a given country. In some countries, 
the political opposition is more or less forbidden. In some countries, 
there are strong restrictions for the opposition. In some countries, 
Figure 13. Considering the latest national election in your own country, 
how fair was it regarding the opportunities of the candidates and parties 
to campaign.
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Figure 50. THINKING OF THE LAST NATIONAL ELECTION IN
[COUNTRY] , HOW FAIR WAS IT REGARDING THE
OPPORTUNITIES OF THE CANDIDATES AND PARTIES
TO CAMPAIGN (%).
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room for operation for the opposition parties is limited, for example, 
by media. In many countries elections are, thus, highly unfair.
How do the respondents perceive the situation in their own coun-
try? A clear majority fi nd that the campaigning opportunities for the 
candidates and parties were at least somewhat fair. One fi fth believes 
Figure 14. How widespread corruption is in the public service in Finland.
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that the election was fair in this respect. Another one fi fth fi nds that the 
elections were at least somewhat unfair. In Ireland, 80 per cent of the 
respondents consider that the candidates and parties had fair chances 
in the last national election. Meanwhile, only a third of the Russians 
share this opinion.
In this respect, Finland is an interesting case. People in the Nordic 
countries typically consider the political system fair for all the parties 
and candidates. Figures are high especially in Norway and Denmark. 
In Finland, only 55 per cent believe that the system is fair and one 
third fi nds the system at least somewhat unfair. This fi gure is clearly 
the highest among the EU countries. In principle, the Finnish system 
is fair and all parties have equal opportunities, though there is an ongo-
ing debate concerning the economic opportunities, voting districts ect. 
It is possible that respondents in Finland have taken into account the 
economic resources of the candidates. As it turns out, the differences 
in Finland are, indeed, considerable in this respect.
Thus, we have to remember that even if the elections are formally 
and in practice as fair as possible, the economic possibilities to run the 
campaign are not equal. The parties and candidates with considerable 
economic resources at their disposal have considerably better opportuni-
ties than those with limited resources. 
Transparency International (see www.transparency.org) has moni-
tored corruption on a global scale for years. According to the 2006 
data, the fi ve least corrupt countries in the world are Finland, Iceland, 
New Zealand, Denmark and Singapore. On the other hand, the three 
most corrupt countries are Haiti, Myanmar and Iraq.
A third (31 per cent) of all respondents believe that only a small 
number of people working in the public sector are engaged in corruption 
in their country. At the same time, 39 per cent claim that a consider-
able number of people in the public sector are corrupt.
Differences between the countries are great. In Russia, less than ten 
per cent of the respondents believe that only a small number of people 
are not involved in corruption whereas more than two thirds are. In 
the neighbouring Finland, the situation is the other way around. Two 
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thirds say that only a small number of people is corrupt and less than 
ten per cent claim the opposite to be true. In general, people in the 
non-EU countries perceive corruption as more common than people 
in the EU. In the Nordic countries, corruption appears to be at the 
lowest level.
In the ISSP survey there was a three item scale measuring how well 
the democracy is perceived as working in different countries. The fi rst 
Figure 15. How well does democracy work in Finland today.
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Figure 54a. HOW WELL DOES DEMOCRACY WORK IN [COUNT-
RY]: a) TODAY (scale 0 -10 turned and divided in three
classes, %).
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question dealt with how well the democracy works today, how well it 
worked 10 years ago and how well the respondents estimate it to work 
ten years from now. The respondents were asked to use a scale from 0 
to 10 and locate their own country on the scale. In the tables, we have 
divided the answers into three classes indicating whether the democ-
racy is perceived as working well, whether the respondents’ opinion is 
neutral or if whether it is perceived as working poorly.
Figure 16. How well did democracy work in Finland 10 years ago.
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Figure 54b. HOW WELL DOES DEMOCRACY WORK IN [COUNT-
RY]: a) 10 YEARS AGO (scale 0 -10 turned and divided
in three classes, %).
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The fi gures show that the respondents have a positive opinion about 
the development of the democracy in general. In the following table, 
we have the fi gures – democracy works well and poorly – for Finland, 
Russia and the ISSP as a whole:
Figure 17. How well does democracy work in Finland 10 years from now.
Total ISSP
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Germany
Netherlands
Great Britain
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
Russia
United States
Japan
Nordic Countries
EU Countries
Non-EU Countries
0 25 50 75 100
51
56
44
72
49
32
49
41
65
59
50
42
51
30
56
51
52
31
30
32
20
33
36
39
37
27
31
33
34
31
45
29
32
30
17
14
23
6
17
32
13
23
10
10
17
25
18
26
15
17
18
ISSP 2004  Citizenship  FSD2184 / CINEFOGO 2006-2007
7-10
WELL
4-6
NEUTRAL
0-3
BADLY
Figure 54c. HOW WELL DOES DEMOCRACY WORK IN [COUNT-
RY]: a) 10 YEARS FROM NOW (scale 0 -10 turned and
divided in three classes, %).
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Table 1. Views on the development of Democracy in Finland, Russia and 
all ISSP countries.
We can assume that Finland represents a country with long democratic 
traditions and the Finnish democracy works considerably well in in-
ternational comparisons. On the other hand, Russia has experienced 
rapid social changes and a deep socio-economic transition. The roots 
of the current Russian democracy are not deep grown.
Slightly more than a half of the Finns fi nd that the Finnish de-
mocracy has been working well so far, currently works well and will 
be working well in the future, as well. It is, however, interesting that 
the future expectations in Finland are at the same time more critical. 
A growing number believes that in the future, democracy will not 
work as well as today. People’s perceptions of the development of the 
Russian democracy are highly positive. If everything continues as ex-
pected, Russia is likely to take a giant leap towards democracy within 
the next 10 years.
What can, then, be said about the legitimacy of the Finnish de-
mocracy on the basis of the previous empirical analysis? In interna-
tional comparisons, Finland belongs to highly functional parliamen-
tary democracies, the Nordic welfare state model, social corporatist 
countries and the least corrupt countries in the world. The image that 
the respondents have of their country in the Finnish ISSP survey on 
citizenship is, however, more critical. The respondents believe that 
the Finnish political system does not encourage people to take initia-
tive in political matters, that too many politicians act only in order to 
gain personal benefi t, and that there are no real choices between the 
political parties.
Finland Russia ISSP
10 years ago Well 52 Poorly 9 Well 10 Poorly 68 Well 41 Poorly 22
Today Well 53 Poorly 6 Well 18 Poorly 33 Well 44 Poorly 16
10 years from now Well 55 Poorly 14 Well 42 Poorly 25 Well 51 Poorly 17
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 Democracy is not an easy and simple concept. Peoples’ perception 
of democracy varies greatly. On one hand, the political elite may be 
under the impression that the status quo in our country is as it should 
be. On the other hand, the general population is highly critical towards 
the political practices. At least from the perspective of active citizenship 
and strong civil society, the results indicate that, in Finland, there is 
still room for improvement in many respects. The results indicate that 
when government authorities treat everybody equally, when politicians 
take into account the views of citizens and when citizens have fair op-
portunities to participate the legitimacy increases. 
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Differentia Specifi ca of Voluntary Organizing   
in Finland
Martti Siisiäinen
This chapter conducts a general analysis of voluntary organizing in 
Finland in a comparative perspective. Comparison in this study means, 
on the one hand, analysis of the present situation of associational activ-
ity and its changing character in relation to earlier times; and, second, 
defi ning the specifi c features of Finnish associational activities in in-
ternational comparison (based on the ISSP-data). These comparisons 
make it possible to offer some general comments about the possibilities 
and the restrictions of comparisons based on international surveys.
The changing voluntary associations at the turn 
of Millennium: changes in associational activities                    
in Finland since early 20th century
It can be argued that registered voluntary associations have played an 
exceptionally important role in Finnish society, for historical and social 
reasons, which will be discussed later in this paper. During the Russian 
rule in the fi rst part of the 19th century, the Finnish nationalist movement 
acquired a very well organized and state-centred character (see Stenius 
1986; Alapuro et al [ed.] 1987). The leadership was in the hands of intel-
ligentsia and state-offi cials that both were quite dependent on the state. 
Developing voluntary associations connected parts of the bourgeoisie, 
state-offi cials, clergy and wealthy peasantry and, at the end of the century, 
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parts of the working class. Formal voluntary associations had at the same 
time a mobilizing and moderating infl uence on the movements. 
The dominance of the form of voluntary association was also re-
alised in the workers’ and peasants’ movements. Since the Finnish in-
dependence in 1917 the registration of associations has become a rule 
in all major movements from communist and populist to conservative 
ones. Registration of an association makes it a legal subject, which – in 
most cases – is a precondition for becoming an acknowledged partner 
in negotiations with state or municipal authorities etc. Being registered 
has meant at least a partial acceptance of “the rules of the game” by the 
association but it has also created in many cases a more or less effective 
channel for infl uencing the political decision making (e.g. via neocorpo-
ratist mechanisms). The other side of the extensive state-centeredness of 
Finnish collective action has been the scantiness of alternative forms of 
infl uencing political and social institutions. As the proper mass-mobiliza-
tion by associations started after mid 19th century it spread quite quickly 
covering quite evenly almost the whole country during the fi rst decade 
of the 20th century. Figure 1 describes the formation of new registered 
associations after Finnish independence: 
Figure 1. Registration of new voluntary associations in Finland 1920–2005
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More than 170,000 associations were registered between 1919 and 
2006 (approximately 2,000 per year). Approximately 80,000-90,000 
of them are still active. Sweden and Finland have the highest number 
of associations relative to population (see the Johns Hopkins study: 
Salamon et al. 1999; Helander & Laaksonen 1999). Most peaks of 
registrations were concurrent with active periods of protest (rightist: 
1928-1932; leftist: 1944-1948; 1966-1972; leftist & populist: 1959-
1961; green: 1979-1984): this refers to the fact that protest movements 
(the kind that were not included into components of positive social 
capital by Putnam in his Italy study 1993) have been very central in 
the creation of networks of social capital in Finland. An exception 
to “the rule”: 1996-1998 (10,000 new associations, no large protest 
movements) (see Siisiäinen 1999; 2002; 2007).
Within the system of voluntary association, proportions of dif-
ferent types of association have changed quite dramatically during the 
last decades (see Table 1):
Table 1. Registration of different types of associations 1919 – 2002
Type of
ASSOC.
  1990-1994   1995-1999 2000-2002     1919-2002
N % N % N % N %
Political 550 5 300 2 150 2 30430 19
Econ/prof 1395 14 2265 14 1005 13 41655 26
Welfare 870 9 1205 8 695 9 9955 6
Culture 2230 22 4625 29 2465 32 22800 14
Sports 2280 22 3680 23 1715 22 20075 12
Other hob 1855 18 2470 16 1260 16 20190 12
Religious 185 2 295 2 205 3 3770 2
War/peace 65 1 115 1 45 1 5625 4
International 190 2 225 1 80 1 2265 1
Other 565 6 525 3 200 3 6200 4
Total 10185 100 15705 100 7820 100 162965 100
Assocs/year 2037 3141 2607 1940
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The most important general conclusions that can be drawn from 
the table are, fi rst, the decline in (party) political organizing from 19 
per cent (during the whole period 1919-2002) to two per cent (2000-
2002). The change is even more striking if the comparison is made 
to the most political decades: from the 1950s to the 1970s more than 
one fourth of all associations were linked to a political party. After the 
exceptional times between two world wars (and after the civil war of 
1918) and the time of recovery from the hardships of World War II, 
Finnish civil society could not develop into its proper modern forms 
before the end of the 1950s. The exceptionally fast modernization 
of various fi elds of industry after the war was refl ected in the steady 
proliferation of various interest organizations, economic and occupa-
tion associations and political organizations for various constituencies 
(party, women’s, children’s, youngsters’ associations). 
All decades till the 1970s were characterized by the strong infl uence 
of class to voluntary organizing. Social tensions – often clearly of class 
origin – coloured the formation of associations in many fi elds outside 
party politics: temperance, sports, adult education, choirs etc. The other 
side of the shifting of the point of emphasis away from economic and 
political fi elds is the mushrooming of cultural (32 per cent), sport (22 
per cent) and other hobby associations (16 per cent) (together 70 per 
cent of all new associations founded in 2000-2002; cf. 38 per cent in 
1920-2002). A great part of these new associations fulfi l interests of 
self-development or self-realization or can be understood as parts of 
individual ego-projects aiming at developing person’s physical or men-
tal abilities. Also the share of economic/professional associations has 
dropped whereas religious, social welfare and international associations 
have more or less been able to keep up their proportion.
In closer examination the most central changes in the social con-
tents of associational activities and characteristics around the turn of 
the century are (see Siisiäinen 2003; Siisiäinen (ed.) 2002): 
(1)  Specialization and differentiation proceeding from general as
sociations of – for example music, literature or dance – to very 
specialised ones (e.g. associations for different types of ethnic 
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music, different types of combat sports or for hundreds of breeds 
of dogs or cats). This means that members only need to invest a 
very small part of their personality in the membership role (c.f. 
Bauman 1995).
(2) “Wildness” & light organizational structures: In the city of Jy-
väskylä, more than 80 per cent of associations registered before 
1995 reported that they are members of central federations/un-
ions whereas the corresponding proportion was only 40 per cent 
of those registered in 1995-2001 (Siisiäinen 2003). This change 
means that the possibilities of utilizing new associations as means 
of “system integration” tend to decrease. Many of the associa-
tions established during earlier periods could channel discontent 
and protest potential into forms that could be utilized in the 
development of the social political cohesion of the social system. 
Thereby “non-political” associations (in the narrow meaning of 
the word political) could, on certain conditions, be turned into 
forces supporting the system integration (see Lockwood 1964) 
of the hegemony (see Gramsci 1967). Wildness of many new as-
sociations is expressed in the cutting loose of the ties to ideologi-
cal subcultures, too: only very seldom new associations belong 
to associational subcultures based on ideologies anymore. New 
associations do not have as tense relationship with municipal or 
state authorities or institutions as do the older ones.
(3) Smallness: The average size of associations has diminished (mem-   
 berships, budget) (see Siisiäinen [ed.] 2002) 
(4) New associations have less interaction with municipal institu-
tions and the state which is a good indicator of the fact that the 
voluntary organizations of the turn of the Millennium are not 
any more as state- (or municipality-) centred as the older ones. 
This holds true for both social movements and voluntary as-
sociations.
(5) Growing importance of local and international factors at the 
expense of national factors in the new formation of associations. 
For example the proportion of association names in Finnish was 
94 per cent among associations registered 1940 – 1979 but only 
78 in 1990-1990 whereas the proportion of English names rose 
from zero to ten per cent (Siisiäinen 2007).
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These changes mean that the role of especially those associations that 
have been central in the traditional system integration has decreased 
at the turn of the Millennium. These include associations that have 
required an extensive investment of members’ personality in the asso-
ciations. Many of the association types that tend to die out have been 
collective and ideological organizations (as distinct from individual “ego 
projects”) purporting to create solidarity and act as “collective intellec-
tuals” (see Gramsci 1967) whereas many of the new ones form arenas 
of individual action. These new associations follow rather the logic 
of consumption than the logic of production of some collective good 
(c.f. Bauman, op.cit). These new associations fi t better as parts to the 
development of forms of governance at a distance based on behaviour 
of individuals who understand themselves as entrepreneurs of their own 
life (see Rose 1999). The older system of governance relied more on 
the rule of individuals as members of associations and the relationship 
between participating individuals and the state was intermediated by 
associations and other civil society organizations. In the new system of 
governance actors are integrated as individuals making consumer-like 
choices, not so much  as members of social collectives.
On the other hand, this kind of cultural and hobby associations 
are among the most important actors in the creation of generalized 
trust in Putnam’s idea of “rosy circle” of social capital (see Putnam 
1993), a kind of perpetuum mobile formed by associations and trusting 
mutually reinforcing one another. It goes without saying that there is 
no unanimity about the causal relations between (different types of ) 
associations and generalized trust.
The conclusion that no general crisis of associational social capital 
exists in Finland is backed by the examination of the development of 
association memberships in Finland (see table 2):
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Table 2. Number of association memberships 1972–2005
Memberships 1972 1975 1981 1986 1988 1994 2000 2005
0 38 27 28 25 21 23 17 13
1 37 34 39 36 35 30 29 18
2 25 22 16 24 20 21 25 22
3 - 9 8 10 11 12 16 19
4 - 8 4 3 6 7 8 12
5 - - 2 1 3 8 4 8
6- - - 3 - 4 - 4 9
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
          N 994 1124 1436 2291 2008 1788 1616 1000
(Allardt 1976; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979; Luokkaprojekti 1984; Siisiäinen 2002; 
Kankainen 2007)
The proportion of those who have no memberships at all has declined 
quite evenly during the 34-year period and the share of those having 
four or more memberships has grown. However, results concerning the 
development after the turn of the Millennium give inconsistent results 
about the participation of Finns in associational life (c.f. Kankainen 
2005; Borg 2005). A general conclusion is that social group differences 
in association activity have to some extent decreased (for example be-
tween men and women). However, there still is a correlation between 
the level of education and income and the number of memberships. 
Old and young people are more passive than their middle aged fellow 
citizens. Further inconsistencies can be found between Finnish surveys 
and international surveys (which, also, give inconsistent results as 
compared to each other).
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Finnish association memberships                                                      
in international comparison
Finns have belonged to the international top group of association activ-
ists as measured by association memberships as long as large comparative 
surveys have been conducted (see. e.g. Morales 2001; Curtis & Baer 
& Grabb 2001; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Wallace 2005; 
Morales & Geurts 2007). The ISSP surveys reinforce the results given 
by earlier surveys (see table 3):
Table 3. The number of association memberships among citizens in vari-
ous countries in 2004 (ISSP)
Number of 
Memberships
0 1 2 3 4 5
All 35 31 19 10 4 1
Finland 12 25 30 23 8 1
Sweden 9 24 33 24 9 2
Denmark 3 16 29 32 16 3
Norway 11 25 27 22 11 3
Germany 27 37 25 8 2 0
Holland 19 31 28 15 5 1
England 37 31 21 7 2 1
Ireland 13 31 27 20 8 2
Spain 53 27 13 5 1 0
Portugal 54 30 11 4 1 0
Russia 66 25 7 1 0 0
USA 18 29 22 16 10 4
Japan 60 28 9 2 0 0
Nordic countr. 9 23 30 25 11 2
EU countries 35 31 20 10 4 1
NON-EU 36 33 18 9 3 1
The proportion of those without any memberships varies between 3 
(Denmark) and 66 per cent (Russia), the average of all countries in-
cluded being 35. Finland is the fourth in the top quartet consisting of 
four Nordic countries followed by Ireland and the Netherlands. The 
proportions of non-members rise – quite much in the Nordic countries 
– if churches and religious organizations are excluded but the order 
or countries will remain almost the same. There are only very minor 
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differences between the EU-countries and Non-EU countries included 
in the survey but the variations within both categories are big.
The order of countries resembles very much the list obtained in 
comparative studies concerning associational social capital and general-
ized trust during the last decade (or two) (see e.g. Wallace 2005). There 
is a lot of research evidence stressing the importance of a visible and 
well functioning system of voluntary associations for the development 
of generalized trust and solidarity in society (e.g. Wollebaek &  Selle 
2002). These kinds of civic structures, for their part, have contributed 
to the development of well functioning welfare states. This is one of the 
main directions where to look for roots of the special characteristics of 
Finnish traditions of collective action.
There is a lot of evidence pointing to the fact that association 
memberships and volunteerism, here defi ned as being active in associa-
tions, do not follow the same pattern (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Belonging to and participating in different types of associations 
in different countries
Status of belonging: Political party
Belong and  
participate
Belong, not 
participate
Used
to belong
Never
belonged
All 3 7 9 81
Finland 2 8 9 82
Sweden 3 7 14 76
Denmark 3 5 13 79
Norway 3 15 16 66
Germany 2 2 6 89
Holland 2 9 9 80
England 2 9 7 82
Ireland 3 8 5 85
Spain 3 3 5 89
Portugal 2 4 5 90
Russia 1 2 14 83
USA 15 27 4 53
Japan 1 4 5 90
Nordic countries 2 9 13 76
EU countries 2 5 8 84
Non-EU countries 4 9 9 78
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Membership in political parties is quite similar in all countries included 
in the survey with the exception of the USA. One to three per cent of 
respondents are active members (= belong and participate) in parties 
and in addition seven to nine per cent (Finland, Sweden, Holland, 
England, and Ireland) or less are passive members. In the USA 15 per 
cent are active and 27 per cent passive members.
Status of belonging: Trade union etc.
Belong and 
participate
Belong, not 
participate
Used to 
belong
Never 
belonged 
All 7 16 22 55
Finland 6 50 17 27
Sweden 8 56 22 14
Denmark 14 55 21 10
Norway 13 40 22 25
Germany 6 11 28 54
Holland 6 24 19 50
England 5 15 33 46
Ireland 14 15 21 51
Spain 7 7 12 74
Portugal 4 8 15 73
Russia 6 15 45 34
USA 12 9 19 60
Japan 2 12 17 68
Nordic countries 10 50 20 19
EU countries 7 19 24 50
Non-EU countries 8 13 19 60
The Nordic countries are countries of wide and relatively active trade 
union memberships whereas in most of the countries the vast major-
ity has never belonged to trade unions (in Spain, Portugal and Japan 
about three out of four, in the USA two out of three). In previous 
state-socialist countries many used to be (obligatory) members under 
Communism but are non-members at present. 
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Status of belonging: Church rel org
Belong and 
participate
Belong, not 
participate Used to belong
Never 
belonged
All 16 23 11 51
Finland 7 61 11 20
Sweden 7 54 11 28
Denmark 15 70 6 9
Norway 10 48 9 33
Germany 15 36 14 35
Holland 15 25 20 40
England 16 18 24 41
Ireland 56 20 8 17
Spain 9 7 9 75
Portugal 15 15 8 62
Russia 2 8 3 87
USA 40 22 22 17
Japan 3 5 3 88
Nordic countries 10 58 9 23
EU countries 13 26  9 51
Non-EU countries 19 20 12 50
The ISSP survey groups churches and religious associations into the 
same category irrespective of differences of religious systems between 
countries (state church system; different meanings of church mem-
berships in catholic and protestant countries etc.). However, the low 
proportion of activists (seven %) shows clearly the high degree of 
secularization in Finland and Sweden (even compared with the other 
Nordic countries). The low percentage of activists in Portugal and 
Russia must be connected with the fact that all activism is at its lowest 
in those two countries.
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Status of belonging: Sports group etc.
Belong and 
participate
Belong, not 
participate
Used to 
belong
Never 
belonged to
All 20 9 23 47
Finland 23 17 31 29
Sweden 28 22 32 18
Denmark 41 11 36 12
Norway 28 16 39 17
Germany 29 12 26 33
Holland 43 13 33 11
England 22 6 33 39
Ireland 36 8 20 35
Spain 15 10 18 58
Portugal 7 7 16 70
Russia 4 3 20 73
USA 23 8 26 43
Japan 13 10 24 53
Nordic countries 29 17 34 19
EU countries 22 10 24 44
Non-EU countries 18 8 23 51
Activism in sports clubs and associations belonging in the “other as-
sociations” category is especially high in Denmark, Holland, Ireland 
and middle high in Sweden, Finland, England and the USA.
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Status of belonging: Other voluntary assoc
Belong and
participate
Belong, not 
participate
Used to 
belong
Never be-
longed 
All 12 7 14 68
Finland 16 20 15 49
Sweden 9 15 22 54
Denmark 26 16 22 36
Norway 20 18 25 37
Germany 8 4 5 83
Holland 20 6 19 56
England 12 5 22 61
Ireland 21 6 18 54
Spain 9 5 10 76
Portugal 5 4 8 82
Russia 2 1 9 88
USA 21 6 24 50
Japan 3 3 6 87
Nordic countries 18 17 21 44
EU countries 11 7 13 69
Non-EU countries 12 6 15 67
A new summated scale was formed using all questions concerning as-
sociation memberships (5 types of associations) and different forms of 
association participation. Values for each type of association:
0 = never belonged
1 = used to belong
2 = belong but don’t participate
3 = belong and actively participate
The sum values range thus from zero (minimum) to 15 (maximum) as 
all fi ve association types are added together (see Table 5):
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Table 5. Total association activity (a sum variable) in the countries included
Total association activity
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
All 19 9 13 15 10 9 8 5 4 3 2 1 1 0 0 0
Finland 6 2 7 11 15 12 13 11 9 5 4 2 1 0 0 0
Sweden 2 2 6 9 11 16 17 14 10 6 3 1 2 0 0 0
Denmark 1 1 2 4 10 11 12 15 14 11 9 5 3 1 0 0
Norway 2 3 6 9 11 14 13 11 11 7 6 3 2 1 0 0
Germany 10 8 18 19 13 12 8 5 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
Holland 4 6 8 14 14 13 12 10 7 5 4 2 1 1 0 0
England 12 11 12 14 12 10 8 8 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
Ireland 6 3 5 15 10 10 12 9 9 9 5 4 3 1 1 0
Spain 35 10 13 16 7 5 6 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0
Portugal 38 10 15 14 8 6 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Russia 24 26 20 14 7 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
USA 8 5 8 13 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 4 2 1 1
Japan 38 15 15 14 7 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nordic 
countries
3 2 5 8 12 14 14 13 11 8 6 3 2 1 0 0
EU 
countries
19 9 12 14 11 9 8 6 4 3 2 1 1 0 0 0
Non-EU 
countries
19 9 13 15 9 8 8 5 4 4 2 1 1 0 0 0
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We know from various international comparisons of association activ-
ity, generalized trust and various dimensions of social capital (see van 
Deth & Montero & Westholm (ed.) 2007; Wallace 2005) that no one 
reliable measure of total associational activity exists. Comparative stud-
ies have shown that the associational or social capital phenomenon 
is very complicated, multi-dimensional, historically and societally 
layered, making comparison very diffi cult. Therefore all explanations 
of different forms of social capital have been met by severe criticisms. 
However, quantitatively the most reliable comparisons in the fi eld 
concern association memberships (even though also they have dif-
ferent role, importance and meaning in different countries, political 
systems and welfare regimes) on the one hand and generalized trust, 
on the other. All explanations using individual based data as a basis 
of making causal generalizations at an upper, national level usually 
are heading into trouble. There is very little evidence of the causal 
relationship between membership in associations and trust. It looks 
like the relationship is indirect and develops, partly as an unintended 
consequence of associations (c.f. Coleman 1988). All these problems 
refer to the need to study associational and social capital mechanisms 
in local interaction contexts taking into account historical, political 
and cultural factors.
In the previous and following sections I will try to identify some 
differentia specifi ca of Finnish associational features that can be meas-
ured quantitatively in an international survey frame.
Table 6 describes the volume of associational activity in differ-
ent countries or the volume of actors' associational social capital (see 
Kivelä & Siisiäinen 2007). This associational potential can be used as a 
means of system integration in various ways as suggested, for example 
by Putnam and his followers. Same volume of associational capital can 
also have very different infl uence in different regimes of governance 
(or hegemony). It is also important to notice that the fi gures are only 
rough measures of associational capital connecting some (and ignoring 
other) dimensions of the phenomenon.
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Table 6. Averages of total association activity in different countries
Total association activity (average)
All 3.69
Finland 5.33
Sweden 5.74
Denmark 7.06
Norway 5.99
Germany 3.63
Holland 5.09
England 3.92
Ireland 5.74
Spain 2.43
Portugal 2.24
Russia 1.90
USA 5.69
Japan 1.80
Nordic countries 6.05
EU countries 3.69
Non-EU countries 3.68
The mean of EU-countries and all included countries is 3.69. At the 
top is Denmark followed by Norway, Sweden and Ireland, the USA, 
Finland and The Netherlands These countries, perhaps in slightly 
varying order, tend to show highest levels of associational capital in all 
studies of this kind.
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What makes Finland different:                            
conclusions and ensuing questions to research 
In studies using more developed measures of associational activity than 
above, more nuances about differences between countries have been 
revealed. First factor, creating distinctions between countries, divides 
association participation to formal memberships (no action) and ac-
tive membership. Countries at the top on both lists include Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands whereas Finland is high only on the 
membership list and a little bit lower on the one measuring active or 
working memberships (see Baer 2007; c.f. Wallace 2005; c.f., however 
Curtis & Baer & Grabb 2001).
Second divide separates countries whose citizens have high level of 
bridging social capital (e.g. associations connecting persons with dif-
ferent class or stratum background, belonging to different age groups, 
females and males etc) from countries with high levels of bonding 
social capital (contacts with relatives, friends, neighbours, work col-
leagues outside working time). Finland, again, is situated in the mid-
dle whereas many countries with low levels of bridging social capital 
or generalized trust score high in bonding social capital (for example 
Portugal and Latvia). 
With the assistance of the results from different international 
projects on social capital and association memberships, a preliminary 
“location” of Finland or the Finns (high, medium, low) on various as-
sociational dimensions can be attempted. In various studies countries 
have been ordered on the basis of the scores measuring different dimen-
sions of social capital such as generalized trust, volume of activeness 
of association memberships, participation and social networks (see 
Table 7).
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Table 7. The location of Finland (Finns) on different comparative lists 
based on various measures of forms of social capital
Feature of SoCa/
participation
High Medium Low
number of association 
memberships
-1990s (Siisiäinen 1999; 
Morales 2001; Curtis & 
Baer & Grabb 2001)
-2004 (Wallace 2005; 
Baer 2007)
generalized trust
Inglehart 1999; 
Wallace 2005; 
Kankainen 2007
obeying laws as a sign 
of good citizenship 2004 (Wallace 2005)
meeting colleagues outside 
work time 2004 (Wallace)
meeting friends 2004 (Wallace 2005)
having somebody to discuss 
personal 
problems with
2004 (Wallace 2005)
participation & activity & 
donations in/to 
organizations
2004 (Wallace)
voluntary work for any 
organization 2004 (Wallace)
increase of “working 
memberships” in the 1990s
- decrease comp. to 
other social democra-
cies (Baer 2007)
number of voluntary asso-
ciations per population
Siisiäinen; the Johns 
Hopkins projects (see 
Salamon et al. 1999; 
Helander & Laaksonen 
1999)
corporateness of associa-
tions
Schofer & Fourcade-
Gourinchas 2001
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This summary of the results of a number of participation studies could 
be easily extended to other studies but the general picture would remain 
approximately the same. Finns have many memberships in associa-
tions, have high level of generalized trust and have relatively many 
other kinds of social networks at their disposal. On the other hand, it 
looks like Finns have not so many alternative channels in use as their 
“EU-compatriots”. It also looks like political participation in Finland 
is not so closely (or “causally”) connected with participatory values and 
attitudes (or vice versa) (c.f. Morales 2001, 26).
From this we can draw a general conclusion: voluntary associa-
tions are exceptionally important for the Finnish way of advancing 
interests and organizing collective identities and in the totality of 
the Finnish type of social capital. First, because there probably are 
more associations per inhabitant in Finland that in any country in the 
world (together with other Nordic countries) (Salamon et al. 1999; 
Helander & Laaksonen 1999). Second, Finns have many associa-
tion memberships; and third, the mainstream of collective action has 
concentrated more in formal registered associations in Finland than 
– most probably – in any other country in the world. It means that 
even though actors in some other countries (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, The Netherlands) have as many – or even more – association 
memberships in average as the Finns, the relative weight value of as-
sociation memberships in the total system of collective action or in the 
functioning of the mechanisms of system-integrative social capital is 
relatively bigger in Finland than in other countries.
Finnish studies have shed light on specialties of the associational 
life in the country and from these some questions to be studied com-
paratively can also be deduced. These include: fi rst, the meaning or 
role of associations in the totality of actors’ everyday practices and 
in the system of cross-cutting and/or overlapping local, national and 
international fi elds. Second, associations (civil society)–state relations 
which should be examined not only by means of combining indi-
vidual-based survey-data and typologies of states (e.g. open – vs. closed 
state) or welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen: “liberal”, “conservative”, 
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“social democratic” [1990]; Brown & Kenny & Turner & Prince 2000; 
Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001) but also with the assistance of 
historical-sociological analysis. (3) Dialectics and mutual interaction 
between challenging social movements, formal associations (voluntary 
organizations) and the political (and welfare) subsystem. (4) Different 
meanings of social networks (forms of sociability) in different (politi-
cal) cultures and problems associated with drawing conclusions from 
responses to survey questions. The survey results concerning Finland, 
for example, would become much more understandable when studied 
in the light provided by clarifi cation of issues mentioned above. Here it 
suffi ces only to make few comments and thereby, hopefully, make it a 
little bit easier to understand where to look for answers to the question 
of what makes Finland different.
(1) Meaning of associations in the totality of everyday life
It seems that associations have different meaning in the totality of col-
lective actions in different countries. There are countries and welfare 
regimes where associations do not have a very central role at all (e.g. 
Spain; Portugal). Also, in countries where citizens have many associa-
tions memberships the relation of members to associations seem to 
differ. In the Nordic countries associations are the most important 
way of acting collectively but in other Nordic countries – compared 
to Finland – people use more alternative networks like neighbourhood 
relations, relatives, friends  (as measured by survey questions). It is my 
impression – with no specifi c evidence from association studies – that 
ethnographic and local studies concerning the role and functioning 
of different kinds of networks and interaction systems in connection 
with cultural deep structures would be needed. 
 The “promise” of the system of voluntary associations has 
– perhaps – been taken more seriously in Finland than in many other 
countries. It has been understood (to some extent, at least) as a guarantee 
for the fact that things are taken care or will be taken care in case of need. 
This is reminiscent of the relationship between association activity and 
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generalized trust shown in some of the new studies (Wollebaek 2007a; 
2007b). On the basis of these studies and concrete historical analyses 
it can be argued that – especially in the case of the Nordic countries 
– the “mere” existence of a visible, extensive and effective system of 
voluntary associations covering different classes and social categories, 
is a very important factor spreading trust in society, not so much the 
activity of the members in associational life. This associational infra-
structure can only be effective in the production of trust if it has been 
tested in the past and if it has proven to be effi cacious and workable 
if needed. This is how the dialectics between social movements and 
voluntary associations and the development of the Nordic welfare states 
worked: associations initiating and demanding state reforms, states 
acting inclusively and – more or less – openly, thereby convincing a 
large part of citizens about possibilities to act via the state. And that 
is one of the main reasons why the Nordic states have been doing so 
well in international comparison of social capital and trust.
(2) State-centredness of collective action
During the 19th century the Finnish nationalist movements were state-
centred compared to corresponding movements in many other countries 
(e.g. the Baltic countries). This feature is connected with the close re-
lationship between core strata carrying these movements (bureaucrats; 
intelligentsia; clergy; teachers) and the state. (see Alapuro 1997). In 
Finland no proper feudalism developed but the close connections be-
tween clergy, the intelligentsia and high rank offi cials has given reasons 
to speak about “state-feudalism”.  
Finland’s geographical position between bigger nations has brought 
about general political and military realism and caution which can also 
be seen in the Finnish model of collective action (avoidance of confl icts, 
reluctance to use actionist and confrontational forms, obedience to law; 
confi dence in the value of acting openly and in the power of educa-
tion in the repertoire of collective action (see Alapuro 1997; Siisiäinen 
2004). Many of the most highly esteemed achievements of civil society 
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organizations (e.g. institutionalized welfare state solutions; the right 
– and in many cases obligation – for women to work outside home: 
two-bread-winner model) have been inscribed in state institutions and 
have, almost, been sanctifi ed (c.f. Bergman 2002). These features have 
been embodied and symbolized in and by the form and template of 
the Finnish registered association (see Siisiäinen 2004; 2007). Finnish 
political system has been, at least in the era on neo-corporatism from 
the mid 1960s, quite open to challenging social movements. 
 The dialectics between social movements and the political (and 
welfare state) system has functioned rather effectively and made it pos-
sible for movements to have real infl uence on the development of the 
system. Movements have produced new associations (which have, on 
their part, initiated new movements) and these have been able to com-
municate with (and inside) state apparatuses – and thereby to become 
institutionalized and integrated into the system (see Siisiäinen 1994; 
2007). This is how, at least from the perspective of system-integration 
approach, the Finnish corporatist system with intense representation 
of civil society organizations in state negotiation institution has devel-
oped. In Finland the level of “corporateness” is high which, according 
to Schoefer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (op.cit.) has a positive correla-
tion with association activity. This dialectics has persuaded people 
to think that it is possible to infl uence the state and that this can be 
done with the assistance of the welfare state. This state of affairs has, 
however, started to change at the same pace as the welfare state system 
has been declining since the mid 1990s. But still, these facts have to 
be taken into consideration as explaining social backgrounds for Finn-
ish fondness of associations. However, new associations and the new 
generation of association members are different which, most probably, 
tends to decrease of divergence of the Finnish association system from 
the average European one.
These questions should be studied together with the examination 
of the dialectics between (different types of ) social movements, (dif-
ferent types of ) voluntary associations and (different types of ) welfare 
states shortly dealt with above.
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(3) Cultural contextualization 
Anthropological and cultural studies have made it common knowledge 
that formally same kind of artefacts or organizational templates can 
have and in most of the cases also do have different meanings for actors. 
This holds true also for social networks (forms of sociability) in differ-
ent (political) cultures. Problems arise when mechanical conclusions 
are drawn from responses to survey questions. No doubt differences 
in social networks, for example which actors (alters) belong to a per-
sons (ego’s) network and what kind of resources a person can mobilize 
via her/his networks, is important and reasonable to study (see van 
der Gaag & Snijders 2005; Kivelä & Siisiäinen 2007). However, the 
functioning and the “real” meaning of the networks in actors’ lives can 
only be revealed in the totality of the actor’s life practices and in the 
locality where they take place. This raises – once again – the question 
what we are studying when we are studying social capital or working 
association membership in a standard international survey.
Conclusions
A general conclusion about the associational engagement of the Finns 
is that they are among the most active nations in the world as meas-
ured comparatively by association memberships – formal and work-
ing – and by measures of (Putnamian) social capital, especially trust 
and bridging social capital. In a closer look, the location of Finns on 
comparative lists depends on the scale (world – Europe – the EU - the 
Nordic countries). It looks that it is very diffi cult to get new fruitful 
results about association memberships or their relationships with trust 
(or solidarity) by means of survey research. 
As to Finland, in can be concluded on the basis of several surveys 
that voluntary associations are of special importance to Finns, because 
fi rst, there are so many associations in Finland relative to the size of 
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population; second, Finns have many association memberships; and 
third, because collective action is, probably in a unique way, channelled 
into voluntary associations and because there are less real alternatives 
to associations.
That is not, however, the whole picture. Associations should be 
studied in their social and historical environment and as parts of the 
totality of political system and culture. Associations and networks 
should also be weighted relative to other fi elds in actors’ lives. The 
picture becomes even more complicated as associations as “collective 
actors” are examined fi rst as parts of synchronic total or subsystem; and 
second as parts of diachronic systems or social fi elds struggling about 
stakes using their own capacities. In the latter perspective associations 
should be seen – not as static parts of a system but – as trajectories, as 
proactive or reactive, rising or declining, integrating or disintegrating ac-
tors. And these dynamic actors, for their part, act as mediators between 
individual actors lives or personal trajectories and societal subsystems on 
different levels, from local to international spheres. Therefore surveys 
that have yielded a lot of interesting results have to be complemented 
with studies of individual, social and collective practices all of which 
are connected with different forms of associational practice.
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Missing Link between Trust and Participation? 
A country comparison
Antti Kouvo
“Is that just an accident, or is there really some necessary connection 
between association and equality?” 
(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America)
Introduction
Possible benefi ts of associations have puzzled scholars of the sources 
and mechanisms of social capital. The reciprocal relationship between 
trust and civic engagement, the so-called Tocquevillean (1835) model 
has been an often-presented supposition in the social capital literature. 
Besides indicating the vitality of civil society in general, associations 
are believed to bring about a multitude of possible benefi cial outcomes 
such as bringing together people from different backgrounds, enhancing 
trust in others and in public institutions and thus supporting political 
involvement and awareness. (Tocqueville 1981 [1835]; Putnam 1993: 
2000; Brehm & Rahn 1997). However, several recent studies have 
questioned the importance of associations for the society as a whole. 
Several empirical fi ndings, especially in Europe, have revealed that 
compared to other relevant determinants, the link between associational 
membership and its suggested outcomes such as generalized and insti-
tutional trust, is relatively weak (Freitag 2003; Kumlin & Rothstein 
2005; Kouvo 2005).  
The real importance of associations is also questioned because other 
forms of social life, such as family or other informal networks might 
have as great an impact on trust as formal associations, whose impact 
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on social capital is often rather limited at the individual level (Freitag 
2003; Stolle 2003). However, the Tocquevillean model has also been 
updated, partly in response to this criticism. It is suggested that the 
effects of associational activity may have importance at the community 
or country level as so-called “rainmaker effects”. This means that also 
non-members of associations may benefi t from vibrant associational 
activity in certain region or country and thus the individual level rela-
tionships might not be easily observable. (van der Meer 2003; Putnam.) 
In other words, we should also take into account the external effects 
of associations on those that do not belong to them. 
While the Tocquevillean model suggests a bottom-up mecha-
nism between grass root social interactions and trust (society centered 
mechanism), it is also possible to emphasize fair and well-functioning 
social and political institutions as the most important determinants 
of trust in society (institution centered mechanism). This means that 
trust in society is generated from above by non-corrupted and fair 
public institutions. Both political and impartial institutions are con-
sidered fundamental sources of generalized trust in society. (Rothstein 
& Stolle 2003;) 
This chapter revisits the relationship between associations and 
trust. However, to enrich our understanding of the issue, we approach 
this relationship from two perspectives at the same time by testing 
both the institution and society centred mechanisms. Self-reported 
confi dence in government and participation in associations are used as 
independent variables in separate analyses. While we already know that 
the relationship between participation in associations and trust may 
be weak, also the possible “rainmaker effects” of associations are taken 
into account by analyzing the impact of national level associational 
activity on non-members of associations.
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Trust and civic engagement
At the community level social capital may be shortly defi ned as a 
“societal resource that links citizens to each other and enables them to 
pursue their common objectives more effi ciently” (Stolle 2003, 19). 
Despite disagreement on the exact defi nition among scholars, the ele-
ments of social capital are often defi ned and measured as trust, norms 
of reciprocity and interaction networks (Putnam 1993; Hooghe & 
Stolle 2003, 2). In this chapter we approach social capital through the 
interplay of trust in other citizens and government with networks that 
are created through associational memberships.
The defi nitions of trust and confi dence relate primarily to the 
logic of trust, but we can also simply categorize trust from the point 
of view of the level on which it is placed, or as a continuum running 
through different levels (Misztal 1996, 72). Analytically speaking, trust 
may occur in “the isolated dyad of two actors, between individuals in 
the presence of third parties and between an individual and the collec-
tion of individuals” (Barber 1983; Paxton 1999, 98). The dependent 
variable, generalized trust expresses to what extent people rely on each 
other - also on those they do not personally know. This indicator is 
often seen as the most fundamental measure of the type of social capital 
that bridges even previously unknown citizens together. For example 
Putnam (2000, 137-139) argues that though this item certainly re-
fl ects some personal psychological characteristics, it is mostly based 
on actual personal experiences of others in surrounding society. Thus 
reporting distrust reveals something about the social environment the 
respondent lives in.
The second element, institutional confi dence, focuses on actors 
and institutions such as politicians, offi cials and organizations. In 
most of the empirically oriented studies citizens’ confi dence in public 
institutions is supposed to be closely linked with generalized trust and 
civic engagement (see, eg., Brehm & Rahn 1997, Freitag 2003, Kouvo 
2005; Paxton 1999; Oorschoot et al. 2006). It is also suggested that 
instead of being an outcome of generalized trust, the trustworthiness 
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of public institutions may function as a source of it. This explanation 
is based on the idea that the emergence of interpersonal trust neces-
sitates that societal and political institutions provide a fair and effi cient 
environment in which trusting or civic mindedness will be rewarded 
and not exploited. (Rothstein & Stolle 2003.) Thus we may argue that 
those who have confi dence in institutions may end up also being civic 
and trusting each other.
Associations are considered one cornerstone of social capital. 
Those that belong to and participate in voluntary associations are sup-
posed to have higher levels of trust in both other citizens and public 
institutions. This Tocquevillean relationship between trust and civic 
engagement is fundamental for the entire social capital theory. For 
example in the works of Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) it is assumed 
that civic engagement and generalized trust infl uence each other, and 
that together they promote confi dence in institutions. As mentioned 
before, these assumptions have been challenged. First, it seems that, 
especially in Europe, the link between civic engagement and trust 
appears to be weak at the individual level while at the aggregate level 
country comparisons there is a strong connection between them. As we 
can see from the Figure 1, participation in associations and generalized 
trust are at the highest level in Nordic countries and lowest in Southern 
Europe, Russia and Japan. USA, Great Britain, Ireland and continental 
Europe situate themselves somewhere in the middle. The Figure is in 
line with already known macro-level correlations of participation and 
trust (see. eg. Newton 2001).
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The less studied dynamics, however, is the possible “rainmaker ef-
fects” of associations. The term is based on the ideas of Putnam et 
al. (2000) arguing that the “rain” produced by civic engagement and 
generalized trust does not only affect active citizens but also inactive 
ones. Van der Meer (2003) has tested this mechanism with an elegant 
research design including both national and regional levels. The study 
gave only weak support on the idea of rainmakers at the country level, 
but at the communal level the density of associations was positively 
associated with generalized and institutional trust felt by those that 
do not participate. 
The idea of this chapter is to diversify the picture of these previous 
studies with the ISSP data. At fi rst, the impact of associational member-
ships and institutional confi dence on generalized trust is analyzed at 
the individual level. Second, to detect possible rainmaker effects, the 
impact of national associational density on non-members is approached 
with analysis combining data from different levels of observation.
Figure 1. Memberships in at least one association and generalized trust. 
Percentages by country.
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Research questions, data and methods
The aim of the chapter is to evaluate the importance of associational 
activity on generalized trust between citizens. At fi rst the differences in 
associational activity and generalized trust between countries are pre-
sented in descriptively. After that, the relationship between associational 
activity and trust is approached by multivariate analyses. The empirical 
research questions are can be summarized as following:
1.What is the relationship between associational activity and generaliz- 
    ed trust among respondents and how does it vary between differ- 
   ent types of countries (society-centred explanation)?
2.What is the impact of institutional confi dence on generalized trust  
   (institution-centred explanation)?
3.What is the impact of associational density on non-members of  
   associations (rainmaker-effects explanation)?
The data are from International Social Survey Program (ISSP) Citi-
zenship dataset from the year 2004 (N=18 993) from 13 countries 
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Netherlands, Great 
Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Russia, USA, Japan). 
Generalized trust is measured by agreement with statement “gener-
ally speaking people can be trusted.” The originally four-step variable 
is dichotomized for the purposes of analyses (“You usually/almost 
always can’t be too careful in dealing with people” =0; “People can 
usually/almost always be trusted”=1). This item is also probably the 
most popular measure of generalized trust or “faith in people” and was 
fi rst published in the study of Rosenberg (1956).
Institutional confi dence is measured by agreement with the state-
ment “most of the time we can trust people in government to do what 
is right”. This item is slightly problematic, since the term government 
may imply various different meanings in different countries. However, 
we can trust it to indicate citizens’ confi dence in offi cials or politicians. 
The item was originally a fi ve-step variable but was categorized into 
three classes.
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Membership indicates whether respondent is currently a member 
of association. Active and passive members are collapsed in the same 
category. Items on which this variable is based are used as a single general 
indicator of belonging to any association and separately representing 
memberships in different associations (political party, trade union, 
church, sports associations and “other” associations).
Socio-demographic variables age and education are used as de-
mographic control-variables. There is some evidence of the presence 
of education and life cycle or cohort effects (Patterson 1999; Putnam 
2000). These well-known determinants are used here to control the 
effect of other relevant variables.
Logistic regression is chosen as the method of analysis in order to 
evaluate the effects of the selected independent variables. In the analyses 
we apply multinomial logistic regression (MLR) procedure. In general, 
MLR can be recommended for the analysis of dichotomous dependent 
variables as well, because in most contemporary software applications it 
has many options not available in the binary procedure (e.g. Tabachnick 
& Fidell 2001, p. 521-523). The effects of the independent variables 
in the models are presented with the odd ratios (Expß). The pseudo-
coeffi cients of the determination of the models are also reported in the 
tables (Nagelkerke Pseudo R²).
Trust, associations and institutional confi dence
The results of logistic regression analyses of explaining generalized trust 
in 13 different countries are presented in Table 1. When other determi-
nants are controlled for, there is a signifi cant link between generalized 
trust and association membership in Sweden, Germany, Ireland and 
Spain. However, in Norway, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Great 
Britain, Portugal and Russia this link is relatively weak. 
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The fi nding is interesting, because in the macro-level descriptive 
analyses (Figure 1.), for example Nordic countries seemed to be pretty 
similar, but here we can see that the individual level link between gen-
eralized trust and association membership exists only in Sweden. It is 
also surprising that in the USA this association is non-signifi cant.
Institutional confi dence seems to explain generalized trust a lot 
better than association memberships. In all countries except Russia and 
Japan, confi dence in governmental institutions seems to promote trust 
in fellow citizens very well. It is still possible that this is also because 
of the fact that these two types of trust are overlapping each other to 
a certain degree. 
As a control variable, education seems to increase generalized trust 
as well. Those with higher education seem to trust other previously 
unknown citizens much more likely than low-educated. In most of the 
selected countries, differences between age groups are not statistically 
signifi cant, though in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain 
and USA age has some impact. When in these two Nordic countries 
younger generations seem to be more trusting, in Great Britain and 
USA the effect of age is the opposite. In fact, age has even stronger main 
effect on generalized trust, but controlling for education diminishes 
the signifi cance of it in many countries. However, as studies on the 
relationship between age and generalized trust have shown (Torcal & 
Montero 1999; Robinson & Jackson 2001), the substantial between-
country differences found here may stem equally from age, period 
and generation effects which are also more or less specifi c for each 
individual country.   
In general, it is possible to see that the chosen determinants explain 
generalized trust in certain countries in a satisfactory way. However, 
for example in Russia, Japan and Southern Europe these relationships 
are less visible. It seems that though membership in association is an 
individual choice, it has only little impact on personal feelings con-
cerning the trustworthiness of other people. Thus, to argue over the 
importance of associations on generalized trust, it might be useful to 
look also at the impact of associational life also on those that do not 
belong to them.
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In Table 2 logistic regression models explaining generalized trust 
of non-members of associations in all 13 countries are presented. As 
in the case of all citizens, education and institutional confi dence are 
also strong determinants of generalized trust of non-members of as-
sociations. The impact of age is, again, relatively weak. 
Table 2. Generalized trust of non-members in 13 countries. Logistic 
regression, Odds-ratios Exp (β) presented
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age
-33
34-52
53-69
70- (ref.)
.89
1.00
1.21
1
.99
1.10
1.29*
1
1.00
1.12
1.28*
1
.92
1.05
1.25*
1
.89
.99
1.20
1
.88
1.00
1.22*
1
Education
Primary/less
Secondary
Tertiary (ref.)
.43***
.60***
1
.48***
.60***
1
.49***
.60***
1
.45***
.60***
1
.42***
.61***
1
.43***
.60***
1
Institutional 
confi dence
Disagree
Neutral
Agree (ref.)
.51***
.76***
1
.52***
.78***
1
.54***
.78***
1
.53***
.79**
1
.50***
.74***
1
.54***
.78***
1
Memberships
 in country
Any association 5.73***
Political Party 4.17***
Trade Union 3.94***
Church 3.41***
Sports etc. 16.01***
Other 64.48***
Nagelkerke
Pseudo R
.07 .04 .05 .05 .08 .08
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
To examine the possible rainmaker effects of associations, the share of 
memberships in certain associations in each country was included in 
the model. All associational activity in the country seems to increase 
also generalized trust of non-members. The amount of memberships 
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in interest organizations such as political parties and trade unions as 
well as church are all important factors. However, the most important 
fi nding is that more loosely knit associations such as sport clubs are 
even more important for the level of generalized trust, also of citizens 
that do not belong to them. 
The fi nding is in line with Granovetter’s (1973) idea of “the 
strength of the weak ties”. Various overlapping networks that are not 
interest-based might be even more important for the cohesion of so-
ciety than more formal and interest based ones. It might be that sport 
and other leisure time associations gather people from more diverse 
backgrounds than political parties and trade unions. Thus they may 
also more effectively facilitate trust in previously unknown fellow 
citizens and thus build the “bridging” type of social capital between 
socially heterogeneous groups. However, we should still keep in mind 
that also the presence other types of organizations predicted trust of 
non-members relatively well.
Discussion
The analyses show that the relationship between association member-
ship and generalized trust varies to a great degree between different 
countries. Results also confi rm the previously known fact that at the 
individual level this relationship may be relatively weak. However, in-
stitutional confi dence seems to predict well generalized trust in almost 
all countries in the sample. Does this mean that institution-centred 
explanation is absolutely right and associations have little to contribute 
as sources of generalized trust in society?
The whole picture is probably not as clear-cut. As the analyses done 
with non-members of associations revealed, the mechanism through 
which associations promote generalized trust in society is situated 
between macro and micro levels of society. Even when controlling for 
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institutional trust, living in a nation with dense associational network 
seems to increase the likeliness of trust for fellow citizens.
Some degree of caution is in order when interpreting results of 
these analyses that mix together information from both aggregate and 
individual levels. At fi rst, the range of different types of associations 
available in our data might narrow and bias the picture of possibly 
even more diverse associational profi le of some countries. Secondly, 
there is a risk of ecological or individualistic fallacies when inferences 
about the nature of individuals are based upon aggregate statistics col-
lected for the group to which those individuals belong (see. Robinson 
1950). However, in this chapter we have tried to minimize this risk by 
restricting the analysis only to those that do not belong to associations. 
As van der Meer (2003, 135) noted, if even among non-members a 
signifi cant relationship is found, then there surely is some connection 
between associational density at the macro level and generalized trust 
at the individual level. It seems clear that effects of associations for the 
cohesion of society are not restricted only to those who are members. 
Even non-members and thus society in general benefi t from vital civil 
society characterized by active joiners of associations.
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Divergent Citizenship 
Raimo Blom
This chapter investigates different conceptions of citizenship. The ISSP 
survey included a set of questions concerning the respondents’ percep-
tions of good citizenship. (see Appendix 1, q: 29). Thinking about the 
question theoretically, we discover that there are many different aspects, 
attributes and dimensions important for the idea of citizenship. Just 
to mention a few, the concept of citizenship entails various rights and 
obligations, which frame different relations to social and political ac-
tion. Citizenship can also refer to different kinds of interrelationships 
between resources, social position and the realisation of rights in soci-
ety. These, in turn, have implications to differences in relation to the 
possibilities to monitor and control the use of power in society. The 
scale of citizens’ orientations can vary signifi cantly, too, from local to 
global or cosmopolitan loyalties and sense of belongingness (Merton 
1957, 387-420, Delanty 2000).
Many questions concerning citizenship were fi rst dealt with in 
the political theory and philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie (from 
Hobbes to Locke and Rousseau, and already criticised by Marx and 
others; Blom 1982). In practice, those questions were posed during 
bourgeois revolutions, especially the French Revolution. The problems 
of basic citizen rights surfaced in early political theories. Questions 
in relation to public political power, such as Hobbes’ Leviathan, also 
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came into attention. The latter type of question, in fact, concerns the 
citizen’s relation to the absolute state power and the possibilities to 
control it. This question found its pragmatic solutions in the form of 
constitutions and different Fundamental laws. It was also settled in 
different theories of democracy. Moving into modern times, the list 
of basic rights was expanded from the right to private ownership and 
the basic freedom and political rights to other economic rights and to 
social and cultural rights.  
People’s conceptions of citizenship do not derive from legal theory. 
Thus, there is more to citizenship beliefs and values than merely rights 
and obligations. The following pages compare the citizenship beliefs 
in different countries using the ten-item scale of the ISSP data from 
2004 (see Appendix 1). The questions deal with what can be expected 
of the good citizen. In fact, the survey concentrated on the perceived 
importance of different aspects in being a good citizen. This is one of 
the focal points of the survey. Moreover, variables measuring political 
and social participation were also included in the analysis.
The text proceeds as follows: fi rst, the topics and methods are de-
scribed briefl y. The fi rst question is how important the different aspects 
are for the good citizen. The purpose here is to construct a ranking 
list of the importance of different aspects of citizenship. A comparison 
is also made on the importance of the different citizenship elements 
in different countries. An analysis is then conducted on the main 
dimension of the “good citizen”. The method used is factor analysis. 
The main descriptive task then follows. The countries are positioned 
in the factor space using the citizenship dimensions as pairs in the 
description. In the interpretation of the comparative country results, I 
am mainly interested in the differences among the EU-countries. The 
outer reference point consists of some non-EU countries (the United 
States, Russia and Japan) and the average ISSP countries. The special 
emphasis in the country comparison is Finland, as well as the Nordic 
countries. Finally, it is analysed whether there is any relation between 
the differences in citizenship beliefs and action in the capitalism and 
welfare state regimes presented in the literature. The references used 
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are Crouch and Streeck (1997), especially Boyer (1997) on the types 
of capitalism, and Esping-Andersen (1990 and 1999) in the case of 
welfare regimes. 
The basis of Boyer’s classifi cation for types of capitalism is the 
distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional charac-
teristics, and adjustments and the consequential advantages and disad-
vantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are ‘market-oriented’ 
(USA, Canada and Britain), ‘Rhineland or corporatist’ (Germany, 
Japan), ‘statist’ (France, Italy), and ‘social democrat’ (Sweden Austria) 
(Boyer 1997, 90; table 4.6.).
Esping-Andersen separates three welfare regimes: ‘liberal’ (USA 
as modal example), ‘social democratic’ (the Nordic countries) and 
‘conservative’ (Germany, Italy) (Esping-Andersen 1999, 73- ). The 
original basis was the de-commodifi cation of welfare or the decrease 
in the commodity nature of labour power. In the liberal model, few 
rights and a low level of de-commodifi cation mean that the liberal 
welfare regime is almost completely Anglo-Saxon: it comprises the 
United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Britain. 
The social democratic welfare regime includes the Nordic countries, 
and the conservative model almost all the other countries. There are 
different variants inside the three welfare regimes and, in some cases, 
the situation has changed after Esping-Andersen’s latter book. Thus, 
a valid starting point for the interpretation of the results is Esping-
Andersen’s three regime model.
The importance of citizenship elements 
The idea of citizenship developed historically in different times. The 
most famous presentation of the matter is Marshall’s contribution 
(1950). In Marshall’s model, legal rights derive from the 17-18th cen-
turies, political rights from the18-19th centuries and social rights from 
the 19-20th centuries. The institutions supporting citizen’s different 
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basic rights, such as the parliament for political rights or the welfare state 
for social rights developed in various historical conditions. Nowadays, 
cultural rights have also gained an entirely new meaning in the global 
world (Pakulski 1997). Marshall has also been criticized (Turner 1997). 
It can be criticized by stating that his framework is not sensitive enough 
to the consequences of citizenship at the end product level, and to the 
distinction between the formal and substantial rights. 
The different categories of citizen rights have different functions, 
and the rights are also often in confl ict with each other. (Tuschling 
1976, Blom 1982). These basic confl icts derive from the diffi cul-
ties to construct a valid concept of legal state. Another reason is the 
dependence of all the other rights on the economic rights and social 
position. Because of the economic dependence, the concept of citizen-
ship is always incomplete and impossible to realise in practice. David 
Lockwood (1996) speaks about two sets of social categories that can be 
unequal: classes and different citizen categories. The latter are identifi ed 
through “their different capacities to exercise various rights, their social 
categorisation by rights themselves, and their motivation to extend and 
enlarge them”. In an empirical study investigating the conceptions of 
the citizen, it is possible to see the emphases of the different aspects of 
citizenship and interpret the relation between different elements.
The next table summarises the perceived importance of different 
matters for the good citizen in the order of their importance in the 
entire ISSP data. The table presents the sums of the percentages of 
classes 6 and 7 on a 7-point scale (1-7) where 7 is “very important”. 
The table also includes the same percentages in the Nordic countries, 
the EU-countries and the non-EU-countries.
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Table 1. To be a good citizen: the importance of different matters (%)
The differences between the qualities that people fi nd important for 
the good citizen are substantial. This means that in people’s conception 
of citizenship there are different fi elds of importance. The difference 
between the importance of abiding the law and being active in the civil 
society is over 50 percentages. Tentatively, we can fi nd three blocks 
according to the hierarchy of the importance of an aspect for good 
citizenship. The fi rst group of important qualities includes obeying 
laws, not evading the taxes, voting, as well as trying to understand 
other people. Another category, of relatively high importance, includes 
Total 
ISSP
Nordic 
countries
EU-coun-
tries
Non-EU 
countries
Always to obey laws and regulations 78 74 74 83
Never to try to evade taxes 73 68 70 76
Always to vote in elections 68 75 63 74
To help the people in 
[country] who are worse 
off than yourself
63 63 51 57 
To try to understand the reasoning of 
people with 
other opinions
62 62 59 65
To keep watch on the 
actions of government 56 52
48 65
To help the people in the 
rest of the world who are worse off 
than yourself
45 36 42 49 
To be willing to serve in 
the military at a time of need 44 43 36
51
To choose products for political, 
ethical or environmental reasons 34 29 33
35
To be active in social or political 
associations 27 14 20
34
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helping people who are worse off in one’s own country and the rest of 
the world, keeping watch on the actions of the government, and be-
ing willing to serve in the military at a time of need. Finally, there are 
the qualities of low importance, political, ethical and environmental 
reasons for choosing the products, and being active in social and po-
litical associations.
There are substantial differences in the perceived importance of 
the good citizen’s characteristics between the countries and country 
groups. Some differences between the country groups are noticeable. 
Examples of the differences between the countries are presented in the 
context of the factor-score comparison of the countries.
People in the non-EU-countries and all the ISSP-countries fi nd 
all studied good citizen qualities more important than the respondents 
in the EU-countries. In choosing products for political, ethical or en-
vironmental reasons those country groups are at the same level. The 
difference is the most substantial regarding the perceived importance 
of helping people in one’s own country. The importance of this aspect 
is lower in the EU-countries. The other aspects, in which the EU-
counties are also clearly at a lower level than all the ISSP-countries or 
the non-EU countries, are keeping watch on the government, serving 
the military at a time of need, and being active in social and political 
associations. 
The main fi nding is the all-around difference between the EU-
countries and the non-EU countries. We can ask what the explanation 
is to this cleavage in the conceptions of necessary qualities for the good 
citizen. One possible explanation is need based. In the EU-countries, 
the citizens’ position and citizen rights have, on average, been relatively 
stable for longer than in the non-EU-countries. Citizenship in non-
EU countries creates the need for almost all the qualities of the good 
citizen mentioned in the study. It is worth noting that, in the case of 
the United States, most qualities of the good citizen are also considered 
especially important in comparison to other countries. This implies 
that in addition to the perceived need for further democratic develop-
ment, also normative and cultural conceptions of the nature of good 
citizenship play a role. 
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The differences between the EU-countries and the Nordic coun-
tries are different in each issue. The Nordic countries value voting in 
elections and helping people in one’s own country higher than the EU 
countries. Astonishingly, helping people who are worse off than you 
in the rest of the world is not seen as particularly important quality 
for the good citizen in the Nordic countries. This fi nding clearly goes 
against the image of the Nordic countries as exemplary and even altru-
istic members of the global community. In the EU-countries, serving 
in the military at a time of need and being active in associations are 
more important characteristics of the good citizen than in the Nordic 
countries. These results are not easy to interpret.
Dimensions of the good citizen 
The dimensions and later measures (factor scores) were formed by using 
factor analysis. The data in the factor analysis were all the ISSP-survey 
respondents (n = 52 550). There were 8632 missing cases, a total of 16. 
4%. The number of respondents in the fi nal analysis was 43 918.
Three factors explained 57.7 percent of the variance. The eigen-
values were 3.4 (I factor) 1.3  (II factor) and 1.0 (III factor). The factor 
analysis of the good citizen’s qualities that gave the best result in the 
varimax rotation was a solution of three factors.
Interpreting the factors is relatively easy, even if the loadings of two 
variables were split into two factors. The fi rst factor is called Political 
citizenship. In it, the activity in associations gets the highest loading. It 
is, actually, a proxy for activities in the civil society. The following two 
variables, voting in elections and keeping watch on the government, are 
political obligations included in the concept of the good citizen. The 
last aspect in the fi rst factor is choosing products for political, ethical 
or environmental reasons. The core of this variable is ethical or moral. 
All in all, the fi rst factor is political citizenship with key responsibilities 
associated with the concept. All these variables have a strong moral ele-
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ment in common with the choosing product variable. Thus, the fi rst 
factor links together political and moral elements in its content. The 
division of a part of the loadings to the law-abiding citizen also in a 
way shows the importance of moral elements in the fi rst factor.  
The second factor is the dimension of  Social citizenship. The 
main loadings are on the variables concerning helping those who are 
worse off than the respondents themselves in the rest of world or in 
one’s own country. The variable “understanding” does not have any 
clear place in any one factor. For obvious reasons, it gets minor loadings 
both in the political citizen and in the factor of social citizen.
The third factor is Law-abiding citizenship. The core in it is the 
law-abiding person who never tries to evade taxes. Smaller and related 
moral loading on the third factor comes from choosing products for 
political, ethical or environmental reasons. It can be said that the the 
term “subject” meaning an individual being under central state power, 
as opposed to an autonomous citizen subject (Althusser 1971) fi nds 
its expression here.
Table 2. Rotated factor matrix of the importance of the qualities of good 
citizen
 Factor I    Factor II    Factor III
Active in associations .725
Keep watch on government .710
Vote always in elections .618  .407
Choose products for political 
ethical or environmental reasons .587
Help less privileged/world .856
Help less privileged/own country .834
Understand other opinions .453 .455
Always obey laws .837
Never try to evade taxes .818
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Table 3. The loadings in the non-rotated factor matrix
Contact with politicians                 .723
Contact media                                   .704
Attend political meeting or rally      .697
Take part in demonstration                .680
Sign a petition                                    .677
Boycott certain products                   .669
Donate money or raise funds            .636
Join an Internet political forum         .589 
The loadings were very even. The factor explained 45.3 percent of 
the joint variance of the variables. Contact with politicians variable 
is slightly higher than the other variables, and donating money and 
especially joining an Internet forum are lower than the loadings of 
the other variables. The factor score scale of these items is called Par-
ticipation.
The comparison of countries
The factor scores above presenting three dimensions of good citizenship 
and the factor of Participation are used in the comparative analysis. 
The theoretical background for the analysis and interpretation of the 
comparative results is the differentiation between countries according 
to the types of capitalism and the welfare state regimes.  The results are 
presented in the following fi gures. The factor scores for each country 
are marked in a two-dimensional space. The constant dimension in 
the country comparisons is Political citizenship. It is the dimension 
that explains the greatest part of the joint variance of “What it takes 
to be good citizen” variables. Each of the three other dimensions is 
presented in turns, paired with it one by one. The main purpose is to 
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Figure 1. Political citizenship and social citizenship (means of factor 
scores; central point = total ISSP)
investigate how the countries’ position changes depending on the two 
dimensions used at a time. 
If we start with the viewpoint of Finland, we can see that the 
country is different from any other country in the analysis. The main 
reason is the low importance of the political citizenship in the Finns’ 
conceptions of the good citizen. The importance of the political citi-
zenship is lower in Finland than in other countries. Finland is, in 
large part, below the other Nordic countries. Among the other Nordic 
countries, the distinctions are not substantial. Sweden is slightly above 
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Denmark and Norway. Nearest to Finland, then, are Great Britain and 
Germany. 
Despite Finland, Great Britain and Germany being on the weak 
side and Portugal and the United States on the strong side of the political 
citizenship, the differences in the strength of the political citizenship 
between countries are not extensive.  Ireland and Spain, as well as the 
entire group of the non-EU countries are at the same level with the 
Nordic countries other than Finland. 
As regards social citizenship, a small group of countries is consider-
ably nearer to the strong end of the social citizenship than the others. 
All the other countries are more or less at the same level. The exceptions 
are Spain, Portugal and Ireland in which the social citizenship is at a 
higher level than in the other countries. The totality of the non-EU 
countries is mildly on this side of the average of the ISSP countries. 
In the dimension of social citizenship, Finland is above the weakest 
countries. In this respect, Russia, Sweden and Japan are even slightly 
weaker than Finland. 
What do the results in fi gure 1, then, reveal about different larger 
‘citizenship regimes’? The two-dimensional picture refers to the follow-
ing conclusion. First, there is the block of countries in which Sweden 
and Denmark are together with the Netherlands. United States is also 
close to this group. The latter result is slightly diffi cult to understand 
from the point of view of welfare regimes or types of capitalism as the 
Nordic welfare state regime differs remarkably from the Neo-liberal 
US model.
A group slightly less tight than the one mentioned above consists 
of Japan, Russia, Germany and Great Britain. The entire group of the 
EU-countries, on average, belongs in this category. Of the remaining 
countries Portugal, like Finland in the opposite direction, is clearly distinct 
from the other countries. The closest neighbours of Portugal are Ireland 
and Spain which are relatively close to each other. The entire group of 
the non-EU countries is relatively close to Ireland and Spain. 
All in all, the clearest result can be seen in the group of the Nordic 
countries, excluding Finland. It makes sense that the Netherlands is 
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a part of this group. The opposites of the Nordic group are Germany 
and Great Britain, and on the other side, Ireland and Spain. Finland 
and Portugal, as each other’s opposites, are the lone ones in terms of 
the political and social citizenship.
 It is also possible to provide an example of the difference be-
tween the countries. For this purpose, I use the variable “Keep watch 
on government” from the fi rst factor.  It has a high factor loading and 
is seen as relatively important for the good citizen.
Using two classes in the “very important” end of the variable, we 
see that there is a clear differentiation between countries. At the top, 
there is the United States. Other countries that perceive keeping watch 
on the actions of the government more important than other coun-
Figure 2. Good citizen obeys laws
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tries are Sweden, Ireland, and Portugal. USA is 19 percent above the 
average in the ISSP countries and the other top countries mentioned 
some ten percent above the average. The clearly lowest fi gure (nearly a 
half below the average) is in Finland. Finland is also clearly below the 
Nordic countries, especially Sweden.
There is a change in the composition of the citizenship groups 
when Law-abiding citizenship is substituted for Social citizenship. The 
group around the Nordic countries (excluding Finland) changes its 
form. Thus, Spain joins Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands in their 
category. Denmark is now further from the group than earlier. It can 
still, however, be said to have stayed in the near neighbourhood. The 
Figure 3. Political citizenship and law-abiding citizenship
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average of the EU countries is, in fact, almost within the same distance 
from the Nordic cluster as Denmark, while Ireland and the average of 
the non-EU countries are relatively close to these countries. 
What is left of the countries after the large Nordic group? Germany 
remains in its old place, alone. Great Britain has changed its posi-
tion because of the greater Law-abiding citizenship than in Germany. 
Finland also stays in its place far from the other countries. Portugal 
and the United State are at the opposite end from Finland in the high 
Political citizenship and higher Law-abiding citizenship. In the Law-
abiding citizenship, the United States together with Great Britain are 
the law-abiding countries. On the same side with them are also Russia 
and Japan with their position changed to the right compared to the 
earlier country picture.
The formation of the country categories is not very different com-
pared with the country groups in the picture above where the Social 
and Political citizenship were the axes. Replacing Social citizenship 
with Law-abiding citizenship provides a manner of opposite picture 
on country groups and positions. 
The last picture of the country groups is the Political citizenship 
examined together with the more action oriented measure of Political 
and Social Participation.
The comparative positions are now different compared to the 
earlier analysis. Russia and Japan are far from the other countries. The 
average of the non-EU countries also relocates to this side. The distance 
between Japan and Russia is also relatively long. The group of Nordic 
countries including the Netherlands is very clear. Spain, Ireland and 
United States can also be seen as a part of this county category in a 
larger sense.  Finland, Great Britain and Germany are relatively far from 
the Nordic group, Finland of course being the most distant country. 
Still, it should be remembered that in Participation, Great Britain, 
Finland and Germany are relatively close to the large Nordic group 
of countries. The demarcation line is between Russia, Japan and the 
non-EU countries, in this order, and all the other countries.
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Conclusion: Divergent Citizenship
The results reveal two points. First, there is a clear, relatively consistent 
ranking as regards the characteristics expected from the good citizen 
by the respondents. Secondly, almost all characteristics are perceived 
as more important in the countries outside the EU. The possible inter-
pretation here is the longer stable period in the citizenship position in 
Figure 4. Political citizenship and participation
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the EU countries than in the other parts of the world.  The perceived 
importance of the citizenship characteristics depends on the need. This 
can mean that there is more willingness to make an effort for the better 
realisation of citizenship in the countries outside the EU.
The dimensions of the good citizen’s qualities are relatively clear. 
The main dimension is the Political citizenship. It is followed by the 
Social citizenship and the Law-abiding citizenship. The fi rst dimension 
is very wide. It includes moral demands for the good citizen’s action. 
The second factor is about helping people in more disadvantageous 
position than the respondents themselves. This factor refl ects the feel-
ing of collective responsibility, whereas the third factor concerns the 
respect for law. Considering the historical layers of the citizenship 
rights, the third dimension refers to the historically oldest layer. The 
second factor is associated with newest developments, and the fi rst 
dimension has some connotations of the moral kind, together with 
the Law-abiding citizenship
When the countries are positioned in the space in which the axes 
are the factor score of the political and social citizenship, the main result 
is distinguishing the block of Nordic countries (excluding Finland). 
In the neighbourhood of this larger ‘Nordic’ group we can fi nd the 
United States, Japan and Russia, i.e. all the countries selected to be 
the criteria for the analysis of the EU-countries. Portugal and Finland, 
the countries on the opposite sides of the factor space, are clear non-
members of the Nordic group. Ireland and Spain are also relatively far 
from the group of Nordic countries. The reason for Finland’s separate 
position is the low scoring in the Political citizenship and, for Ireland 
and Spain, the high scoring in the Social citizenship. Portugal is also 
higher in the Political citizenship than other countries. 
Combining the law-abiding citizenship with the political citizen-
ship in the picture, the positions do not change considerably from the 
earlier fi ndings. Now, the United States are farther than Portugal from 
the Nordic group of countries, and there is a longer distance between 
Germany and Great Britain than in the earlier picture. This is due to 
Great Britain’s higher score in the Law-abiding citizenship. Finland is 
relatively low on both axes.
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Adding Participation to the analysis transforms the country posi-
tions. The larger and tighter collection of countries is now around the 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Farthest from them, due to a 
low scoring in participation are Japan and Russia. Russia is the most 
distant country in low participation. Germany, Finland and Great 
Britain are close to the main group of countries in participation but 
due to the low scores in political citizenship they do not belong in the 
group around the Nordic countries. In Participation, Finland is slightly 
above the weakest countries. The participation is slightly higher in 
Finland than in Ireland, Spain, Great Britain and Portugal, as well as 
in the EU counties on average.
It could be asked, what the results reveal about the unity of the 
EU countries. The main result is that there is a relatively clear block 
of countries around the Nordic focus. The political citizenship, which 
is also the most important dimension of the ‘good citizen’, results 
in a tight group of Nordic countries in connection with the social 
citizenship. The other two analyses of country positions, the Political 
citizenship with the Law-abiding citizenship, and the Political citizen-
ship with Participation, refer to an even larger gathering of countries 
around the Nordic focus.
The analysis of countries with the main citizenship axes as co-
ordinates do not provide any clear groups of countries other than the 
Nordic group. The comparison of the results to the types of capitalism 
or welfare state regimes weakly refers to some new developments. The 
Netherlands is very clearly at the centre of Nordic group of countries. 
Finland does not belong in the group. Great Britain and Germany are 
a possible example of a conservative block. The United States as the 
modal type of liberal welfare regime is relatively separate. Portugal is 
also separate because of the strong commitment to social citizenship. 
The EU countries differ from the non-EU countries. In the non-
EU countries, the Social citizenship is more important than in the 
EU countries. The same is true also with the Law-abiding citizenship. 
The results also show the special status of participation as action-
bound criterion of citizenship. Here, the difference between Russia 
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and Japan is clear. In these countries, political and social activity is 
not considered important. In Finland, the participation is at the level 
of the other countries.  
All in all, the results reveal many differences between countries 
with different welfare regimes. However, much depends on the criteria 
of citizenship. From the European point of view, and especially in the 
Nordic countries, a critical question is the low perceived importance 
of Social citizenship and helping people worse off. The EU countries 
are weaker in Social citizenship than the non-EU countries, and in 
the Nordic countries, the situation is worse that in the other EU 
countries.
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Still Citizen vs. State? Post-Communist 
Prospects for Democracy in Europe
Mikko Lagerspetz
During the past two decades, the European subcontinent has gone 
through a profound geopolitical restructuring – larger than has ever 
before taken place there without warfare.1 Among other things, the fall 
of Real Socialism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia brought several newly independent countries on the 
map of Europe. But even more important than the emergence of new 
or re-established states was that an end was put to the former division 
of Europe and to the bipolar world. The removal of the dividing line 
between the power blocs of the Cold War opened way for an eastward 
enlargement of Western-based international organizations such as 
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO), along with the transfer of capital, institutional models 
and political discourses. The political system that was previously (by 
Western observers, not by the offi cial Marxist-Leninist ideology or by 
the concerned populations themselves) called Communism was now 
replaced by something that became depicted as Post-Communism. 
As such, the concept of Post-Communism is not uncontested. The 
best way to fi nd a working defi nition for it is probably by referring 
to commonalities within a set of societies that, despite their varying 
cultural and historical backgrounds, share several decades’ experience 
of a unifying political system with totalitarian ambitions, the popular 
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rejection of it, and the specifi c challenges that arise from a rapid simul-
taneous transformation of economics, politics and social and cultural 
life (see, e.g., Holmes 1997: 15-21). 
The aim of the present chapter is to investigate some of the ways 
in which specifi cities of Post-Communism can be thought of being 
revealed by an international comparison of the ISSP 2004 survey 
results. 
Remarks on Post-Communist civic culture
By now (and by 2004 already, when the survey to be discussed in 
this chapter was done), several of the formerly Real Socialist Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have become members of 
both the EU and the NATO, and others are seriously negotiating on 
membership. The rule of law, liberal democracy and capitalism are 
characteristics of these societies2 in the same way as they characterise 
Western Europe. It is justifi ed to ask, whether it any more makes sense 
to attach to them such a label as Post-Communism. The term can be 
seen as misleading: The new EU member states and the Candidate 
countries are, in large, confronted with issues that they share in com-
mon with other EU members. As put by the Finnish-Estonian politi-
cal scientist Kristi Raik (2003: 20), “[t]here is probably already more 
variation among the Western, ‘old’ democracies than between some 
Western countries and the most successful CEECs. Meanwhile, all of 
them are faced with similar challenges posed by globalisation, and in 
Europe by European integration, for the functioning of democracy on 
a national level.” Moreover, the label of Post-Communism can even be 
seen as derogatory; as a stigma attached to societies and people, who 
despite the continuing existence of many severe problems also have 
every right to be proud of what they have already accomplished in 
terms of political, economic, cultural and social development within 
an extremely short period of time. 
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The subject of this chapter is Post-Communist civic culture. 
However, its aim is by no means to argue that the shared Real So-
cialist past will forever remain the key feature for understanding the 
development of CEE societies. What will be maintained is, however, 
that the concept of Post-Communism is instrumental in pointing at 
the continuous effect on politics and society that a shared historical 
experience necessarily has; it is of course probable that with time, its 
explanatory power will be gradually reduced. Here, we could refer to 
the analogous concept of Post-Colonialism, which can be useful when 
discussing common traits between societies that share the same kind 
of history of subjugation to an external power centre – without insist-
ing that this is the only possible perspective. The latter concept has 
its specifi c uses when criticising discourses and practices of colonial 
rule and neo-colonialism, or when seeking to understand the cultural 
practices of the decolonised world. Importantly, postcolonial criticism 
has also been able to gain wide acceptance to the idea of studying 
literature and other art forms as connected with the social structure 
and power relations in their respective societies, thus bringing down 
old disciplinary boundaries (Moore-Gilbert 1997: 8). In the same way, 
the focus on historical continuities that necessarily results from the 
adoption of the concept of Post-Communism serves to highlight the 
mutual dependency between cultural, social, political and economic 
developments, none of which can be properly understood without 
taking into account the others. 
The interconnectedness of different spheres of development be-
comes visible within the realm of what can be called civic, or political 
culture (here, I treat the two terms as synonymous). The concept itself 
can be defi ned in several different ways; it is closely related to those 
of political participation and legitimacy, but of course, identical with 
neither of them. On the empirical level, a researcher can observe dif-
ferent patterns of political participation (or non-participation); there 
are methods of making judgements on the legitimacy of a political 
system or government. In contrast, political culture cannot be directly 
observed, but is rather something that the researcher has to construct 
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from scattered pieces of evidence. It can be understood as an underly-
ing pattern, creating a predisposition of the society and individuals to 
perceive and produce political action in a certain way. Such a view of 
political culture points at it being rooted also in things rather distant 
from institutional politics. Authority relations in the family and be-
tween colleagues, religious beliefs, or historical narratives may serve 
as examples of phenomena connected with it. Importantly, political 
culture provides the members of society with a range of social roles 
and identities, which can be more or less diverse, with various types 
of relationship with political institutions and centres of authority. The 
roles and identities adopted by citizens will, in turn, infl uence how they 
behave. Both political action and how it is perceived are guided by a set 
of culturally defi ned roles, practices and ideas of reality. Inasmuch as 
they have relevance to politics, power, and authority, they can be said 
to be a part of political culture (Lagerspetz 1996: 29-31). 
In the present analysis, comparisons will be made mostly between 
respondents in Western Europe and in the Post-Communist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Both geographical concepts require 
some clarifi cation. Among the countries participating in the ISSP 
2004 survey, “Western Europe” (WE) can be said to include Norway, 
Switzerland, and those countries that were EU members before 2004, 
with the exception of the former GDR. “Central and Eastern Europe” 
(CEE) will, in turn, refer to the former GDR, Bulgaria, and the coun-
tries that became members of the EU in 2004, with the exception of 
Cyprus. Russia will be treated as a separate case. 
The division applied diverges somewhat from the often-used 
division between the “old” and the “new” EU members, and the non-
members. The reason for this is precisely the search for continuities and 
specifi c traits of political culture that was discussed above. The CEE, as 
defi ned here, can be said to consist of countries and regions that became 
parts of the Socialist bloc during or immediately after the Second World 
War, and that by 2004 could be regarded as consolidated democracies 
in the sense that a return to authoritarian rule seemed excluded; in the 
sense that democracy had become “the only game in town” (Linz & 
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Stepan 1994). As to Russia and its Southern and Eastern allies in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), they are certainly a part 
of the Post-Communist region and have much in common with their 
Western next neighbours. However, both Russia’s size and the insecure 
prospects of democratic development under and after President Putin’s 
administration give reason to treat it in the present analysis as separate 
from (other parts of ) Central and Eastern Europe. 
In the following, we will fi rst take a look at what the survey material 
can tell us about the relationship people have with institutional politics 
in CEE and compare it with how people think about it in Russia and 
in WE. In what senses does the legitimacy of democratic institutions 
and political power differ between the regions? And a related question: 
What is the attitude of citizens in different regions towards the plurality 
of interests and opinions in their society? Next, we will consider the 
ideas people have of alternative ways of exerting political infl uence, 
through the creation and use of non-institutional channels. After that, 
their reported activity in non-institutional civic participation will be 
discussed. Finally, some possible explanations will be suggested for the 
fi ndings; they will, on one hand, be related to the legacy both from the 
Real Socialist era and from a more distant past. On the other, they will 
also be discussed as refl ecting a general tendency in the Western world 
that could be referred to as a late modern (or post-modern) change of 
political participation patterns. 
Institutional politics
The revolutionary change of late 1980s–early 1990s meant the aban-
donment of planned economy in favour of market economy; however, 
the change of political regime can be said to have been even more 
important. It was “freedom” and “democracy”, not “market” nor “capi-
talism” that became the leading slogans of the revolutionary process. 
Multiparty systems and competitive elections were introduced and new 
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(or thoroughly revised) constitutions created throughout the region. 
Popular expectations regarding the new democratic institutions were 
high, and democracy became associated with a promise of growing 
material welfare as well. After initial euphoria and high expectations 
it became clear, however, that a change of political regime as such 
gave no guarantee of the state being better able to tackle the manifold 
problems accompanied by the economic transition (cf., e.g., Simon 
1996). As a rule, the voter turnout declined rapidly in elections fol-
lowing the fi rst full-fl edged democratic elections in each country (see 
Berglund & al. 2004). 
On one hand, the CEE societies have been able to avoid the temp-
tation of a return to an authoritarian regime; even if political crises 
are not uncommon, they have been settled within the frameworks of 
the existing democratic constitutions. On the other hand, the popular 
legitimacy of institutional politics seems constantly to be lower than it 
is in the old democracies of WE. This conclusion can be drawn from 
a large number of former surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, and it is 
once again confi rmed by results of the ISSP 2004 survey (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Legitimacy of institutional politics in different European regions, 
selected indicators
Good citizen always votes
Total 1-3 
(disagreement), 
percentages
Total 5-7 
(agreement), 
percentages
WE 9.0 83.0
CEE 19.0 67.0
Russia 13.2 76.9
Honesty of latest elections
Very or somewhat dishonest Very or somewhat 
honest
WE 4.6 85.7
CEE 14.0 54.6
Russia 31.1 38.5
People like me have no infl uence on what government does
Agree or strongly agree Disagree or strongly 
disagree
WE 59.7 34.1
CEE 69.1 16.2
Russia 60.6 25.2
Democracy in my country today
Total 0-3 (works poorly), 
percentages
Total 7-10 (works well), 
percentages
WE 11.2 53.2
CEE 31.6 20.5
Russia 34.8 17.0
Democracy in my country in 10 years’ time
Total 0-3 (works poorly), 
percentages
Total 7-10 (works well), 
percentages
WE 17.3 30.3
CEE 20.5 44.7
Russia 24.5 40.7
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In CEE and Russia, voting is much less clearly considered a charac-
teristic of a good citizen than it is in WE. This difference in attitude 
is related to how people in general tend to perceive the functionality 
of the institutions of political participation: a much larger percentage 
than in the WE – in Russia as large as 31.1 – were of the opinion that 
the latest elections in their country had been “very” or “somewhat” 
dishonest. Agreement with the statement, according to which people 
like the respondents themselves have no infl uence on what their gov-
ernment does, can be said to refl ect political alienation. While more 
than a third of the respondents in WE countries disagreed with the 
statement, the share of those who disagreed ranged from around one 
quarter in Russia to less than one sixth in CEE. 
In one aspect the results cited above run contrary to what could 
be expected. Due to their different geographical, political, cultural 
and economic proximity to WE, one could expect that the attitudes 
displayed by CEE citizens would be closer, and those of Russian citizens 
less close to those in WE. As we will see, this will often be the case when 
other issues are at stake. Here we see, however, that the legitimacy of 
political institutions in Russia, even if lower than in the WE, still is 
higher than in the other post-communist countries. A possible answer 
could refer to the greater continuity of the state apparatus in Russia. In 
those CEE countries that had newly won their independence, the post-
revolutionary governments were in charge of creating new institutions 
from scratch; even those governments who had inherited an existing 
state apparatus were nevertheless politically compelled to give symbolic 
signals of having abandoned old practices of administration. In both 
types of cases, the state apparatus could be perceived as an ephemeral 
actor whose legitimacy is not supported by habit and can, thus, easily 
be questioned. It can be added that the legitimacy of the former, Com-
munist regime was also probably much higher in Russia than it was in 
the other countries in its sphere of infl uence; in the latter, Communism 
was largely perceived as just another name for foreign (i.e., Russian) 
domination. As can be seen now, distrust towards the former regime 
has led to a more general attitude of distrust against government of 
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any kind – to a perceived contradiction between “ordinary citizens” 
and the state. 
In their overall assessment of the functioning of democracy in 
their country today, both Russian and CEE respondents are much 
more skeptical than are the Westerners. However, the skepticism of 
today is balanced by an equally striking difference in the perception 
of democracy’s future perspectives by respondents in different regions. 
While the WE citizens in average expect that democracy in their coun-
try will in ten years’ time work less well than it does today, citizens 
of Post-Communist countries see forward to an improvement. Their 
narrative of democracy is that of development and consolidation, while 
the Western one is about decline. 
Unity and pluralism 
Perhaps the most fundamental of the senses in which the economic, 
political and social order of Real Socialism diverged from Western 
liberal democracy was its treatment of pluralism and difference. Ac-
cording to the offi cial ideology, the interests of the working class were 
represented by the Communist Party and they were identical with 
the interests of the State. Whatever other interests there were, could 
only be the interests of the class enemy. In a similar vein, the cultural 
and media policies of the regimes were directed at the creation of the 
Socialist Man, whose consciousness would be in correspondence with 
his role in building up a socialist society. Again, deviations from this 
intellectual and moral unity would be either bourgeois remnants – such 
as the practise of religion –, or something worse. As Václav Havel 
(1992: 167-171) argues, the very practice of branding some people as 
“dissidents” shows how important it was for the regime to sustain the 
image of the socialist nation as a unifi ed whole. 
To what extent this unifi cation of society was successful, is of course 
a matter to be discussed. No doubt, the ambitions were higher than 
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what actually was reached. The countries that became Sovietised under 
the Second World War or immediately after that, received a shorter and 
less thorough experience of the regime than did Russia itself; among 
other things, they avoided some of the worst atrocities of Stalin’s rule, 
such as the terror of 1937-1938. The lessons from the few previous 
decades of a beginning of a Capitalist modernization were a resource that 
was not available for the population in Russia. In CEE, there certainly 
was a cultural inertia that slowed down the unifi cation process. It can 
be thought, however, that human activity is never totally uniform or 
totally predictable, and that from this, a pluralism necessarily arises at 
least at the level of people’s everyday experiences. Thus, a society can 
never be totally unifi ed; the question to be asked is, whether and to 
what extent the unavoidable pluralism is acknowledged and supported 
by social institutions and discourses. 
Of course, the unifying pressures of market economy and the 
mass media of capitalist societies can be equally effective in ensuring 
the hegemony of a leading class and suppressing radical opposition; 
in fact, they are probably even more effective, as was proven by the 
fall of Real Socialism through popular uprisings. But the unifying 
method of Capitalism is different, based on the “repressive tolerance” 
of the political system (Marcuse 1969) and the commodifi cation and 
standardization of difference through the market and media. In short, 
Real Socialism denied pluralism, while Capitalism has found ways of 
institutionalising it as part and parcel of the system itself. 
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Table 2. Ideas on unity and pluralism in different European regions, 
selected indicators
Good citizen understands other opinions
Total 1-3 (disagreement), 
percentages
Total 5-7 (agreement), 
percentages
WE 5.7 84.2
CEE 11.3 72.1
Russia 10.7 74.0
Good citizen serves in the military if needed
Total 1-3 (disagreement), 
percentages
Total 5-7 (agreement), 
percentages
WE 38.1 47.7
CEE 28.5 57.1
Russia 11.6 78.6
Government respects and protects the rights of minorities
Total 1-3 (not important), 
percentages
Total 5-7 (important), 
percentages
WE 3.7 90.7
CEE 5.6 86.5
Russia 6.7 75.8
Should government restrict democratic rights when needed? 
No Yes
WE 80.9 19.1
CEE 74.5 25.5
Russia 68.4 31.6
Should public meetings by religious extremists be allowed? 
Defi nitely or probably 
allowed
Defi nitely or probably not 
allowed
WE 24.5 75.5
CEE 18.3 81.7
Russia 9.0 80.9
Should public meetings by racist people be allowed?
Defi nitely or probably 
allowed
Defi nitely or probably not 
allowed
WE 18.2 81.9
CEE 12.6 87.5
Russia 6.7 93.4
Table 2 gives an overview of some indicators refl ecting present attitudes 
towards unity vs. pluralism in three different regions in Europe. The 
differences between WE, CEE and Russia are clear and follow the 
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general pattern, in which tolerance and pluralism are more valued in 
the West and less so in Russia, whereas CEE tends to fall between the 
two extremes. It is noteworthy that the Western respondents are more 
lenient even towards religious extremists and racists, despite the fact 
that such movements are themselves hostile of the pluralist and tolerant 
society that surrounds them. 
Ideas of participatory democracy
There are some fundamental differences in the experiences that WE, 
CEE and Russian citizens have of political activity. What the West-
erners have and what the other Europeans lack is the habitualization 
of participation in a liberal democratic political system; what both 
Russians and Central Europeans have and Western Europeans lack 
is a recent experience of suppression by and resistance against an au-
thoritarian government. Finally, what among them all is unique for 
Central Europeans is the memory of revolutionary mass movements 
being able to overthrow the previous regime. In comparison with the 
CEE countries, the Russian democratisation process had much more 
of the character of reform imposed from above. 
Initially, the Central and Eastern European “dissidents”3 and oppo-
sitionist movements had no access to institutional channels of political 
participation. Their ways of infl uencing society included balancing on 
the verge of what was accepted by the authorities; visible personal acts 
of courage; and creating networks among the like minded. A strategy 
of this type corresponded to a view of political activity as fi rmly rooted 
in the actors’ personal moral qualities and in the everyday life, even 
the intimate sphere – that of the habermasian Lebenswelt (Habermas 
1991). Again, as put by Václav Havel (1992: 210) in his famous essay 
from 1978, “The Power of the Powerless”, the new “post-democratic” 
political system should be aimed at…
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“a rehabilitation of values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, 
love. I believe in structures that are not aimed at the technical aspect 
of the execution of power, but at the signifi cance of that execution 
in structures held together more by a commonly shared feeling of 
the importance of certain communities than by commonly shared 
expansionist ambitions directed outward. There can and must be 
structures that are open, dynamic, and small; beyond a certain point, 
human ties like personal trust and personal responsibility cannot work. 
[…] Rather than a strategic agglomeration of formalized organiza-
tions, it is better to have organizations springing up ad hoc, infused 
with enthusiasm for a particular purpose and disappearing when that 
purpose has been achieved.” 
And some years later, in 1984, Havel (1992: 271) expressed the same 
goal when saying…
“Yes, ‘antipolitical politics’ is possible. Politics ‘from below’. Politics 
of man, not the apparatus. Politics growing from the heart, not from 
a thesis.” 
Here, we can hear the anti-institutionalism of a “dissident” intellectual 
mixing with that of a “Little Man” like the Good Soldier Švejk, and 
also with ideas similar to those of the New Social Movements of the 
1970s and 1980s in the West.  
According to the survey results it would seem that a similar attitude 
continues to characterise the ways in which respondents in CEE see 
their relationship to channels of political participation (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Ideas on direct civic participation in different European regions, 
selected indicators
Right for civil disobedience acts
Total 1-3 (not important), 
percentages
Total 5-7 (important), 
percentages
WE 28.2 56.1
CEE 8.6 79.7
Russia 10.6 74.1
Citizens involved in decision making
Total 1-3 (not important), 
percentages
Total 5-7 (important), 
percentages
WE 4.4 90.0
CEE 3.3 90.9
Russia 3.3 90.8
Should public meetings be allowed for people who want to overthrow government 
by violent means? 
Defi nitely or probably 
allowed
Defi nitely or probably not 
allowed
WE 12.0 88.0
CEE 16.6 83.4
Russia 8.1 91.9
Good citizen keeps watch on government
Total 1-3 (disagreement), 
percentages
Total 5-7 (agreement), 
percentages
WE 11.0 74.3
CEE 24.3 55.4
Russia 14.4 56.9
Good citizen is active in associations
Total 1-3 (disagreement),
percentages
Total 5-7 (agreement), 
percentages
WE 37.6 40.1
EE 47.7 29.6
Russia 31.2 35.4
The right for civil disobedience acts was clearly perceived as more 
important by respondents in CEE than either in Russia or WE. The 
difference becomes even more dramatic if we consider only those 
respondents who considered this right as “very important”, i.e., who 
chose the answer category 7 on the seven-point scale. Their percentage 
in WE, CEE and Russia was 22.8, 42.7 and 37.8, respectively. A similar 
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remark can be made about the next question about the importance of 
citizens being involved in political decision making. The percentage of 
respondents rating it “very important” in WE, CEE and Russia differ 
clearly, being 42.7, 54.7 and 52.1, respectively. Central Europeans are 
also more willing than others to allow public meetings for people who 
want to overthrow government by violent means. 
Against this background it seems astonishing, that two possible 
aspects of civic involvement – “keeping watch on government” and 
“being active in associations” – are not considered particularly important 
by the same CEE respondents. Critical of state institutions, the re-
spondents do not seem to have much trust in institutionalised channels 
for direct civic involvement, either. This side of the Post-Communist 
anti-institutionalism has some important practical consequences, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
Practices of direct civic participation 
In her famous treatment of 1951, Hannah Arendt (1951/1994) de-
picted totalitarian states as mass societies of atomised individuals. In 
the circumstances of an all-embracing surveillance and control by 
the state, people no longer formed groups and associations typical of 
more complex societies, as they were afraid of trusting anybody but 
themselves and their immediate family. Arendt seems to confi rm the 
observation by Tocqueville (1856/1955) a hundred years earlier: It is 
not important for a despot to be loved by his subjects; the important 
thing is that they do not love each other, either. In Arendt’s own words 
(1951/1994: 21), “Bolshevik rulers [had] succeeded in creating an 
atomized and individualized society the like of which we have never 
seen before [...].“
Despite transitions to democracy, including freedom of associa-
tion, the survey results show the persistence of a difference between the 
Western and Eastern parts of Europe with respect to their populations’ 
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willingness or ability to participate in joint action in order to infl uence 
society (see Table 4). When the three regions discussed here are com-
pared, the differences seem again to follow a Western-Eastern axis, in 
which WE and Russia represent the opposite ends and CEE is situated 
in between. In comparison with Russia, CEE countries have by now 
enjoyed some more years of relative stability, which certainly is one of 
the prerequisites for voluntary associations and other institutionalised 
forms of civic involvement to develop. It could also be repeated here 
that the Communist regimes of CEE had a shorter time available for 
making reality of their totalitarian ambitions than the Bolsheviks had 
in Russia. For this reason, the CEE citizens have been more able to 
make use of the possibilities now re-opened.  
Table 4. Practical experience on direct civic participation in different 
European regions, selected indicators
Forms of political participation by respondent during the past year or in a more distant past
Form of participation WE CEE Russia
- Sign petition 60.3 27.8 15.0
- Boycott a product 39.0 10.7 6.6
- Participate in a demonstration 30.6 17.9 25.0
- Attend a political meeting or event 29.4 22.2 19.1
- Contact a politician 21.5 11.0 11.3
- Donate or raise funds 50.7 25.1 16.0
- Contact media 13.7 6.2 6.0
- Join a political internet forum 5.0 4.0 1.8
Belonging to an organization (active and passive members)
Type of organization WE CEE Russia
- Political party 9.4 4.5 3.0
- Church or religious association 46.9 30.2 10.0
- Sports or cultural organizations 40.1 26.1 7.5
- Other voluntary associations 24.9 9.7 2.6
Taking into account the short time period and the awkward point of 
departure, the recovery of organisational activities seems remarkably 
rapid in CEE, but less so in Russia. It should be noticed that differ-
ences between the three regions are smallest when we consider those 
forms of participation that require relatively less organising and long-
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term personal involvement – i.e., participating in demonstrations, 
political meetings and Internet fora. Here we cannot avoid recalling 
recent discussions about a possible erosion of social capital in the West, 
which manifests itself in peoples’ diminishing willingness to engage 
themselves in joint action for common good (e.g., Putnam 2000). 
Such a development would lead to a decline of membership in political 
parties and voluntary associations, of fundraising etc.; i.e., of precisely 
those forms of participation that are now less well developed in CEE 
and Russia. The feared development does not seem to have gone very 
far in WE, at least yet; but again, it is not impossible that the problem 
of citizens’ lacking engagement in common issues now visible in CEE 
and Russia can be seen as anticipating a more general tendency present 
in late modernity. 
Conclusions 
The data and arguments presented above include some interesting para-
doxes. Despite democratisation, citizens of post-communist countries 
continue to distrust their state and the new democratic institutions. 
They see civil disobedience as an important democratic right; this 
parallels the importance that the “dissidents” and revolutionary move-
ments of the 1980s attributed to direct civic participation. At the same 
time, relatively few people do in fact involve in such activities, at least 
less than in WE; and the idea of a pluralist society in which different 
interests can be expressed still gains less acceptance than it does in the 
West. Explanations to these phenomena are manifold and related both 
to history, to the present social situation, and to global trends that have 
already been briefl y discussed above. 
The fi rst aspect of Post-Communist civic culture discussed here 
can be summarised as the constellation of Citizen vs. the State. That 
is, the state is still – after more than fi fteen years of political democracy 
– by many being regarded as the business of “others than ourselves”. 
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This perception of state as an alien force is clearly a heritage from 
the past. It is also clearly an idea that is widespread among the post-
socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In his analysis of 
Czech national identity, Ladislav Holy (1996: 25) quotes an allegedly 
widespread popular saying from the decades before the 1990s, stat-
ing, “anyone who does not steal4 is robbing his family.” This points 
at a separation between the individual and public morals, repeatedly 
described by analysts of the Real Socialist political and economic sys-
tem (e.g., Hánkiss 1988: 27). Not surprisingly, both the revolutions 
of 1988-1991 and the previous resistance were often perceived of as 
a controversy between the “society“ or the “nation” and the “state” 
(Holy 1996: 10; Szajkowski 1997: 157). It should also be noted, that 
the “nation” or “society“ rising to oppose the oppressing regime was 
itself understood as unifi ed. 
It may be however, that the experience of the state as distinct both 
from the individual and his or her cultural identity can be traced even 
further to the period of “national awakenings” in CEE. During the 
course of the 19th century, the ”nations” of the region were constructed 
in opposition to the multinational empires of the Hapsburgs, the Ro-
manovs and the Ottomans. Here, we should recall the distinctiveness 
of the Central and East European nation-building processes from those 
of Western Europe. Whereas the French-inspired Western nationalism 
aimed at creating a culturally united ”nation” within the boundaries 
of an existing political entity, the German type of nationalism prevail-
ing in the Central European region had to defi ne the ”nation” as a 
socio-cultural entity before it had achieved political reality as a state 
(Jenkins & Sofos 1996: 15). Hence, the individual identity produced 
by the national awakenings could not be that of a citizen, but that of 
an inheritor of a linguistic and cultural tradition. 
In sum, both the pre-1918 and pre-1989 experiences of subju-
gation under a foreign ruler contribute to a mentality that is more 
successful in creating revolutionaries than citizens. Critical action 
aimed at overthrowing a government and civic involvement aimed at 
building up democratic institutions can both be regarded as aspects 
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of civil society, but as Alain Touraine (1985: 755) has remarked, they 
require widely different capacities. Evidently, civic involvement needs 
at least some type of institutionalised structures in order to be effective. 
In CEE, non-governmental organizations have developed during the 
1990s and 2000s at a relatively fast pace, even if their strength still is 
clearly weaker than in the WE. Could they develop into agents of such 
“politics from below” that were suggested by Havel, and that have also 
been discussed by such Western European sociologists as Ulrich Beck 
(1994)? One important challenge for the emerging activities consists 
of coming into terms with the popular attitudes towards unity and 
pluralism discussed in this chapter. 
Where does this leave the institutional channels of political de-
mocracy? It should be stated fi rst, that despite wide-spread skepticism 
towards political institutions in CEE and in Russia, a clear majority of 
the population in both regions oppose any restriction of democratic 
rights by the government and are, in fact, optimistic about the future 
of democracy in their countries (cf. answers to these questions as re-
ported in tables 1 and 2). The problem is not about people opposing 
democracy as such. At the same time it is also obvious that the creation 
of democratic institutions in the Post-Communist countries has taken 
place in an epoch, which has throughout Europe been characterised 
by a trend towards weaker party organizations, more unstable party 
systems and a reduction of political debate to media campaigning 
focused on party leaders (Hedin 2001: 50). The new democracies 
cannot avoid being infl uenced by this trend. But whereas the modern 
democratic institutions have been somewhat able to resist it in WE, 
supported by their already won position in citizens’ minds and habits, 
they are more fragile in the East. George Schöpfl in (1993: 274) makes 
an important point: 
“The greatest damage done by communism […] was the destruction 
of institutions. […] The role of institutions in politics is not merely 
to represent individuals, but also to provide the necessary distance 
between them and to establish codes of conduct and political ground 
rules in which there is a degree of detachment, routine and predict-
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ability. In the absence of this politics easily becomes a matter of 
personal passions, interactions and relations.” 
This analysis points to the crucial impact that institutional structure 
has for the formation of political culture. But in the “personal passions, 
interactions and relations” that may impair democratic consolidation 
we also see the reverse side of what Havel described as an ideal to strive 
for: “Politics ‘from below’. Politics of man, not the apparatus. Politics 
growing from the heart, not from a thesis”. The idea of non-alienated 
politics will continue to attract people in all parts of Europe. Maybe 
the most important challenge for democracy of the future will consist 
of creating or (re)opening institutional channels for “politics growing 
from the heart”.
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Endnotes
1. I wish to thank Dr. Krista Hinno of the Centre for Civil Society Studies and 
Development of the Tallinn University, Estonia, for assistance in processing the 
statistical data referred to in this chapter; and Annamari Konttinen, University 
of Turku, Finland, for useful comments and smooth cooperation when editing 
this volume. 
2. Here, we are not referring to all Post-Communist countries in Europe; the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) and especially Russia will be discussed 
below. In the terminology of this chapter, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in-
cludes those European countries in which a Communist (or maybe more accurately, 
Real Socialist) regime was introduced during the 1940s. Thus, it includes Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, but no other previous parts of the Soviet Union. Most of 
the CEE countries, but not all (Albania and the countries in former Yugoslavia) 
were members of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. The CEE countries that 
participated in the ISSP 2004 survey were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East 
Germany, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Hence, not all CEE 
countries, but all the main geographic subregions were represented.  
3. As to the quotation marks around “dissidents”, please be reminded of Havel’s 
argument referred to in the previous section! 
4. (that is, from the state-owned employer)
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Conclusions: EU as a Political Entity? 
Citizenship and Participation in EU countries
Raimo Blom & Annamari Konttinen 
The chapters in this book contribute to the research tradition of citizen-
ship, social networks, social capital and social and political participa-
tion – as well as in the heyday that the tradition has now enjoyed for 
more than a decade. They do that by providing an extensive portrait 
of, particularly European, citizenship, and by covering phenomena 
such as citizens’ notions of the signifi cance of citizenship and the 
characteristics of a “good citizen”, trust in political institutions and 
the functioning of the entire democratic system, as well as a variety 
of forms of social and political participation and association activity, 
together with cognitions such as sense of effi cacy that form the foun-
dation for feelings of belongingness to a society as well as rationale for 
social and political participation. The latter tie the newer stratum of 
social science research with the tradition of study of political effi cacy, 
sense of belonging and alienation, started in the US in the1950s, and 
with roots in Tocquevillean thinking.
The ISSP Citizenship data makes also possible larger scale com-
parisons between the EU countries and non-EU countries, within 
the limits of ISSP-membership and participation in the Citizenship 
module (see Appendix 2). The results show relatively large variety and 
sharp contrasts, also between European countries. One can, however, 
also observe notable similarities among them. The analysis starts with 
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the question of the special nature of Finland. The location of Finland 
in the conceptual grid of aspects of “good citizenship” corresponds to 
Finland’s position in the theories of types of capitalism and welfare 
regimes. Regime analysis is also consistent with the grouping of other 
countries in this grid. The main focus in the analysis was in the dif-
ferentiation of EU-countries as well as in looking for the least common 
denominator: the signifi ers of a “European” citizenship. 
While the survey method constrains the study to methodological 
individualism, where phenomena such as social capital or trust are 
reduced to quantifi able and measurable qualities and perceptions of 
individuals, the comparison of nations opens perspectives that transcend 
this limitation: we can observe different citizenship regimes and their 
constitutive elements such as generalized trust or sense of political ef-
fi cacy or forms of participation in their cultural and historical contexts. 
The special treatment given to Finland in some of the chapters of this 
book is, we hope, an example of such in-depth treatment.
The New Boom of Citizenship Studies in the 1990s
A new wave of studies emerging early in the 1990s has created many 
more or less ambitious typologies and categorizations of countries based 
on empirical generalizations. Quite often this has happened at the cost 
of older theory based typologies, many of whom were developed in the 
1950s, some even in the classical period of sociology around the turn 
of the 19th and 20th century.
As the new boom started, most attention was paid to the different 
aspects of social capital as formulated by Robert D. Putnam (1993; 
1995): trust, voluntary associations and social networks of bridging 
social capital that brings together people from different social back-
grounds (Putnam 2000). This analysis led to empirical typologies 
based mostly on survey fi ndings. Countries were fi rst roughly grouped 
into those whose citizens had many association memberships (e.g. the 
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Netherlands; the Nordic Countries; Ireland) and those whose citizens 
didn’t belong to the same extent (see e.g. Morales 2001; Curtis et al. 
2001; Siisiäinen 1999; Wallace 2005; Baer 2007). Putnam adopted this 
typology to differentiation between regions within nations, too (1993; 
2000). The differences that he found between countries have presented 
themselves in approximately the same form in subsequent studies (with 
small fl uctuations caused by methodical and operational choices). 
A new dimension in participation research was opened by making 
a distinction between formal membership and working membership 
(e.g. Curtis et al. 2001). On working membership dimension, the USA 
and Canada, for example, rank high, whereas some countries of high 
formal membership show lower fi gures (e.g. some Nordic countries, 
Ireland) (op.cit. 792-793). A step further is made by Dekker and 
van den Broek (1998; 2005; see Stroemsnes & Wollebaek 2006; c.f. 
Morales 2001) who develop a typology using the percentage of associa-
tion memberships in the population and the percentage of volunteers 
among members as variables. This results in three different types of 
civil society: (1) the parochial (few members, high percentage of the 
members as activists); typical representatives to be found among the 
Southern European countries. (2) active civil society (high proportion 
of members + high percentage of volunteers among members); typi-
cal countries in North America; (3) broad civil society (relatively high 
membership fi gures + modest proportions of volunteering); the Nordic 
countries, West Germany, and the Netherlands.
Another widening of this social capital perspective on associa-
tions and social networks has been the examination of both bridging 
(especially associations) and bonding networks (e.g. relatives, friends, 
community networks). The inclusion of these bonding “memberships” 
disperses the country groupings based on association activeness fi gures 
alone. Some countries seem to have both high association membership 
fi gures and social contact fi gures (e.g. meeting friends) (the Netherlands, 
Sweden), while some countries rank low in association memberships 
but high in friendship and other social networking activities (Bulgaria, 
Cyprus), whereas some countries with high memberships are located 
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clearly lower on the list of meeting friends and other informal forms 
of networking (e.g. Finland) (see Wallace 2005).
Trust and high number of association memberships have corre-
lated highly on country level ever since they have been measured since 
early 1990s (see Warren [ed.] 1999; Inglehart 1999; Wallace 2005). 
Generally speaking, the top ten “trusting” nations consist of citizens 
in – mostly protestant – welfare states (Nordic countries, some central 
European countries, some English-speaking countries). The relation-
ship between association memberships and trust is one of the most 
studied sociological problems around the turn of the Millennium. 
The differences between countries seem convincing at the macro level 
whereas at the individual level, most of the researchers tend to think 
that there is not enough evidence about the positive effect of associa-
tion memberships on the level of trust (see Siisiäinen and Kouvo in 
this volume). As many researchers, especially in the Nordic countries, 
have noted, the relationship between trust and association membership 
on individual level seems to be more or less spurious and “the scope of 
the voluntary sector […] appears more important than activity level for 
the aggregate level of social capital and civic engagement” (Stroemsnes 
& Wollebaek 2006, 15).
In can be concluded – especially from the results of many Scan-
dinavian studies – that the role of broad, visible and widely known 
system of voluntary associations is of utmost importance for the creation 
of social capital and trust. And second, the role of the public sector 
and state institutions (the Nordic welfare state institution) as well as 
various forms of neo-corporatism (study circles, tripartite state com-
mission with trade union representation, tradition of large citizens’ 
movements etc.) belong to the most central background factors in the 
explanation of the high level of social capital in the Nordic countries 
(see Rothstein  2001; Trägårdh 2007). Third, the relationship between 
broad system of voluntary associations and the (welfare) state as well 
as general knowledge about the effectiveness of this dialectics has been 
very important in the creation of the sense of security among citizens as 
the basis for social capital. This is connected with the historical devel-
   173
opment of specifi c types of relationships between civil society and the 
state, and with different kinds of political opportunity structures (e.g. 
open vs. closed state; inclusionary vs. exclusionary state to challenging 
movements) (see Kriesi et al. 1995).
On the basis on these kinds of fi ndings, it seems well grounded 
to conclude that
(1) research has to take the macro level more seriously into focus as 
the context of micro relations between individual association 
memberships and social capital;
(2) state and welfare regimes need to be included among the inde-
pendent “causal factors” in the explanation of the differences (or 
similarities) between countries;
(3) state – civil society relations need to be theoreticized and typo-
logicized as a general basis for more detailed comparisons between 
countries;
(4) this stresses the importance of historical analysis: (a) of state – civil 
society relations; (b) of conceptual and rhetorical analysis of civil 
society in different countries (e.g. Trägårdh 2007; Brown et al. 
2000).
(5) 15 years after the Putnamian turn, some of the partly forgotten 
“classical” themes dealt with in theories about the relationship 
between (interest) associations and the political system should be 
reinstated in the frame of reference of (regulation of ) confl icts (e.g. 
Dahrendorf 1957), relation between organized and non-organized 
interests (e.g. Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach & Baratz; see Blom 
1981; Siisiäinen 1985; 2004; Blom & Siisiäinen  1992), relation-
ships between inequality structures (classes), other discourses of 
difference and voluntary organizing (discussions about sociological 
pluralism; see Siisiäinen 1986).
In making theoretical typologies, a central decision concerns the level 
of generality. Very general typologies (c.f. Weber’s discussion about the 
relationship between religions and the development of capitalism or 
Marx’s analysis of the modes of production that preceded capitalism) 
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can only form the fi rst, abstract point of departure for developing more 
concrete classifi cations. On the other hand, if a more empirically based 
typologizing classifi cation tries to follow too closely the empirically 
depicted reality, the theoretical usefulness and fruitfulness will be lost. 
It then resembles a small-scale map, which copies its geographical object 
too keenly and becomes useless in orientating oneself.
The typologies utilized here are the fi rst step in specifying the 
characteristics of the Finnish case. They help us to fi rst place Finland 
in a more general category among European welfare political regimes; 
and second, help make distinctions within the more general, “Nordic 
(Scandinavian) type”. General, theoretically grounded typologies are 
needed to open all survey fi gures which can be “attained” in so many 
different ways (c.f. China’s high scoring in international comparisons 
of trust, see Inglehart 1999); diffi culties in interpretations of the Johns 
Hopkins study of the non-profi t sector (c.f. Salamon et al. 1999).
We have found Eva Schofer and Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas’ 
syntheticizing typology a fruitful basis for our analysis. Building on 
a thorough meta-analysis of empirical studies, Schofer and Fourcade-
Gourinchas conclude that there are two distinctions that account for 
much of the variation of voluntary association memberships among 
nations in terms of the number and types of associations that people 
join: (1) between statist versus non-statist (sometimes called “liberal”) 
societies, and (2) between corporate versus non-corporate societies 
(2001, 806). Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas’ interpretation of 
their results emphasize the differences on the societal, structural (or 
“macro”) level and thereby adds evidence to the ideas that have risen 
in many new Nordic studies (see Rothstein 2001; Wollebaek & Selle 
2002; Ilmonen 2007). 
Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas also stress the importance of 
classical sociological theories of the fi eld and of the historical analy-
sis of collective action as well as attitudes and behavioural patterns 
leading to participation: these practices and attitudes do not develop 
independently from their “dialectical” and historically grounded rela-
tions with different kinds of institutions. Institutional means to pursue 
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civic engagement, on their part, are constrained by political structures. 
Political structures “serve as social sites where perceptions and ideas 
about actorhood and sovereignty are played out, institutionalized, and 
constructed as ‘legitimate’” (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001, 
810). This all gives support for understanding the relationship between 
associations (and other forms of social and political participation) as 
dialectical interaction between constraining and/or enabling “dual” 
opportunity structures and challenging or consensual movements and 
associations (see Tarrow 1989; Siisiäinen 1990).
Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas build their typology on the 
work done by neo-institutionalists and regime theoreticians. The most 
central ideas are derived from Gösta Esping-Andersen’s typology that 
distinguishes between liberal, social-democratic and conservative re-
gimes (1990; op.cit. 810-811). The basic variables of the new typology 
are defi ned as follows: 
(1) Statism describes the different ways of deriving political legiti-
macy in modern societies (the state vs. civil society). In statist countries, 
like France and Germany, “the state constitutes a separate and superior 
order of political governance that derives much of its legitimacy from 
a well-developed bureaucratic elite […] and is therefore often subject 
to some form of state control”. In Anglo-Saxon countries, by contrast, 
the state derives “its legitimacy from its function as the representation 
of civil society, which is considered to be the principal locus of public 
life” (op. cit. 811). In Scandinavia states, also support and act benevo-
lently toward associations but the boundaries between the state and 
civil society are more blurred (op. cit. 812). 
(2) Corporateness is the second variable of the typology bringing 
some central ideas of theories of corporatism back to the fore: “polities 
vary in the way in which social actors are incorporated… Some social 
systems assign sovereign “actorhood” to private persons and typically 
locate interest representation in individuals – with group action being 
legitimate only as the embodiment of individual wishes. Other systems 
assign a higher moral purpose to organized groups, empowering in-
dividuals chiefl y as members of broader collectives that have specifi c 
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“rights and functions” (op. cit. 813). As a modern representative of a 
corporate society, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas take up Sweden 
as distinguished from its opposite, the Anglo-Saxon nations represent-
ing individualistic political cultures (op. cit. 814). By cross-tabulating 
these two variables, a new typology utilizing older Jepperson’s (1992) 
ideas is obtained (op.cit. 817):
Figure 1. Variation in National Polity Structure; Statism versus Corpo-
rateness
Degree of 
Corporateness 
Degree of Statism 
L ow High 
L ow 
High 
United States, 
Br itain, Canada 
Fr ance, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, L atin A merica 
Scandinavia n (No r dic) 
countr ies 
Wi lhelmine Germany, 
postwar Germany, A ustria, 
Central and Eastern Europe, 
Japan 
It is easy to locate Finland in this typology in the same category with 
the other Nordic countries as a non-statist and corporate country. There 
are also some other theoretically based attributes that could be added 
as complementary aspect to the typology. Finland can be regarded also 
strong and as an inclusionary state in its relations with challengers (c.f. 
Kriesi et al. 1995).
  
Degree o f  
C o rp o ra t e n ess  
Degree o f  S t a t i s m  
L o w  H i g h  
L o w  
H i g h  
United S tates,  
B i t a i n ,  Ca n ada  
Fr ance,  It a ly ,  Sp i n ,  
P o r t uga l ,  L a t i n  A m er i ca  
Scandinavia n (No r dic ) 
count r ies  
Wi l h lm ine  Ge rm a ny , 
p o s t war  Ger m a n y ,  A us t r i a , 
Ce n t ra l a n d  Eas t er n  Eur o pe , 
Japa n  
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The background for the analysis of the types of capitalism is the 
French regulation school (Aglietta 1973, Lipietz 1987, and as gen-
eral review Jessop 1990). In our analysis the starting point is not the 
whole institutional structure of regulation but only the main features 
of the structural differentiation of capitalism. The theory used is that 
of Boyer’s (1997). We can proceed by investigating the foundation of 
Boyer’s types.
The basis of Boyer’s classifi cation for types of capitalism is the 
distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional char-
acteristics and adjustments, as well as the consequential advantages 
and disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are ‘mar-
ket-oriented’ (USA, Canada and Britain), ‘Rhineland or corporatist’ 
(Germany, Japan), ‘statist’ (France, Italy) and ‘social democrat’ (Sweden, 
Austria) (Boyer 1997,90).
Esping-Andersen distinguishes three welfare regimes: ‘liberal’ 
(USA as modal example), ‘social democratic’ (the Nordic countries) 
and ‘conservative’ (Germany, Italy) (Esping-Andersen 1999, 73- ). The 
original basis was the de-commodifi cation of welfare or the decrease in 
the commodity nature of labour power. In the liberal model, few rights 
and a low level of de-commodifi cation mean that the liberal welfare 
regime is almost completely Anglo-Saxon: it comprises the United 
States, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Britain. The 
social democratic welfare regime includes the Nordic countries, and 
the conservative model almost all other countries. There are different 
variants inside the three welfare regimes and, in some cases, the situation 
has changed after the publication of Esping-Andersen’s 1999 book. 
De-commodifi cation of welfare, the basic feature of Esping-An-
dersen’s regime typology has certainly changed. Labour market relations 
are more fragmented and insecure than earlier and their mode of regula-
tion is changing. In a similar way, the de-commodifi cation of welfare 
and welfare state have been under new pressures. (Julkunen 2001, 
Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). For example Esping-Andersen (2002, 
25) describes a transition where welfare is “externalized to market” and 
“internalized in the family” We can add to the picture also Manuel 
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Castells’ (1996) contribution and the question of new informational 
mode of capitalism or the multitude of world-scale transformations 
called globalization. Globalization sets both new limits to nation states 
and new demands for global citizenship. 
Regime analysis has experienced many challenges and further 
developments, which give new signifi cance for the whole regime idea. 
A good example is the work of the group Globalization, Gender and 
Work Transformation. Their book (Walby et. al. 2007) Gendering 
the Knowledge Economy. Comparative Analysis provides many criti-
cal questions as well as important answers. From our perspective, the 
most interesting matters are 1. the different dimensions, often dualities, 
used in the defi nition of the types of capitalism, 2. the institutions 
used in classifi cation of (gender) regimes,  and 3. the place of the types 
of regulation in the analysis, for example in the regulation of gender 
relations.
In the literature, there are well-known distinctions between corpo-
ratism and liberalism (Crouch 1982), liberal market and coordinated 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001) and institutionally thin and thick 
societies (Streeck 1992). Walby (2007, 13) says that capitalist produc-
tion regimes differ on series of a dimensions, and many dualities need 
still further subdivisions (for example corporatism or the nature of 
regulating institutions). In the case of ‘citizenship regimes’, the relevant 
institutions are both the offi cial institutions supporting the democratic 
system and also the socio-political institutions regulating the use of 
citizenship rights. Also Streeck’s (1992, 37) distinction between in-
stitutionally thick and thin societies can be relevant in the analysis of 
citizenship regimes. Still, in the case of associations as institutions we 
must notice that there is a danger of tautological explanations.
Our analysis does not move on the level of regulation of organiza-
tions and practices. However, we know well that welfare state regimes 
and the actual regulation differ a lot. Walby’s idea of the move from 
domestic to public formation of welfare and gender relations can have 
analogical use in the sphere of citizenship analysis. A good example 
regarding the regulations related to the gender regimes is the com-
   179
parative analysis of Lenz (2007) that unites the levels of nation-state, 
European Union and UN and the global structure. In the work of the 
research group mentioned above, globalization forms a highly impor-
tant context. For example, the background for Lenz’ analysis is the 
‘magic triangle’ of Altvater and Mahnkopf (2000; Lenz 2007, 111). 
In Altvater’s and Mahnkopf ’s model the levels and codes relevant for 
research are supranational organizations/nation states with the code of 
power and decision-making, transnational corporations following the 
code of the market, and civil society following the code of negotiation 
and communication. The levels presented above are analogous to an 
extent with the conceptual differentiation of citizenship. ‘Cosmopolitan 
citizenship’ (Delanty 2000) comes to the level of supranational organiza-
tions. The global companies use and are also benchmarking corporate 
citizenship (Sklair 2001) and the civil society with the concept of ‘civil’ 
as the root of citizenship.
The comparative analysis of Lenz (2007) shows among other things 
the difference between German corporate capitalism and Japanese hy-
brid corporate capitalism. In the German case the level of nation-state 
is dominant. In the case of Japan, corporatism works at the enterprise 
level. The other example is the US which is totally separated from inter-
national regulation of UN and other bodies concerning global equality 
norms and gender regulations. Both examples are as such relevant for 
comparative citizenship analysis. More generally, the example refers to 
the need of clearly defi ned multi-level analysis, which also understands 
the different codes used in different sectors. In relation to our book 
this is mainly the next step of citizenship research.
What are we actually doing when trying to fi nd the differentiation 
of social and political participation according to regimes or systems? 
Let’s start once more from the basics. The conceptual background 
of our analysis is formed by the types of capitalism and the welfare 
regimes. In addition, some differentiating features of political system 
like the degrees of statism and the degree in corporateness (in earlier 
typology, page 176) and also the nature of civil society and its relation 
to the state and politics must be considered.
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Let’s go back to the original presentations of Boyer and Esping-
Andersen. The basis of Boyer’s classifi cation for types of capitalism 
are the distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional 
characteristics and adjustments, and the consequential advantages and 
disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are ‘market-ori-
ented’ (USA, Canada and Britain), ‘Rhineland or corporatist’ (Germany, 
Japan), ‘statist’ (France, Italy) and ‘social democrat’ (Sweden, Austria) 
(Boyer 1997,90; table 4.6.).
The types or regimes in question are relatively stable and longer 
lasting and historically based on defi nite types of class relations, political 
structures and coalitions. They are not subject to immediate political 
changes or conjunctures. If they were, for example present Finland and 
Sweden with their right-wing governments would not be very good 
examples of social democratic regimes. Still, there remains the question 
of the possibility of change. To determine whether a regime shift has 
occurred or not, we must ask if the decisive factors have changed? 
The very basic structural conditions, forms of labour market rela-
tions that are dealt with in Boyer’s typology or de-commodifi cation of 
welfare in Esping-Andersen’s regimes have certainly changed. Labour 
market relations are more fragmented and insecure than earlier, and 
their mode of regulation is changing. In a similar way, the de-com-
modifi cation of welfare and welfare state has been under new pressures. 
(Julkunen 2001, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002.)
After seeing the obvious limits of regime analysis we can notice 
that in many ways our regime based analysis of social and political 
participation is also a test of the usefulness of “regime type” concepts 
in the analysis of the differentiation of countries.
One theoretical step closer to the Putnamian concept of (system 
integrative) concept of social capital could be found on the home fi eld 
of Putnam, from the American theory of sociological pluralism (Bent-
ley, Schattschneider, Lipset). In this tradition, the relation between the 
reproduction of the structures or inequality (class interest), the forms 
of voluntary organizing and political democracy are analysed in a way 
that could fi ll in some of the gaps found in Putnamian analyses (see 
Siisiäinen 2004b).
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The concepts of citizen and citizenship have many dimensions and 
aspects. The adequacy of regime analysis depends on what approach 
to citizenship we have. If we look at the regimes of social and political 
participation, the regime analysis is very limited.
If we take as example the means of participation scores by countries, 
the regime picture is unclear. The Nordic countries have scores between 
525 (Finland) and 551 (Denmark). At the top there is Canada (572) 
and New Zealand (567). USA is on the level of Nordic countries (550). 
But on the same level there are Austria, France, Australia, Germany, 
Netherlands Portugal and Uruguay, all between 520 and 550 scores. 
This tells that in non-associational participation there are no clear re-
gimes, at least regimes following the welfare – state typologies. At the 
bottom of the scale are earlier socialist countries Hungary (414) and 
Bulgaria (428) and Russia (438), and on the other hand some Asian and 
Latin American countries like Philippines (422) and Chile (433). The 
form of political system and political culture with the socio-economic 
development level of the country unite to form the background of the 
means of participation scores.
If we go to deeper analysis of social inequality of participation, 
the picture changes once more. The effects of social position on par-
ticipation are of top signifi cance. Measured by education, the social 
position has a clear effect on social and political participation in every 
country. The level of education and participation correlate positively 
in all countries. The correlation is highest in Germany and USA, and 
very clear also in Norway. The education has the lowest effect on par-
ticipation in Finland. Thereby Finland is also in this respect different 
than the other Nordic countries. It has higher social equality. The same 
kinds of results concern also the effects of gender and age on social and 
political participation (Siisiäinen & Blom 2008). 
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Figure 2. Participation by level of education
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The main conclusion from the analysis is that more educational 
equality is needed if we want to create a more democratic society in 
terms of social and political activity and possibilities to infl uence on 
social conditions. This concerns both associational activity and other 
forms of participation.
In taking into account associational membership as well as different 
forms of socio-political participation, we will clearly see that citizen-
ship is a cultural matter and that it is also strongly related to moral 
consciousness and to value related conceptions of good citizenship. All 
these aspects can be reasons and motives of action.
Finally it must be said that even now the core of any citizenship 
conception is citizenship rights. These rights are more or less related to 
other aspects of citizenship. As experienced matters or practical means 
they are central in the examination of citizenship. It can be added that 
in the times of economic crises as nowadays the signifi cance of rights 
acquire further importance.
In the formation of identity citizenship is important but there 
are also other factors which have the same or even bigger infl uence on 
identity than citizenship as such. A Finnish study based on the ISSP 
Citizenship data of the year 2005 show that the occupation and region 
has bigger infl uence on identity than the citizenship (Oinonen et al. 
2005). In other circumstances, the ethnicity, race, religion and also 
generation can be signifi cant in identity formation.
Our analysis gives results that have some wider signifi cance to 
the direction of the analysis of democracy and power, for example the 
differences in degrees of equality of participation between countries 
according to education, gender and age groups. The relatively clear dif-
ferentiation of countries according to the types of welfare regimes and 
the degree of statism and corporativeness as such is meaningful evidence 
about the wide scale of different socio-political possibilities. Secondly, 
the wide differences according to social position using education as 
the indicator tell that although the ordinary people’s real possibilities 
to infl uence political decisions are very limited everywhere, there are 
those who do not have those possibilities at all or only have them to 
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a very limited extent. Large parts of population have no possibilities 
to infl uence the society and politics, even though the assumptions of 
participatory concepts of democracy state differently. This is why the 
results are good evidence about the state of participation in different 
countries but relatively weak evidence about the state of democracy, 
power and hegemonic relations. Therefore it can be emphasized that 
research on participation cannot take place in a vacuum.
EU as a Political Entity?                                               
Cosmopolitical Convictions or Nationalist Thinking?
The citizenship model of Europe has experienced heavy transformations 
as well as signifi cant blows in the last few decades. The foundations of 
ideals of equal participation rights and welfare rights have been tried 
by different resource allocation battles. Also the rise of neo-liberalism 
has tended to reinforce differences instead of alleviating them. New 
Europeans, immigrants and members of new EU countries are often 
in a weaker position. The Nordic welfare model has suffered, especially 
in the recession-ridden 1990s to the point that some wonder if the 
paradise is already lost.
In Marshall’s model of citizenship, legal citizen rights were born 
fi rst, in the 17th and 18th centuries, political rights in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, and social rights in the 19th and 20th centuries. The institutions 
supporting citizens’ different basic rights, such as the parliament for 
political rights or the welfare state for social rights, followed the devel-
opment of principles defi ning them. Nowadays, cultural rights have also 
gained increased signifi cance in the globalized world (Pakulski 1997). 
The different categories of citizen rights have been dealt with in 
an uneven manner in this book. The more established legal rights have 
only been given fl eeting attention, while political rights have been 
discussed at length. A perspective that has repeatedly manifested itself 
is the dependence of the realization of political rights on social rights: 
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important political perceptions such as sense of political effi cacy are still 
unevenly distributed among different segments of societies. One could 
go as far as to state that all the other rights depend on the economic 
rights and social position. Because of the economic dependence, the 
concept of citizenship is always incomplete and impossible to realize 
in practice.
Some limitations to the realization of citizen rights have been 
brought about by globalization: the nation state, while still an im-
portant locus of political identity, has lost some of its signifi cance as 
the guarantor of citizen rights. These ideas resonate with the work of 
a number of contemporary writers such as Heater (2002) on ‘world 
citizenship’, Falk (1994) and Urry (2000,172-86) on ‘global citizen-
ship’, Hutchings and Dannreuther (1998) and their contributors on 
‘cosmopolitan citizenship’, Soysal (1994) on ‘post-national citizenship’, 
and Kaldor (2003) and Keane (2003) on ‘global civil society’ in that 
they see identifi cations, networking and mobility that crosses national 
borders as a force that is permanently going to change the way we 
conceptualize citizenship.
The most infl uential normative perspectives upon the ethical char-
acter of global civil society are liberal cosmopolitanism and nationalist 
thinking. Within international political theory, the main alternative 
to cosmopolitan arguments is usually regarded as provided by moral 
theories that call upon the continuing signifi cance of national bounda-
ries in relation to political community. 
These kinds of perspectives tend to drive us to see things as ei-
ther-or: either we have bonds with as well as obligations to others, 
irrespective of our nationality; or the nation-state defi nes our sense 
of political. Overcoming this dualism and seeing alternative notions 
of belonging, and of exercising rights and obligations is a remarkable 
challenge both for theoretical and empirical social research. In EU, 
divergent political cultures are wise to cherish diversity while looking 
for what unites us all.
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Appendix 1: ISSP 2004 Citizenship Basic Questionnaire
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Appendix 2: ISSP 2004 Data
ISSP 2004
ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) is a continuing pro-
gramme (since 1984/1985) of cross-national social science surveys 
conducted in ISSP member countries. At the moment, there are 45 
member countries. At the time of ISSP 2004 survey on Citizenship, 
38 countries were members:
Australia
Austria
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Flanders
France
Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland (Republic)
Israel
Japan
Latvia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela
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Sampling and data collection
ISSP surveys are based on national representative samples. Most coun-
tries employ samples between 1000 and 2000 respondents. The total 
size of ISSP 2004 sample is  52 550. Of the 38 countries that partici-
pated in ISSP 2004 survey, some followed slightly different sampling 
methods than others. Two countries, Brazil and Venezuela used quota 
procedures, and eight: Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Latvia, the Philippines, 
Russia, Spain and Uruguay, used substitution of different kinds. Finland 
and France had a lower age cut-off at 15 years, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and South Africa had a cut-off at 16 years; all other ember countries 
had a cut-off at 18 years of age. Six countries reported an upper age 
cut-off (Finland at 74, Flanders at 85, Latvia at 75, Norway and Sweden 
at 79, and Venezuela at 80.
Essentially the ISSP questionnaires are administered as face-to-
face interviews or in a self-completion format. The number of times 
that respondents were contacted varied from country to country; this 
contributes to differences in response rates, from 15% to 95%.
202
List of authors:
Annamari Konttinen
Lecturer
Centre for East Asian Studies
University of Turku, Finland
Antti Kouvo
Senior Fellow
Department of Sociology
University of Turku, Finland
Harri Melin
Professor
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
University of Tampere, Finland
Martti Siisiäinen
Professor
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Raimo Blom
Professor Emeritus
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
University of Tampere, Finland
Mikko Lagerspetz
Professor
Department of Sociology
Åbo Akademi University, Finland
